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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION fu~D BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
One of the principal intellectual forces in Europe 
during the final decade of the nineteenth century and 
the first decade and a half of the twentieth was that of 
international socialism. The international socialist 
movement appeared in the history of Western Civilization 
in the mid-nineteenth century and experienced its infancy 
and childhood in the form of the International Working 
Men's Association , or First International (1864-1876}. 
Its maturity seems to have been reached in the wake of 
the successful Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 with the 
founding of the Third International, or Comintern, and 
the expansion of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world 
under Soviet leadership. The period between these two 
phases, the adolescence of international socialism, was 
the period of the Second International (1889-1914 ). Dur-
ing this time the socialist movement built upon its ear-
lier foundations and became a significant social and po -
litical force in almost every European nation. In its 
new-found strength it attempted a renewed effort at 
1 
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international cooperation in meeting the issues which 
stood before it . One of these issues, which became in-
creasingly important as 1914 approached, was that of 
militarism and war . The Second International declared 
itself to be unequivocally opposed to the cause of mili -
tarism and joined the ranks of those groups trying to 
avert the outbreak of international conflict. 
At the same time the Second International was mark-
ing the development of international socialism in western 
Europe, the Russian revolutionary socialist movement was 
growing within the tsarist empire and among its exiles. 
While this Russian movement was developing the strength 
that would allow it to overthrow the tsarist regime, it 
was also participating in the international socialist 
movement of its own age, the Second International . 
There has been no attempt to trace systematically 
the interrelationship between these two important move-
ments, i . e . , the international socialist movement of the 
Second International and the Russian Radical movements 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . 
The author has been able to find only two scholarly at-
tempts to evaluate this relationship , one consisting of 
but two paragraphs and the other but a single sentence. 1 
lG. D.H. Cole, The Second International, Vol . III: 
A History of Socialist Thought (London: acmillan & Co . 
Ltd . , 1956), Part I, pp . xii, 393; Stanley w. Page, Lenin 
and World Revolution (New York : New York University 
Press, 1959), p . 22 . Both of these items will be discussed 
in connection with the author ' s evaluation. 
To remedy this situation is the task of this disserta-
tion . 
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Modern socialism began its development in the minds 
of the Utopian Socialists of the early nineteenth cen-
tury . Many men who were dissatisfied with society as 
they experienced it became enamored with their visions 
of an ideal socialist order . Few , however, went beyond 
the belief that this or that Utopian vision would conquer 
the world by virtue of its own power once it was dis-
covered . In the mid-nineteenth century I:iarx and Engels 
declared that this era of socialism had come to an end . 
They proclaimed a doctrine which was "scientific," i . e ., 
which placed socialism on "a real basis . " At the founda-
tion of their thought was a materialist conception of 
history, stating that economics is the basis of all social 
structure and that the distribution of wealth and class 
structure in every society is determined by the means of 
production and exchange of goods . Building upon this 
foundation, they asserted that in the contemporary bour-
geois society the new productive forces had already out-
grown the capitalistic mode of using them, the result of 
an inevitable conflict . The resolution of this conflict 
comes with the seizure of political power by the growing 
proletarian class and the transformation of the means of 
production into state property. Through this revolution 
the proletariat will use the state to remold society in 
its image, to abolish class distinctions and to eventually 
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render the state unnecessary. Not realizing that theirs 
was possibly a greater dream than those of any of the 
Utopians, Marx and Engels began to herald this revealed 
truth to all the world. 
Marx participated in the founding of the First In tar-
national in 1864 in the hope that this organization could 
strengthen the international labor movement and prepare 
it for the assumption of political power when the revolu-
tionary mov ement arrived. Although he was able to domi-
nate the General Council of the First International most 
of the time, the greater part of his energies were con-
sumed in the struggle with those who challenged his lead-
ership, especially Bakunin . This struggle was partially 
a conflict of ideas but primarily a contest for leader-
ship. The basic tenets of Marxism were never successfully 
challenged and tested in the First International. Vvhen 
the organization split into factional groups and eventu-
ally disintegrated, each faction went its separate way 
still believing it possessed the true understanding of 
things. The Se cond L~ternational was founded in 1889 
within the context of these continuing factional disputes. 
This time the Marxists and other So cialists believing in 
political action were on their guard against the Anarch-
ists and eliminated the threat they posed early. The 
goal of the Second International was the same as that en-
visioned by Marx for the First : the preparation of the 
labor movement for its revolutionary role. This goal was 
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based upon the acceptance of Marx ' s analysis of history 
and society as interpreted by his disciples in the late 
nineteenth century. There were other brands of Social-
ists in the Second International, but the dominant ele-
ment considered itself Marxian . 
Among the socialist groups considering themselves 
to be "scientific" were those developing within the 
Russian revolutionary movement at the very time the 
Second International came into being . Much of the ener-
gies of these early Russian Socialists were consumed in 
the establishment of their own movements and in competi-
tion with one another . As with virtually all revolution-
ary movements in the modern a ge, socialism developed pri -
marily in a national context . The nature of the national, 
political, economic, and social order attracted malcon-
tents to socialism . At the same time, the nature of the 
Russian socialist ideologies, which were either Populist, 
Ma rxist or a mixture of both, caused their adherents to 
identify themselves with the international socialist 
movement . The issues raised by the emergence of Russian 
socialism on the international scene bring the author, a 
student of Russian history, to this study . 
One of the underlying questions in a study of such 
a movement as the Second International is whether the 
movement lived up to the hopes of its founders . In ex-
amining Russian participation in the Second International 
the basic task will be to discern the role of t h e Russian 
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revolutionary movement in the fulfillment or lack of ful-
filLnent of the hopes of the founders of the Second Inter-
national . Such a study is apt to have several results 
significant to the student of Russian history . First of 
all, it vvill reveal the nature of the relationship of 
Russian socialism to the western European socialist move-
ment , with which it shared a common heritage . Socialism 
in the nineteenth century was an international phenomenon . 
Although there was a native Russian socialist tradition, 
modern Russian socialism inherited much from the Utopian 
and Ma rxian schools of the v est . The reading of Fourier 
and Saint-Simon, the lessons transmitted to Russia through 
such figures as Herzen and Plekhanov have fused native 
Russian socialism with that of the West. In participating 
in the Second International Russian Socialists associated 
with their socialist cousins . H.ha t was the nature of 
their relationship? This question is not relevant solely 
on the basis of Russian socialism ' s western heritage. It 
is instrumental in gaining an understanding of late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century revolutionary social-
ism . Russia was one of the Great Powers of this era . Her 
future was to have a great impact upon the history of the 
world, and the advance of Russian revolutionary socialism 
proved to be a primary factor in determining the course 
of Russia ' s future . The student of Russian history must 
ask whether the involvement of Russian Socialists in the 
Second International had any significant bearing on the 
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development of Russian socialism . If not, the triumph 
of socialism in Russia in 1917 must be regarded as es-
sentially a national phenomenon, although there are cer-
tainly other international factors to be considered . If 
Russian participation in the Second International did 
have an important bearing on Russian affairs, the Bol-
shevik revolution can be considered to be partial mani-
festation of international socialism. There is one fur-
ther major implication of the answers to these questions. 
In 1919 the Russian Soviet Communists emerge d as the 
leaders of a new international socialist organization . 
If the ties between the Russian Socialists and the Second 
Interna tional were close and meaningful, Russian leader-
ship of the Third International might be considered to be 
a continuation of this earlier relationship. On the other 
hand, if the role of the Russian Socialists in the Second 
International was relatively insignificant, this later 
international socialist activity must be considered in a 
different light . 
The Second International was one of the major in-
tellectual forces of its time in Europe . It was a fore-
runner of the significant and more successful international 
socialist movement that followed the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917 . Its leaders were some of the most outstanding 
politicians in their respective national parties and ex-
pressed their views on the major issues of the day. The 
importance of the Russian revolutionary movement of this 
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period lies not only in the degree to which it contri-
buted to the activities of the Second International, but 
also in the effect it had on Russia 's participation in 
World War I, in its contribution to the collapse of the 
tsarist regime and in the significance of the Soviet re-
gime which grew out of it. 
Several attempts have been made to record the history 
of the Second International, but there are only six sig-
nificant works known to the author which deal exclusively 
with this movement . There have been several volumes de-
voted to the consideration of all three Internationals, 
but these studies have usually emphasized the importance 
of the Third International and delt with the development 
of the Second International only as background material. 
The work of Patricia van der Esch1 is the most recently 
published, but it is extremely summary and little more 
2 than a pamphlet. The study of V. BushuffV, available only 
in Russian, is Leninist in emphasis and must be accepted 
cautiously . The same is true of the work of Joseph Lenz,3 
which in its translation from the German was the only ex-
tensive history of the Second International available to 
lpatricia van der Esch, La Deuxieme Internationale, 
1889-1923 (Paris: Li braire Marcel Ri v~re et Cie, 1957). 
2v. Bushuev , II Internatsional (Kiev: Chervony 
Shlakh , 1925). 
3Joseph Lenz, The Rise and Fall of the Second Inter-
national (New York: International Publishers, 1932) . 
9 
English readers until recent years. Roland Bauer 's book1 
is a Leninist work of a later vintage, its primary pur-
pose being to show that Lenin was the successor to ~mrx 
and Engels and that the Second International did follow 
his leadership. The author's bias is pronounced. This 
leaves the works of G. D. H. Cole2 and James Joll3 as the 
principal histories of the Second International upon which 
the student of this problem can rely to any degree. Both 
are attempts at honest scholarship and reflect little, if 
any, bias. Cole's work is by far the most extensive and 
presents more raw material . It has been written within 
the context of a greater history of modern socialism. 
Joll, however, includes analyses which are most valuable. 
All of these works refer to Russian participation in the 
Second International, but these references are never in-
elusive, nor is any effort made, with the exception of 
Cole, to evaluate the role of the Russian participants, 
individually or collectively. 
Studies of the Russian revolutionary and socialist 
movements are varied and numerous. The principal ones 
consulted are listed in the bibliography . These studies 
have been made essentially to shed light upon the back-
lRoland Bauer, Die II International, 1889-1915 
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1956). 
2 Cole, III. 
3James Joll, The Second International, 1889-1914 
Praeger , 1956). 
ground of the revolutionary movement in Russia and its 
successes in 1905 and 1917 . The author was unable to 
find one which concerned itself with the relationship 
of Russian Radicalism to international socialism . 
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The basic primary sources for this study have been 
the records and documents of the Se cond International . 
This has presented two problems . The only records avail-
able, with the exception of a few pamphlets and notices, 
are the minutes of the International Congresses and some 
of the reports submitted to them . The records of the 
International Socialist Bureau have been lost , so there 
are no minutes of its meetings or deliberations . The 
Congress minutes include only those matters brought to 
the floor of the Congresses and , in some cases , before 
their commissions . There is no direct record of the 
behind-the-scenes discussions, deliberations, and nego -
tiations, which , of course, would reveal the influence 
of the participants to a much greater de gree than the 
official record . The other problem is that all of these 
sources are not in English . The Congress minutes were 
printed, officially or unofficially, in German, French, 
and English . As the role of the English-speaking members 
of the Se cond International was relatively insignificant, 
few of their copies of the Congress minutes have survived, 
and most of the records are to be found in either French 
or German . Since the French and German factions were the 
most important in the Se cond International, many other 
sources are to be found in those languages . 
Background 
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The forerunner of the Second International was the 
International Working lvien ' s Association, or First Inter-
national, founded in London in 1864 through the joint 
efforts of representatives of the British and French 
trade unions and with the participation of various exiles 
from other parts of Europe who were living in London at 
the time . l Its activities should be kept in mind in any 
study of the Second International because the Se cond Inter-
national was a conscious effort to revive the First and 
looked to it for precedents that would aid in the govern-
ing of its activities . 
The idea of an international labor movement was 
probably first conceived by British trade unionists around 
1843, but only after several abortive attempts was a suc -
cessful organization founded in the 1860's . Utilizing 
contacts made in 1862 with French labor delegates to the 
L~ternational Exhibition in London, British trade unionists 
1The principal sources used for this summary of the 
First International were: G.D .H. Cole, ~.·.i.arxism and Anarch-
ism 1850-1890, Vol . II : A History of Socialist Thought 
(London: Ma cmillan & Co. Ltd., 1954), pp . 88- 212; R. N. 
Carew Hunt, The The or and Practice of Communism (London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1951 , pp . 102- 10 ; Raymond W. Postgate , 
The Workers' International (London: SWathmore Press , 1920); 
G. M. Stelkhoff, History of the First International (London: 
Wllirtin Lawrence Ltd ., 1928). Both Postgate and Stelkhoff 
are Communist in their perspe ctive . 
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made arrangements which l ed to the fotltlding meeting of 
the International Working Men ' s Association at St . Mar-
tin ' s Hall in September 1864 . In the beginning this or-
ganization was primarily a trade union enterprise , as 
neither France nor England had a political movement among 
the workers, despite their expressed political interests . 
As the British and French founders of the I.W. M. A. wanted 
to include representatives of like-minded groups from 
other countries, they invited some of the exiles living 
in London to participate in the proceedings . Among them 
was Karl lviarx, who thus was included in the movement from 
its inception . The founders represented several schools 
of thought -- Proudhonist , Syndicalist, Marxist-- but 
for the time being they put aside their differences in 
order to build a strong trade union movement free from 
factionalism . The inaugural address given by Marx re-
flected this desire for unity and solidarity among work-
ing men . 
It is difficult to ascertain the actual impact of 
the First International on the growth of the trade union 
movement . It was founded at a time when all of Europe 
was politically and socially restless . The 1860's saw a 
rapid growth of trade unions in some areas and an increase 
in the number of strikes, for which the International re-
ceived both the credit and the blame . VIhen each incident 
of growth or agitation is examined closely, however, it 
is diffic ult to say that it would not have occurred 
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without the encouragement of the International. The only 
concrete action that can be credited to the First Inter-
national is the collection of strike funds and the pre -
vention of the transporting of strike-breakers across 
national frontiers . Its power was always limited by the 
loose nature of its organization; and what power it did 
have was continually undermined by doctrinal disputes . 
The London Congress of 1864 was attended by dele gates 
from Great Britain, France, Belgium, and SWitzerland (Ge-
neva), plus t he exiles living in London . No direct repre-
sentative was sent from Germany. Marx had seen to it that 
none were invited, as they would have been Lassallians . 
The exile delegates from Poland and Italy soon dropped out . 
A General Council was established to preside over the Inter-
national . Its seat was to be in London . Th e course of 
the I .W. M.A. was set when the British trade unionists be-
came so absorbed in their domestic interests that they 
allowed the General Council, dominated by Jarxists, to 
represent the British labor movement . The Council hoped 
to hold the second Congress of the International in Bel-
gium, at which its constitution was to be ratified . How-
ever, new laws regulating the admission of foreigners 
caused the Council to postpone the ratification Congress 
for a year and to merely convene a small conference in Lon-
don in 1865 . 
Ratification of the International's constitution and 
statut~s did occur at the Geneva Congress of 1866 . There 
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was little difficulty in securing ratification, except 
when the majority of the French delegates attempted to 
exclude all but manual workers from membership in the 
International -- which would have excluded such middle -
class helpers as Marx . When this proposal was defeated, 
the French delegates tried to have the same restriction 
placed upon membership in the General Council, but their 
effort failed . The question of middle-class participa-
tion meant little to the British , but for the French its 
answer would determine whether their labor movement would 
remain essentially trade unionist or whether it would be-
come more politically oriented . 
At the Lausanne Congress of the following year the 
first indication of doctrinal cleavage became apparent . 
In connection with the discussion of every item on the 
agenda there appeared a division of opinion regarding the 
role to be played by the State . The Proudhonists and ex-
treme Syndicalists stood opposed to virtually all pro-
posed poli tical action and refused to regard the State as 
an instrument of the proletarian cause. The British 
trade unionists, the Iv..arxists and others saw that the 
State could be used to varying degrees to support their 
respective causes . The resolutions passed by the Con-
gress were usually ambiguous enough to satisfy all fac-
tions . This division made evident at Lausanne was only 
the prelude to further internal disorders. 
15 
The major crisis of the International had its be-
ginnings in 1868 with the admission of Bakunin and vari-
ous sections of his followers by the General Council. 
Iv:arx and Bakunin soon came into sharp conflict with one 
another over several issues, and this conflict was to 
dominate the remaining years of the First International 
and eventually spell its downfall . They differed con-
siderably in their personalities and perspectives . Al-
though both were unquestionably revolutionaries, Marx's 
essentially orderly mind was repulsed by the anarchism 
of Bakunin's call for unfettered destruction. In the 
same sense, 1.fJB.rx envisioned the International as exer-
cising some discipline over its member sections, while 
Bakunin championed complete autonomy of national move-
ments . Bakunin, like Proudhon, was opposed to the in-
stitution of the State in any form, while ~~rx antici -
pated the day when the new State would be in the hands 
of the workers . Finally, these two outstanding person-
alities differed as to whether they should collaborate 
with bourgeois movements to a necessary degree ( W~rx) or 
whether they should operate independently of them under _all 
circumstances (Bakunin) . Conflict over these issues in 
one form or another was to be the order of the day in the 
First International for the rest of its existence . 
This conflict did not emerge immediately at the 1868 
Congress in Brussels . Delegates of the host country held 
a majority at this Congress and had the final word on most 
16 
matters . The principal issue before the Congress was the 
question of collective ownership of the land, referred to 
it by the previous Congress. The Brussels gathering came 
out in favor not only of collective ownership of the land, 
but also of mines , means of pub lic transportation and com-
munication, and forests as we ll. This was not to mean 
State ownership and control, however, but collectivization 
through cooperative association supported by an organiza-
tion of mutual credit. It is significant that at this Con-
gress the International voiced its clear acceptance of the 
principle of socialization. 
The Basle Congress of 1869 was the most representa-
tive yet to be held and probably marked the apex of the 
International's influence . It was marked by Bakunin 's 
first personal appearance and open conflict between his 
views and those of Marx. Marx and Engels attended few of 
the Congresses of the I .W. M.A., N~rx feeling that his con-
trol of the General Council was sufficient to protect his 
interests and Engels being occupied elsewhere. Bakunin 
proposed the abolition of the institution of inheritance, 
feeling that he was thus attacking the State which pro-
tected the institution . 1~rx argued, through Eccarius, 
that it was a waste of time to attack the practice of in-
heritance, which was just a manifestation of the system of 
private property . The proposal of neither side received 
the majority support necessary to be binding upon the Inter-
national, although Bakunin's received more affirmative votes. 
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The other major issue before the Congress was the exten-
sion of the authority of the General Council . The author-
ity asked for was granted, with Bakunin ' s support . Later 
this very extended authority would be turned against 
Bakunin and his supporters . The extension of this author-
ity to the General Council was also significant because 
events prevented the convening of another Congress for 
three years . 
These events were conne cted with the Franco-Prussian 
War and, more specifically, with the Paris Commune . The 
war itself had weakened the International by forcing it 
to suspend its international congresses for the duration 
and by involving so many of its supporters in battle. 
The experience of the Commune drove the surviving French 
leaders of the International into exile and virtually 
destroyed the French working-class movement. This was 
of great consequence for the International because France, 
Paris in particular, had been the center of its activity . 
With the passage of the Reform Bill of 1867 the British 
trade unionists had become more and more involved in their 
own affairs and had steadily withdrawn from participating 
in the International . The Germans had never directly par-
ticipated due to the struggle between the 1Jarxists and the 
Lassallians and the le gal restrictions placed upon their 
activity. Therefore , it was the French who had been the 
principal active section . But with the downfall of the 
Commune the movement was destroyed and its leaders were 
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either killed, imprisoned, or dispersed in exile. The 
First International thus lost the bulwark of its strength. 
In the 1860's there were two centers in Europe be-
lieved to have active revolutionary possibilities. One 
was France. Here the revolutionary tradition was still 
the strongest in Europe, and it was obvious that the 
Second Empire was collapsing . But the defeat of the Paris 
Commune dimmed all hopes of a proletarian revolution in 
France . The other possibility was Great Britain, the most 
advanced capitalistic nation in the world and, therefore, 
according to fuarxist doctrine, the nearest to socialist 
revolution. But the concessions being received by the 
British worker through parliamentary legislation made it 
very unlikely that he would seriously turn to revolution . 
There were no other revolutionary possibilities in other 
European countries at this time due to either dissensions 
within the national movements , government regulation or 
the absence of a developed working- class movement, or com-
binations thereof . The period between the Basle Congress 
of 1869 and the Hague Congress of 1872 did see some in-
creased support of the International in Italy and Spain, 
but this growth was along Bakuninist lines, independent of 
the General Council, and, therefore, it did not really 
strengthen the international movement . 
At this time the conflict between Marx and Bakunin 
became overt . The basis of this conflict was the way in 
which they regarded the organization of the revolutionary 
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movement . Marx supported centralization and Bakunin took 
a definitely anti - authoritarian stand . In the disillusion-
ment following the defeat of the Paris Corr...rnune two inci-
dents occurred that made them personalize this conflict in 
the bitterest manner . The first was Bakunin's failure to 
complete the coilllilissioned Russian translation of the first 
volrune of Das Kapital and to return the advance he had re-
ceived when it became obvious that he would not complete 
the task. The situation was complicated by the activities 
of Sergei Nechaiev. This young Russian duped Bakunin into 
supporting him in a Russian revolutionary movement that 
did not exist and in the process took it upon himself to 
aid Bakunin in escaping the commission to translate Das 
Kapital by intimidating the publisher . \"fuen Marx, already 
strongly anti - Russian in his sentiments, heard of this, he 
was convinced that Bakunin was implicated in the publica-
tion of Nechaiev ' s notorious Revolutionary Catechism and 
was conspiring to destroy the International . Marx 's grow-
ing hostility toward Bakunin was fired by another Russian, 
Nicholas Utin, who had been a follower of Bakunin in Ge-
neva . Utin had broken with Bakunin and had applied for 
admission to the International . So vehement was Marx in 
his antagonism toward Bakunin that he overlooked Utin 's 
Russian origin and received much information from him with 
whi ch he tried to discredit Bakunin . At the International 
Conference held in London in 1871 Marx accused Bakunin of 
conspiring against the International, and the investigation 
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of his accusations consumed much valuable time that might 
have been spent more profitably studying the implications 
of the collapse of the Commune . The London Conference 
also instructed the workers in each country to form their 
own independent political parties. The absence of any 
substantial Bakunist representation allowed the resolution 
to be passed . It was inevitable that the Bakunists should 
challenge the right of this Conference to bind the un-
represented members of the International and that they 
would raise the issue at the next general Congress. 
The next Congress was convened at the Hague in 1872 . 
It was the last Congress of the I .W.M. A. at its full 
strength and the most representative of all, only the 
Italians, by their own choice, being absent . N~ny issues 
were to be debated before the Hague Congress, but they 
were all set aside as the delegates became involved in 
the struggle between Marx and Bakunin . As the rivals ap-
proached this Congress 1 arx still had a majority in the 
General Council, but it was a weakened majority . The set -
back suffered with the collapse of the Commune made 
Bakunin's arguments for decentralization now seem more 
appropriate . Marx was determined to expel Bakunin and 
his followers from the International and did everything 
he could to pack the Congress . He must have realized 
that he might destroy the International in doin g so, but 
he was evidently willing to do this rather than let it fall 
into · t he hands of his opponents . His move to transfer 
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the seat of the General Council to New York was an obvious 
effort to make the International ineffective when he re-
alized that he was not going to have his way . 1 The Bakunin-
ists were determined to prevent the International from con-
tinuing along its authoritarian lines . \fhen they realized 
that they were not going to have their way, they withdrew 
from the Hague Congress , repudiated it as an invalid 
gathering of the International , and established a rival 
Congress and General Council at Zurich. 
The Congress called by the New York General Council 
in 1873 turned out to be a farce . Even Marx had forsaken 
the International by this time , and within two or three 
years it passed from existence, except for a feeble attempt 
at revival in the United States . Its last conference was 
held in 1876 in Philadelphia with only one non-A~erican, a 
German, attending . The anti -authoritarian federalist Inter-
national continued to function through its final Congress 
in 1877. By the late 1870 ' s the First International was 
dead, as well as any other international movement that rep -
resented the main stream of socialist thought . 
* * * * * 
Although the modern Russian revolutionary and social-
ist movements can be traced back to the Decembrists of 
1825, the relevant background to Russian involvement in the 
1cole , II, 199-201 . 
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Second International begins with t he assassination of 
Alexander II in 1881. 1 The more extreme elements among 
the Russian terrorists hoped this event would touch off 
widespread mass uprisings. Their more moderate col-
leagues hoped it would alarm the government into grant-
ing liberal reforms. Both groups were sorely disappointed. 
The goverrunen t neither crumbled in the wake of popular 
1The unsuccessful efforts of the Narodnik movement in 
1873-74 caused some of its members to evaluate their fail-
ures and to form a secret society in 1877, "Land and Li ber-
ty" (Zemlya i Volya), through which they hoped to profit 
by their earlier mistakes . Their task was to agitate for 
social revolution. Terrorism was to be their chief weapon 
of self-defense. Their organization was to be more cen-
tralized than its predecessors. In the meantime, a new 
and better organized Narodnik movement had been attempted 
in 1876. It met with relative success in the Chigirin dis-
trict of the Kiev province, where over nine hundred peas-
ants pledged themselves to the cause of revolution, but it 
was exposed, resulting in mass arrests of its leaders. 
lv .. embers of "Land and Liberty" planned to retaliate with 
terrorism, but Vera Zasulich, acting somewhat independently, 
took the initiative by firing at General Trepov, the police 
commandant of St . Petersburg . She was tried, but the jury 
a cquitted her. Before the government could arrest her on 
administrative charges she fled from Russia. 
The "Land and Liberty" followed her examp le with a 
series of attacks on leading political officials, which 
only led to increased repression . This turn of events 
caused a division -to appear within the ranks of the organ-
ization between those who wanted to make the policy of 
terrorism more offensive and aim at the Tsar himself and 
those who wished to follow a more moderate course. In 
July, 1879, "Land and Liberty" was dissolved over this 
issue and split into two groups, "Black Partition" (Cherny 
Pered~l ) and "The People ' s Wi 11n (Narodnaya Vo lya) . The 
former was composed of moderates , whose program was based 
upon propaganda and non-political activity . It soon proved 
to be ineffective, and its principal leaders, G. v. Plek-
hanov and P . B. Akselrod, fled from Russia and were joined 
by Vera Zasulich in Switzerland. The latter group under-
took a systematic program of political assassination aimed 
at increasingly higher figures in the government until on 
Ma rch 1, 1881 (O.S.), Tsar Alexander II fell victim to one 
of their bombs . 
23 
revolt, nor was it intimidated into granting concessions. 
Rather, it retaliated with a new wave of repression that 
took away the leadership of the People's Will and the 
Black Partition . Thus decapitated, these malcontent 
groups felt extremely ~rustrated and helpless as they 
saw the regime resort to reactionary policies reminiscent 
of those of Nicholas I, as the masses revealed a contin-
ued absence of revolutionary spirit in their response to 
the loss of their "Little Father", and as scores of in-
tellectuals were alienated from the revolutionary move-
ment by its drastic action. The People's Will and Black 
Partition, which had never been strong, now began to wane , 
although the regime was not aware of this, as evidenced 
by its extreme efforts to organize the aristocracy in the 
defense of the tsardom. By the second half of the decade 
neither movement survived, although the name of the 
People 's 'Hill lived on in such independent groups as the 
one to whi ch the brothers of Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) and 
Josef Pilsudski belonged. 
Alt hough the spirit of the militant Populism of the 
People's Hill did not die with the collapse of its organ-
ized party, it was eventually replaced by another spirit 
as the leading force in radical thought, that of lv.a rxism. 
Bakunin ' s translation of The Communist r.:anifesto had 
reached Russia in the 1860's. A second edition, with a 
special preface by .:iarx, was published in 1882 . A Russian 
translation of the first volume of nas Kapital was issued 
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in 1872 and was passed by the tsarist censor, because he 
felt few would bother with such a weighty tome and those 
who did would not understand it. Both of these works had 
relatively wide circulation but made a negligible impact 
on radical thinking, as 'Iarx was seen as essentially a 
critic of capitalism . Those responsible for the serious 
acceptance of Iv:arxism among Russian revolutionary circles 
were the former leaders of the Black Partition, Plekhanov 
and Akselrod, who, along with Vera Zasulich, had fled to 
SWitzerland and become converted to the doctrines of ~~rx . 
~~ 1883 they formed a small group to be known as the 
"Ernancipa tion of Labor" ( Osvobozhdenie Truda). Plekhanov 
published two pamphlets in which he attempted to bring 
the implications of his new-found position to the Russian 
radicals. The first, Our Differences, pitted the Marxist 
tenets of the leadership of the industrial proletariat 
and the inevitability of capitalism against the Populist 
faith in the Russian peasantry and the village commune . 
The second, Socialism and the Political Struggle, argued 
that social and economic revolution must be accompanied 
by political revolution. Still the L::a.rxist position had 
little impact upon the Russian revolutionary mind, so 
firmly was its hope fixed on "the collectivist and eq_uali-
tarian tradition of the Russian folk . " Ignoring evidence 
to the contrary and encouraged by a more sympathetic atti -
tude on the part of Karl Marx himself, 1 most Russian 
1
cole, II, 301-302 . 
revolutionaries continued to adhere to their Populist 
ideology. Thus, there ensued in the 1880's and 1890's 
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an ideological duel between the few members of the Eman-
cipation of Labor in Geneva and their disciples in Russia, 
on one hand, and the defenders of Russian Populist social-
ism, on the other. As their debate centered essentially 
around the nature of Russia's economic future, it was con-
sidered harmless by the censors and was allowed to enter 
the Russian press . 
A historic turning point came with the famines of 
1891-92. Thirty million Russians were affected. PUblic 
opinion was jarred out of its apathy of the previous dec-
ade and forced to focus upon the problems of Russian so -
ciety, particularly those of the peasantry . The weak-
nesses of the Russian system were evident in the famine 
itself and in the failure of the regime to extend adequate 
relief. ~~en Nicholas II made it clear in 1895 that re-
form and constitutionalism were "senseless dreams" in his 
mind , Populists and lvJS.rxi sts a like renewed their deter-
mination to see the tsardom fall. However common their 
determination, their distinctively different perspectives 
remained. Those who considered themselves to be heirs 
of the Narodnik traditions looked forward to a popular 
revolution sparked by terrorist activity that would re-
sult in the founding of a socialist order based on Russia's 
indigenous heritage. The I' arxist s continued to decry the 
idea of depending on either intellectuals or peasants and 
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heralded the growing industrial proletariat as the in-
strument of Russia ' s salvation . Within the Radical camps 
fa c tionalism also began to appear . Jh 1895 B. N. I~ichev­
sky left Plekhanov's group and formed the League of Russian 
Social Democrats as a rival foreign center of Russian r,:arx-
ism . In 1898 it began to publish a journal, "The Workers' 
Cause'' (Rabocheye Dyelo) with Krichevsky, Aleksandr s . 
Martynov , later a leadin g Menshevik, and v. P. Akimov as 
editors . 
By this time the Populists had restored some degree 
of order to their thoughts and action. They, like the 
Marxists , lauded "the working class" as the sole force 
capable of destroying the old regime, but "the working 
classtt for them meant the Russian peasantry. The Popu-
lists also felt their socialism to be "scientific," but 
they saw little merit in the l arxist doctrines of Dialec -
tical Materialism, negating the role of the individual 
which was so much a part of the heritage of the Narodni-
chestvo and the People ' s Will . These elements began to 
call themselves "Socialist Revolutionaries" in order to 
be distinguished from the followers of So cial-democracy 
and to emphasize the militancy of their revived Populism . 
As the 1890's progressed the ~mrxists were able to 
make some advances within Russia . The workers in the 
country's infant industries began to express their dis-
satisfaction with the existing order with increasing fre -
quency , thus providing fertile fields for Marxist agitation . 
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Although gains in membership were not great at this time, 
:rv:arxist groups could be found in each of Russia's grow-
ing industrial centers . In 1898 an effort was made to 
unite these groups with the founding of the Russian Social 
Democrati c Labor Party . l The founders were arrested and 
imprisoned abnost immediately, but the event did indicate 
that the Russian revolutionary movement had come a long 
way from the intellectual circles of the 1860 's . 
Throughout this period Russian Radicalism renained 
largely outside the general international socialist move-
ment . From 1881 onward it was very difficult to organize 
any opposition to the autocracy . A mass movement was im-
possible in Russia; the revolutionary leaders had been 
either arrested or forced out of the country; only abroad, 
especially in Switzerland , were discussions about organi -
zation, doctrine, and political activity carried on with 
any degree of freedom . Not until 1905 did the Russian 
movement become an example to others; not until Oc tober 
1917 did Russian Marxists capture leadership of the inter-
national socialist movement . In the meantime Russian rev-
olutionaries received particular sympathy and respect for 
1 the dangers they braved . 
* * * * * 
The defeat of the Paris Commune and the dispersion 
of the French socialist leaders temporarily destroyed what 
1 Jo 11, 18 . 
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had been the strongest laboring movement in the First 
International and laid the way open for the destruction 
of the International itself on the rocks of the Marxist-
Bakuninist conflict . The German working men 's movement 
was the next strongest to that of the French at the time, 
but Bismarck's Anti -Socialist Laws and dissension between 
the Marxist and Lassallian factions prevented it from 
coming forward as the successor to French leadership, . 
despite the fact that it enjoyed a greater degree df 
unity and discipline than the French movement ever had. 
In 1875, as the First International was breathing its 
last breaths, the ~~rxist and Lassallxan factions buried 
their differences in a compromise program agreed upon at 
Gotha. As the years passed the Lasallians virtually dis-
appeared from the ranks of German socialism, but continued 
government repression prevented the now dominant Marxist 
element from taking advantage of its unrivalled position, 
and the Gotha compromise remained in effect. Then, in 
1890, the new Kaiser ndropped the pilot" Bismarck and re-
pealed the Anti- Socialist laws, leaving the way open for 
virtually unfettered socialist activity. The German 
Social Democratic Party convened immediately at Erfurt 
to draft a new program that would be strictly Marxist . 
The product of this meeting became known as the Erfurt 
Program and, along with Karl Kautsky's exposition of it, 
served as a model constitution for almost all European 
social-democratic parties up to 1914. 
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During the 1880's several social-democratic parties 
had been founded that now looked for leadership from the 
German Marxists in their strengthened position . Marxist 
parties were formed in Spain and Denmark in 1879. By 
1883 the Parti Ouvrier had been organized in France under 
the leadership of Jules Guesde. The same year saw the 
adoption of a Marxist program by Henry M. Hyndma.Il in Eng-
land and the founding of the Emancipation of Labor group 
by Plekhanov and Akselrod in exile in Geneva. Similar 
groups appeared in Norway, Austria, Switzerland, and 
SWeden . Anarchist elements were still strong in Italy, 
and a clearly Marxist party did not emerge there until 
1892 . A somewhat similar situation existed in the Nether-
lands, but Ferdinand D. Nieuwenhuis was in the process of 
forming a social-democratic party throughout the 1880's . 
All these groups were forced by circumstances to recognize 
to some degree the leadership of the Germa.Il interpreters 
of Marxism . The record of German social-democracy was too 
impressive to ignore . It had survived the repression of 
Bismarck 's policies, had been the first Marxist party to 
be organized on a truly national basis, and had also won 
substantial victories at the polls. The only areas where 
these claims to socialist leadership were not immediately 
recognized were : in the I.a tin countries, where Anarchism 
remained strong; in Great Britain , where the Fabians and 
moderate Socialists were becoming dominant; and in Eastern 
Europe , where the Populist traditions were still strong in 
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an area barely touched by the Industrial Revolution and 
where politica l conditions forced all revolutionary groups 
to retain an underground character . In western Europe, 
however, the German model presented a desirable pattern . 
Although socialism had lost none of its revolutionary 
goals , it had come to accept the conditions of elections 
and parliamentary campaigning. The Erfurt Program was 
designed to meet just such a situation. After endorsing 
the general socialist objectives calling for the destruc-
tion of the old order and the building of the new, it out-
lined an immediate program to be sought through legisla-
tive reform. Thus, the seeds of "reformism" were already 
planted, although at this time the call for in~ediate re-
forms was subordinated to the advocacy of the principles 
of socialism. The Possibilism of Paul Brousse in the 
French Party was considered to be unquestionably unortho-
dox, and the German Revisionism of Eduard Bernstein was 
yet unannounced . The Erfurt Program made a clearly 
Marxian analysis of society and history , despite the fact 
that available statistics repudiated ~rx's "iron law of 
wages," and advocated public ownership of the means of 
production as the sole remedy for the ills of the world. 
It clearly stated that the working- class could not 
"achieve the passing of the means of production into 
community- ownership without winning political power." 
However , in stressing the necessity of political action, 
it did not make clear whether it was to be revolutionary 
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or parliamentary. In this ambiguity the letter of Marx-
ist doctrine was upheld, but in its interpretation by 
the social-democratic parties of this period a clear dis-
tine tion was evident . Marx had recognized the need for 
legislative action as a preparatory stage to violent 
revolution leading to a dictatorship of the proletariat . 
The Erfurt Program made no mention of such a revolution 
or such a dictatorship . It made all its demands on the 
basis of anticipated parliamentary action . The German 
Social Democratic Party had gained its strength on such 
a basis. It is clear that deviation from Nia rx's original 
teachings had already taken place, although the drafters 
of the Erfurt Program would have been the last to admit it. 
It should be mentioned that two years af ter the form-
ation of the Erfurt Program the Belgian Labor Party, whose 
principal leader was Eduard Anseele, issued a program from 
Brussels that d1ffered from and rivalled the German pro-
gram on issues that were to be of grave concern to the 
socialist world in subsequent years . Stemming from con-
ditions unique to Belgium at the time, the Brussels Pro -
gram was more economically oriented, less centralist, and 
more concerned with allowing for diversity of organ ization 
and "free association." All these issues, especially the 
latter which was related to the trade union movement , 
would reach the floor of the Second International . 
By the end of the 1880's it seemed to many that 
socialism was more alive than ever . Social unrest was 
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steadily increasing with the extension of industrializa-
tion and the awakening of new economic and social poten-
tialities . All Europe was astir with the throbs of 
nationalism and imperialism . With the centennial year 
of the French Revolution approaching, it seemed most 
appropriate for socialist revolutionaries to rededicate 
themselves through the founding of a new International . 
CI-L~..PTER II 
TKE FOUNDING OF THE II lliTER.TIJAT IONAL 
Preliminary Steps 
The movement to revive the dissolved First Inter-
national , which culmina ted in the foundin g of the Second 
International in Paris in 1889, had many origins . In 
1877 the Ghent So ci alist Unity Congress was convened 
with the hope that an inclusive International might be 
reorganized. But the irreconcilable battle between the 
Anarchists and the advo cates of political action was re-
newed . It was this conflict that had wrecked the First 
International. Reali zing that reconciliation vvi th the 
An.ar chi st s was impossible, the majority at Ghent , vvhich 
favored political action , established their own Federal 
Bureau to summon a further Congress . Such a congress 
was held at Co ire, Switzerland , in 1881 , where it was 
decided that the time was not ripe for the establishment 
of a Second International, and the idea was indefinitely 
postponed , although not abandoned . Pavel B. Akselrod 
attended this conference as a fraternal dele gate repre-
t . R . 1 sen 1.ng ... uss1.a. 
l Co le, III, Part I, 2 . 
Pavel Bor i sovich Akselrod (1850-1928) was the son 
of a poor Jewish innkeeper . He was educated in Russian 
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During the 1880's several attempts to revive this 
idea developed simultaneously throughout the Western 
world . The German Social nemocratic movement was very 
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reluctant to support any revival of international social-
ism, especially if it did not take the initiative in the 
matter . Under the leadership of ~mrx and Engels the Ger-
man movement had learned a lesson from the failure of 
the First International and was not anxious to undertake 
a similar endeavor too soon . In reaction to two attempts 
on the life of Emperor Wilhelm I during the spring and 
early summer of 1878 Bismarckenacted the Anti-Socialist 
Law of October of that year . This law placed severe re-
strictions on socialist activity and was renewed regu-
larly until 1890 . German Socialists were therefore hesi-
tant to engage in any activity whi ch might incur the 
further wrath of the government and were hoping that a 
record of good conduct might result in a relaxation of 
Bismarek1·s anti- Socialist policy . Nevertheless , prompted 
by the urgings of Wilhelm Liebknecht, the concern for the 
public schools and, as a student, became involved in clan-
destine revolutionary activity . He was forced to emigrate 
to western Europe, where he became associated with a 
Bakuninist group, but he was also deeply impressed with 
the teachings of Lassalle while he was in Germany . When 
he returned to Russia he joined the Narodnichestvo and 
then the Cherny Peredel . Again he was forced to emigrate, 
this time to Switzerland, where he was one of the princi-
pal founders of the Marxian "Emancipation of La born group 
in 1883 . Due to his previous exile in western Europe, 
Akselrod was much more familiar with socialist organiza-
tions than Plekhanov, and the actual organization of the 
"Ernancipa tion of La bor1' might have been mainly his work. 
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formal revival of international socialist ties steadily 
increased within the German movement . Finally, at the 
Party Congress at St . Gallen in October, 1887, the de-
cision was reached that plans should be made for an inter-
national socialist congress . l 
Just one month earlier the same decision had been 
reached by the British trade unionists . Meeting at Swan-
sea the Trades Union Congress had declared itself in 
favor of an international conference to promote the cause 
of the eight -hour day . In November , 1888, a meeting was 
called by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union 
Congress to implement this decision . Seven foreign dele-
gates were present, including Brousse , the French Possi -
bilist , and Anseele from Belgium . 2 The Possibilists had 
already made two attempts during the eighties to revive 
the International . In 1883 and 1886 they had held con-
gresses in Paris attended by numerous foreign delegates . 
These congresses had accomplished little , but they had 
indicated a resp onse to the growing feeling that the 
various national labor movements ought to cooperate in 
their common concerns . By 1888 the cause of the eight -
hour day had been c learly linked with this feeling, and 
it was in this spirit that the London delegates voted to 
1Ibid . , 5; Joll, 27 . 
2Ibid ., 28 . 
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summon a full dress international congress for the follow-
ing year. 1 
Considerable confusion followed . The Germans balked 
when they heard of the Possibilist and Trades Union Con-
gress plans. Attempts were made to reconcile the Marx-
ists and Possibilists in order to present a united social-
ist front to the capitalist world, but to no avail. The 
Possibilists went through with their plans and on Mar ch 
11, 1889, announced that. an international socialist con-
gress would convene under their auspices in Paris on July 
14, the centennial anniversary of the storming of the 
Bastille. The Marxists reacted immediately and violently . 
Eduard Bernstein published a pamphlet, at Engel's insist-
ence, accusing the Possibilists of being agents of the 
bourgeois government . However , it was apparent that the 
Marxists were going to have to call a congress of their 
own if they wanted one . The Guesdists (French ~mrxists) 
immediately began to lay plans for a congress to rival 
that of the Possibilists. 
The Paris Congress of 1889 
When the historic quatorze de Juillet dawned on Paris 
in 1889 the final arrangements were being made in the meet-
ing halls of two international socialist congresses: the 
Po ssibilist Con gress in the Rue lancry and the Ma rxist 
1cole, III, Part I, 3. 
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Congress in the Salle Petrelle . In the Rue Lancry over 
600 delegates gathered, more than 500 of them French, 
while in the Salle Petrelle there were only 391 dele gates , 
of whom 221 were French . The Possibilist Congress re-
cei ved slight coverage in The Times, while the Marxist 
Congress was s carcely mentioned,l however, it was the 
latter that had the larger international representation . 2 
The Marxist Congress truly represented the main stream 
of European socialism at the time and was the more sue-
cessful of the two gatherings . From its deliberations 
the Second International was organized . 
The Marxist Congress met under a large banner which 
read "In the name of the Paris of 1848 and of Iviarch , 
April and lV.Jay of 1871, in the name of the France of 
Babeuf , Blanqui, and Valin, greetings to the socialist 
workers of both worlds . n3 But the organizers of this 
congress were unfamiliar with the techniques of running 
an international congress, so procedural difficulties 
arose almost immediately . No arrangements had been made 
for recording the proceedings or organiz ing the a genda. 
There was a group of vice- presidents and secretaries 
elected to aid in managing the congress , but their 
lThe Times (London) , July 18 , 1889 , p . 1 . 
2Twenty countries. 
3viilliam z. Foster, A Hi story of the Three Inter-
nationals (New York : International Publishers , 1955), 
p . 140. 
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responsibilities were not clearly understood . Among 
them was Peter Lavrov , the Narodnik delegate from Russia . 1 
The most pr essing issues were those concerned with who 
had the ri gh t to attend the congress and :What .., voting 
method should be followed . lavrov was also named to 
serve on the commission appointed to examine the dele -
gates' mandat es. 2 The solutions of these problems were 
further hampered by problems of translation, which was 
done by wha.ever might be :present and able . Transla-
tions were inevitably followed by disputes over their 
accuracy . There were regular outbursts from Anarchists, 
who frequently interrupted the proceedings with loud de-
nunciations of the Congress and its delegates before they 
could be bodily removed from the hall . The basic diffi -
culties were finally overcome by not being too strict in 
the evaluation of the delegates' mandates and by allow-
ing delegates to vote individually . 3 
lprotokoll des Internationalen rbeiter-Con resses 
zu Paris , abgehalten vom 14 bis 20 Juli 1889 w· rnberg: 
v:orlein & Comp ., 1890},p. 2 . It is not clear whether 
Lavrov was elected a vice- president or a secretary . 
eter Lavrovich Lavrov (1823-1900) was born of a 
wealthy landed family . He entered the army and rose to 
the rank of colonel, serving as professor of mathematics 
in the Artillery Academy in St . Petersburg . He became 
an advocate of agrarian socialism and joined the ~emlya 
i volya society . In 1866 he was tried by a military 
court for spreading subversive doctrines and was exiled 
to a remote section of northern Russia . His Historical 
Letters of 1868-69 became the gosp el of the Narodnichestvo. 
He escaped to western Europe in 1870, became 1ncreasingly 
influenced by Marxism and served the aris Commune . The 
rest of his days were spent as one of the leading social-
ist propagandists . 
2Ibid ., 5 . 3 Joll, 41 . 
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The second plenary session of the congress opened 
on Monday morning , July 15, with a roll call of the dele-
gates . Each name was greeted with a round of applause , 
and lavrov was among those receiving particularly enthusi-
astic ovations. The total number of delegates registered 
was 391. The Russian delegation was composed of six mem-
bers. Representing The Socialist , the organ of the So-
ciety of Russian Workers of Paris , was Peter I.avrov. 
Representing the Society of Russian Social Democracy was 
Geor~ Plekhanov . Three groups which were attached to 
the program of the Narodnaya Volya were represented by 
Jusef Beck (sic). Two other groups attached to the 
Russian delegation were the International Club for the 
Instruction of the Workers of London, represented by 
Phillip Kranz , and the Union of Jewish Workmen of New 
York , represented by Louis Miller and an emigre named 
Barsky . 1 The speaker 'for the day, Eduard Vaillant, then 
1Protokoll des Internationalen Arbeiter-Congresses 
• • • ' 131. 
Georgy Valentinovich Plekhanov (1857-1918) was the 
son of a minor landowner. Early in life he developed a 
sympathy for the lot of the peasant, which led him into 
the revolutionary movement and the Narodnichestvo while 
a student in St . Petersburg . He joined the Zemlya! 
volya, but was repulsed by its terrorist faction, the 
Narodnaya Volya, and formed a rival faction, the Cherny 
Peredel, whi ch advocated distribution of the land to the 
peasants without compensation . This group failed to sus-
tain itself, and Plekhanov fled to western Europe . He be-
came interested in the city worker as a revolutionary 
force in contrast to the peasant and was soon a confirmed 
Marxist . In 1883 he was one of the co-founders of the 
"Emancipation of Laborn group and became the leading ex-
ponent of Marxism among Russian exiles. 
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requested, in order to avoid any loss of time, the elec-
tion of a permanent bureau, which should be named from 
all the nations and should be a true representation of 
the Congress on a small scale . This request was unani-
mously accepted, and Lavrov was selected as Russia's 
representative on this bureau . 1 
The following afternoon the question of amalgamation 
with the Possibilists was raised . Unconditional union was 
rejected immediately . Wilhelm Liebknecht presented a reso-
lution declaring the necessity of proletarian unity and 
willingness to reach an agreement and unio~ with any group 
that would discipline itself to this unity . The resolu-
tion was passed by a vote of twelve to two, the Russian 
dele gat ion votin g for the resolution . The Possibilists, 
however, failed to respond satisfactorily. 2 
Two days had been consumed with the discussion of 
these procedural matters . The next three days were de-
voted to hearing reports from the various countries and 
groups represented . No effort was made to limit the num-
ber of reports, and the delegates patiently listened to 
those of the most insignificant groups, despite the fact 
that the most interesting reports had been given on the 
first day and early the second . Two reports were given 
1Ibid. ' 8 . 
2Lenz, 15; Protokoll des Internationalen Arbeiter-
Congresses ••• , 16, 23 .---
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for Russia: one by Lavrov, speaking in the name of the 
Narodnaya Volya, and one by Plekhanov , speaking for the 
lVIarxists. 1 Lavrov tried to report the position of social-
ism in Russian by summarizing the history of the nation 
back to Peter the Great . His speech was so professorial 
in tone and pedantic that some of the Anarchists became 
restless and began to demonstrate on the floor of the 
congress until they were evicted. Plekhanov's report was 
received more enthusiastically, and as he left the plat-
form he was applauded with a thundering ovation. He had 
denounced the Russian intelligentsia as the possible core 
of a revolutionary movement due to its separation from 
the people and had declared that "the Russian revolution 
will triumph as a workers ' revolution, or else it will 
not triumph at all ." This speech was soon circulated in 
the infant industrial centers of Russia and aroused inter-
est in the writings of 1arx and Las salle among the factory 
2 
workers . 
It was not until Saturday morning , July 20, the day 
before the Congress was scheduled to adjourn, that the 
delegates had time to turn their attention to the various 
issues that concerned them all. After more Anarchist dis-
turbances they fina lly began to discuss the question of 
libid., 31-36, 62-63 . 
2Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & co:: Inc., 1940), 368. 
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international codes for the protection of labor . It was 
clear to most of the delegates tha t such protection would 
have to come from existing governments and that the task 
of the Socialist was to pursue such political action 
necessary to get these governments to grant the desired 
reforms . Thus, at this first Congress of the Second 
International it was revealed that the international 
socialist movement was veering from "revolutionism" to 
"reformism . " Any consideration of practical political 
agitation within the present framework of society would 
indicate this, as the Anarchists were quick to point out . 
Jusef Beck also commented on the demands that were being 
made for le gal re gulation of labor, relating them to the 
Russian situation . He pointed out that the liveliest 
opposition to these demands would come from the bour geois 
class and the political administrations it controls . 
These bourgeois reactionary elements have alvvays received 
considerable support from Russian tsardom; therefore, it 
lies in the interest of all Socialists to foster the col-
lapse of the Russian autocracy as soon as possible, as 
well as that of those European goverrun.en ts wh ich collabor-
ate so closely with st . Petersburg . Due to the fact that 
Beck's time was limited, he refrained from citing the 
statistics he had on the development of capitalism and 
industrialization in Russia, but he did take time to point 
out the limited degree to which the Russian proletariat 
was organized . This speech was only sli ghtly related to 
the issues before the Congress at the time and was es-
sentially an appeal for international support of the 
Russian revolutionary movement .1 
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As a result of these discussions in the final days 
of the Congress , several resolutions on four principal 
topics were passed almost unanimously . There were reso -
lutions advocating an eight - hour day, improved working 
conditions and international labor legislation . The 
resolution on peace and war condemned standing armies, 
called for defense by a people 's militia, and declared 
that the advent of socialism would abolish war . Time 
did not allow for a full discussion of universal suffrage 
and the general strike as a means by which the vvorkers 
might achieve their ends . A French resolution proposed 
to endorse general strikes as "the beginning of the social-
ist revolution , " but it was rejected due to strong German 
opposition . A resolution was passed calling upon the 
workers to strive for universal suffrage if they did not 
have it . The final resolution declared May Day should 
be set aside as a day on which the workers should demon-
strate their solidarity and strength . In deference to 
the German reluc tance to make any forceful demonstration, 
the final statement of the resolution left its interpre-
tation up to the individual labor groups . ·The Russian 
. . 
1Protokoll des Internationalen Arbeiter-Congresses 
• ' 91- 96 . 
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delegation refrained from voting on this resolution, de-
claring that any such demonstration was impossible in 
Russia at that time. These resolutions were by no means 
final or definitive, and the topics concerned were dis-
cussed at almost every subsequent con gress . 
The Congress concluded with the laying of wreaths on 
the graves of the martyrs of the Commune and an evening 
party for the delegates . Many questions remained un-
answered regarding the future of international socialism, 
but one fact was certain: the Second International had 
been founded. 
The Brussels Congress of 1891 
The second congress of the revived International 
met in Brussels between the sixteenth and t·wenty-third 
of August in 1891. Fifteen nations were represented by 
337 delegates. There were no delegates from Russia at 
this congress, so Russian participation was limited to 
Lavrov ' s report, which was read at the afternoon session 
on l'.'~onday , August 16. This was the last major role the 
veteran revolutionary was to play in the history of the 
Second International. In his rather lengthy report Lavrov 
dramatically portrayed the plight of the socialist move-
ment in Russia . The nature of the autocracy prevented the 
organization of a legal socialist party . Russian social-
ism was revolutionary perforce. As such, Russian Social-
ists suffered all sorts of discrimination and martyrdom. 
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He also mentioned the persecutions suffered by the Jews 
in Russia , a topic which was of major concern to this 
Brussels Congress . But at the same time, Russian revolu-
tionaries were winning respect everywhere and gaining 
support throughout the world . The report concluded with 
Lavrov ' s assurance that the Russian Socialists were at 
the Congress in spirit and that they stood with the Social-
ists of all the world in their desire for the prompt eman-
cipation of labor . 1 
The delegates were encouraged by the success of the 
~ay Day celebrations staged since their last meeting, so 
they decided to make the practice an annual affair . Their 
rephrasing of the Paris resolution, however, indicated 
that the various groups were in no way agreed upon the 
interpretation of the celebration . In contrast to the 
French and American points of view, the Germans did not 
want this event to involve them in illegal strike action . 
They even presented a proposal, along with the British, 
to shift the day to the first Sunday in May to protect 
themselves from such a possibility . On the other hand, 
the significance of May Day was more sharply defined, as 
it was declared that the celebration was to have three 
principal objectives: a demand for the eight-hour day, 
pressure for labor legislation over a wide field, and a 
1congre s international ouvrier socialiste tenu a 
Bruxelles du 16 au 23 ao nt 1891 (~russels: Le secretariat 
Belge, 1893},20 .-- ----
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manifestation of the will of the workers for interna tional 
peace . This t hird objective was associated with the May 
Day tradition for the first time upon the initiative of 
the German Social Democrats, who were trying to make the 
celebration political as well as economic and t hereby di -
vert its emphasis from any line which might lead them into 
strike action . 
The Congress was considerably troubled over the trade 
union question . The dependence of the interna tional social-
ist movement on the support of t he national trade union 
groups was undeniable, and yet these groups seemed to be 
lacking in international consciousness . The trade unions 
considered the general strike to be the highest expression 
of working- class solidarity and tended to pla ce little re-
gard on the value of parliamentary victories, while the 
Congress was unanimously a greed upon the need for labor 
legislation . The trade unions continued to be hot - beds 
of anarchism, the influence which had been fatal to the 
First International . One of the purposes of this Brussels 
Congress was to heal the breach of 1889. Delegates of the 
two congresses of that year now sought admission to a 
single congress . Yet, among them were Anarchists from 
the trade unions, who would contribute nothing but con-
fusion to the general scene . Much precious time, espe-
cially during the first two days of meetings, was spent 
excluding these Anarchists from admission . Even with their 
exclusion and eviction , many of the seated dele gates were 
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sympathetic to their cause, and the problem would have to 
be faced again in subsequent congresses. 
Another significant issue was raised: the question 
of nationalism and anti - l:lemitism . This was at a time 
when nationalism was becoming one of the most powerful 
forces in world affairs and when anti-Semitism was becom-
ing an increasingly popular attitude, especially in Ger -
many and Austria . Yet the delegates to the Brussels Con-
gress voted that there was "no need" to take action upon 
these issues and "returned to the order of the day." 
The final issue of major importance discussed at 
Brussels was that of war and peace . This problem was of 
grave importance and yet intricately complex . It would 
reappear and take a place of increasing importance at 
subsequent congresses, until in its final years the 
raison d' ~ tre of the Second International seemed to be 
the consideration of this problem. Among the difficul-
ties for the Second International was the suspicion, 
openly expressed at Brussels, that some socialist groups, 
especially the Germans, were lacking in true international 
sentiment in regard to this question . 
The Congress adjourned with the Second International 
still somewhat uncertain concerning its composition and 
future . 
CHAPTER III 
THE SECOND INTERNATI ONAL IN OPERATION 
The Zurich Congress of 1893 
This third International Socialist Congress con-
vened in Zurich during the second week in August, 1893. 
Engels attended this congress of the Second Internation-
al, his first and only. appearance before it. The repeal 
of Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws had permitted him to 
return to Germany, where German delegates to the Congress 
had persuaded him to accompany them. While in Zurich he 
visited the house of Akselrod and met some of the Russian 
exiles. 1 Akselrod, however , did not go to the Congress, 
as Plekhanov was the sole Russian delegate. The actual 
nature of Plekhanov 's mandate is not clear from the re-
cord. At one place in the minutes of the Congress he is 
listed as representing "a secret organization 'The Ern.an-
cipation of Labor' in st . Petersburg ." 2 Plekhanov com-
mented on this statement of his mandate , and it is 
1vH lson, 337. 
2Protokoll des Internationalen Socialistischen 
Arbeiterkongressesin der 1'onhalle, ZUrich, ~ §. bis 12 
August 1893 (Zurich: Buchhandlung des Schweiz, Gr t-
li vereins, 1894), p . 13 . 
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probably the mandate which was presented when he sought 
official admission to the Congress . A later reference 
to Plekhanov mentions his mandate to be: "Petersburg , 
Russian Social Democratic Party •111 This statement was 
\ 
probably the work of a con gress secretary giving Plek-
hanov's supporters a more clearly defined status than 
they deserved . 
The delegates immediately were consumed in argu-
ments over the admission of certain elements, e . g . , An-
archists and German Socialists recently expelled fro m 
their own party . The latter received unexpected support 
from the British delega tion , which did not wish to see 
the lines of Socialist orthodoxy too closely drawn . The 
repeated presence of Anarchists before the doors of the 
congresses of the Second International continued to be a 
problem and had ramifications in another area, the Inter-
national's attitude toward trade unions . The trade unions 
did not.represent the Marxist ideology which was dominant 
in the International; yet the International was dependent 
upon the support of the trade unions if its own program 
was to have any chance of success . The touchy point of 
the situation lay in the fact that Anarchists and Syn-
dicalists used the trade unions as platforms for the dis-
semination of their propaganda . Anarchist and Syndicalist 
individuals and groups could be excluded from the Inter-
1Ibid . , 61. 
national, but if the much needed trade unions were ad-
mitted, as they had to be, these subversive elements 
were bound to be represented among them. Plekhanov 
joined in the condemnation of the Anarchists and made 
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special efforts to point out that his organization must 
not be suspected of being Anarchist just because it was 
secret. He attacked Anarchism both during and after the 
congress , but never really confronted the basic issue of 
the revolutionary role of the State . 1 In an effort to 
cope with this problem the following resolution was sub-
sequently passed at Zurich: 
All Trade Unions shall be admitted to the Con-
gress ; also those Socialist Parties and Organiza-
tions which recognize the necessity of the organiza-
tion of the workers and of political action. By 
'political action' is meant that the working-class 
organizations seek, in as far as possible, to use 
or conquer political rights and the machinery for 
furthering of the interests of t~e proletariat and 
the conquest of political power . 
Plekhanov cast the Russian delegation's vote in favor of 
this r eso lu tion . 
On the third day the congress got down to business . 
The topics on the agenda were familiar to any dele gate 
who had ever attended a socialist congress , national or 
international: the eight-hour day, the nature of r~Iay Day, 
the importance of political activity, and the socialist 
1 Bauer, 24 . 
2En glish version of the text quoted from Cole, III, 26. 
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response to militarism . With most of the French leaders 
absent because of the French election, Adler was the main 
protagonist for the cessation of work on May Day, while 
Bebel argued its i mpossibility in Germany. Adler , re-
porting on behalf of the commission , proposed that the 
Brussels resolution on May Day should be reaffirmed and 
strengthened by the following amendment: 
The Social Democrats of each nation have the 
duty to strive for the cessation of work on the first 
of May and to support every effort that is made in 
this direction in different places and by different 
organizations . 
Plekhanov's negative vote contributed to the defeat of this 
amendment . A second amendment proposed by Adler declared 
that the May Day d~1onstration should symbolize the desire 
of the international proletariat for peace as well as for 
improved conditions of labor . This amenfunent was passed 
with the support of the Russian vote . 1 
A major discussion arose around the issue of mili -
tarism and war when the commission on this topic reported 
on Wednesday afternoon, August 9. Plekhanov, as the re-
porter, read the Dutch resolution proposing that both a 
general strike and a military strike should be staged upon 
the outbreak of war . A German counter-resolution had been 
proposed endorsing the Brussels resolution and calling for 
proletarians the world over to oppose jingoism and to work 
lprotokoll des Internationalen Socialistischen 
Arbeiterkongress ••• , 36. 
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for the overthrow of capitalism ending the causes of war .1 
Plekhanov then presented his own argwnents for supporting 
the German proposal , although he quest ioned whether it 
should be called "the German resolution" because it simply 
reiterated the stand that had been taken by the Inter-
national at Brussels two years earlier. He went on to say 
that a general strike was impossible at that time because 
the proletariat did not possess the means to carry it out, 
and even if they did possess the means , they would already 
be in control of economic and political power and the 
strike would be unnecessary. He concluded his argument 
by declaring that both a general strike and a military 
strike would le ave the more highly developed nations of 
western Europe at the mercy of the Russian Cossacks. such 
strikes could be carried out only in nations where the 
workers' movement was strong. There was no such movement , 
to speak of, in Tsarist Russia, so if Nieuwenhuis ' pro-
posal was ever to be carried out, the natural result would 
be Cossack rule of al l of Europe . Bebel had declared in 
the Reichstag that in a war against Russian Tsarism he 
vwuld himself buckle on the sword . P lekhanov vigorously 
defended this attitude and went so far as to say that a 
German attack on Russia would be justifiable: "If the 
German army were to cross our frontiers, it would come 
liberating , as the French soldiers of the National 
1Ib id.' 20-21. 
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Convention entered Germany a century ago; as the con-
QUerors of the princes , they brought freedom to the 
people."1 The Dutch resolution was defeated by an over-
whelming majority . 
Despite these several Quarrels , an increasing com-
muni ty of opinion among the socialist leaders of' the 
Second International was coming into being . The Left-
wing , which was a minority , was satisfied by the revolu-
tionary slogans prevalent at every congress . At the same 
time the Right -wing majority was becoming aware of the 
vast possibilities for political action in the existing 
governments . The conflict between lv~arxist theory and 
this course of political action had not yet been per-
ceived by a siGnificant number of European Socialists . 
London Congress - 1896 
This fourth congress of the Second International met 
during the final week of July in ueen ' s Hall . It as 
the noisiest held so far ; however, its deliberations 
added very little, if anything , to socialist doctrine . 
Rather,·, it did reveal t wo significant truths about the 
international socialist movement: first, that there were 
broad differences within it , par ticularly between the Con-
tinental do cialists and their British hosts, and , secondly, 
that the socialist movement had achieved a de6ree of public 
libid., 29 . 
v 
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respectability . Both points can be illustrated by the 
threat of the British t r ade unionist president to sunwmn 
the police to subdue the Anarchist disturbances on the 
first day of meetings . 1 No Continental Socialist would 
have thought of calling the bourgeois police for assist -
ance , and yet , the very fact the threat was made at this 
congress indicates that the International was meeting 
within the content of a new sense of legality . 
As was to become the c ustom at most congresses of 
the Second International , on the day before the of ficial 
opening of the Congress a great public demonstration was 
staged . In this case the day was July 26 and the place 
was Hyde Park . Twelve unhitched wa gons served as speak-
ers ' platforms and were placed far enough ap art to allow 
a crowd to gather around each . Ea ch platform had its 
president or chairman an d its group of cpeakers . The 
principal theme of t he demonstration was international 
peace , but the speakers touched on almost every other 
topi c of socialist concern durin g the course of the after-
noon . ~vo Russians were among those sperucing : Felix 
Volkhovsky2 on platform number five and Georgy Plekhanov 
1 Joll , 74. 
2Felix Volkhovsky (1846-1914) , a right - wing S. R., 
who was to become an active counter- revolutionary after 
1914 . At the time of the London Congress he was living 
in exile in London and editing Free Russia , the organ 
of the En glish Society of the Friends of Russian Liberty . 
on platform number six . 1 On the same day the Russian 
delegation met at Beasly's Coffee House at 35 Little 
Newport Street , probably to verify their mandates . 2 
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Even before the delegates' credentials could be 
verified the Zurich resolution came before the Congress . 
After a series of speeches by those who f avored wide 
toleration of differences and those who desired a clearly 
defined membership, the voting took place, by nationali-
ties . The Russian dele ga tion voted with the majority to 
reaffirm the Zurich resolution and exclude the Anarchists . 
Nieuwenhuis had argued that Anarchist-Comn1unists, like 
Kropotkin , were good Socialists, even if some Anarchists 
were not . Kropotkin was present in London, desiring ad-
mission to the Congress1 and spoke to a mass meeting on 
the very day the Zurich resolution was reaffirmed . The 
majority of the dele gates, however, did not wan t to have 
anything to do with any shade of Anarchist and litera lly 
shouted Nieuwenhuis down . A British reporter rema r ke d 
that the Russian delegates did not participate in this 
lively debate because they didn't understand what was go-
in g on . 3 This was probably true to a degree, becaus e few 
1The Conference Record (London) , July 26, 1896 . 
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of the Russian delegates sent to the congresses of the 
Second International were qualified to keep up with the 
multi-lingual proceedings , particularly when the deliber-
ation became heated and confused . However, the Russian 
delegates no doubt knew what they were doing when they 
voted to exclude Anarchists from the Second International 
once and for all . The President of the session, Hyndman, 
ruled that it had already been decided that Anarchists 
should be excluded, and several of them were evicted . 
This occurred on the morning of the second day of the 
Congress . It was not until late that evening that all 
the permanent delegates were seated . 
Although the greatest delay had been caused by di-
vision within the French delegation, there was some 
trouble in seating the Russian delegat ion, and the record 
is not completely clear on just what happened . \ihen it 
came time to officially seat the Russian section, Plek-
hanov rose to represent trmt group . One observer stated 
that he received "the most cordial reception of any of 
the reporters . nl Plekhanov described the rapid growth 
of the So cial Democratic movement in Russia and declared 
that upon it the revolutionary hope of Russia rested . 
The Narodnik movement, according to Plekhanov' s report, 
was ineffective and out-dated, and he discounted the 
possibility of bringing influence upon the peasantry 
1The Daily Chronicle (London), July 29 , 1896, p. 4. 
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under existing conditions . The report concluded with a 
motion to seat those delegates whose mandates had been 
recognized by the majority of the Russian section it -
self . The German account of the proceedings cites the 
Russian report: 
Eight delegates were present , of which six repre-
sented the Social Democratic Labor Party; several 
workers' organizations in Russia were also repre-
sented , among them even the etersburg workers, 
the latest to take up the great struggle against 
tsarist oppression and capitalist development . 
One mandate had to be declared invalid, as it was 
not issued by a workers' organization, but only 
by a group of young ideological students in Berne , 
who , to be sure , edited a newspaper : The \lorker, 
behind which however stood no workers .~ 
Although the Russian motion was passed and seven delegates 
seated in the Russian section , the record is confused as 
to the number and identity of those rejected by the Russian 
section . 
The seven official delegates , their official resi-
dences , and their primary mandates were: 
Vera Zasulich , Iv~oscow , Emancipation of Labor League; 
Paul Akselrod, St . Petersburg , Emancipation of Labor 
League; George Plekhanov, St . Petersburg , Emancipa-
tion of Labor League ; D. Kolzov, St . Petersburg, 
Emancipation of Labor League; Rosalie Plekhanov , 
Ryazan , Emancipation of Labor League; Alexander 
dchmidt, Voznesensk, Social Democrati c Union; Iva~ 
Danilov, Nijni-Novgorod, Social Democratic Union . 
1verhandlungen und Beschlusse des Internationalen 
Socialistischen Arbeiter- und Gewerkschafts-Kon resses zu 
London vom 27 Juli bis 1 August 1 9 erlin: Vorwarts, 
1896)' p . 9 . 
2Justice (London) , July 30, 1896, p . 4. Vera 
Ivanovna Zasulich (1851- 1919) belonged to a family of the 
lesser gentry in a small rural village . She became asso ci -
ated with the Narodnichestvo and in 1869 was arrested and 
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It seems more than one mandate had been declared invalid. 
G. D. H. Cole cites as examples of those rejected by the 
Marxists: Felix Volkhovsky and Nikolai 'rs.haikovsky, 1 
but they are referred to nowhere else in connection with 
this incident. rrhe rejected dele gate from Berne was 
2 Charles Rappoport . In an article in the Labour Leader 
of August 8, 1896, Volkhovsky wrote an article criticiz-
ing Plekhanov's report . In it he declared the rejection 
of Rappoport to be unjust because the "young ideological 
students," referred to by P lekhanov, were actually r epre-
sentatives of a group of Russian Socialist Revolutionaries 
living abroad, who had many friends and co-workers in 
Russia . Another unjust rejection, accordin g to Volkhovsky, 
was that of Serebryankov, a representative of the old 
People's Will organization . Volkhovsky accused Plekhanov' s 
imprisoned for two years . Incensed by the treatment of 
imprisoned members of Zemlya i volya in 1878, she shot 
General Trepov . Her trial became an indictment of the 
regime, and she was acquitted by the civil jury. To escape 
subsequent arrest, she emigrated to Switzerland . By this 
time her thinking had become influenced by N~rxism, and 
she altered her earlier Populist position. She joined in 
the founding of the "Emancipation of Labor" group in 1883 
and became a symbol to the entire revolutionary movement 
due to her bold defiance of the Russian autocracy. 
1cole, III, Part I , 23 . .Nikolai Vasilievich 
Tchaikovsky (1850-1926), a right -wing S. R. , who was to be-
come an active counter-revolutionary after 1914 . 
2charles Rappoport (1865-1941) began his revolution-
ary activity as a member of the eople's Will, but in 1902 
joined the R. S . D. L.P . He then emi grated to France and de -
voted himself entirely to the French Socialist movement, 
first as a Guesdist and then as a socialist-reformist mem-
ber of the French Socialist Party . 
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entire report of being a plot to strengthen the position 
of Russian So cial-demo cracy by discrediting the other bona 
fide Russian revolutionary groups and by introducing in-
tolerance and partisanship into the question of representa-
tion in the Second International . Then Serebryankov tried 
to gain the floor at the Congress to protest Plekhanov 's 
assertions , but he was refused . Volkhovsky felt that the 
Congress accepted Plekhanov 's report in ignorance of the 
real state of affairs in Russia and unaware of the manner 
in which some of the members of the Russian section had 
been excluded . 1 Neverthe less, the Russian L ... arxists had 
their way , and after the delegation was officially seated 
it was requested that the Congress take note of the fact 
that for the first time in the history of the Second Inter-
national the Russian workers were directly represented . 2 
They did not exclude their rivals entirely, however , for 
later a letter of greeting was read to the Congress from 
Peter Lavrov in the name of the "Group of Old Adherents 
to the People 's Wi ll Party , " the group of Paris exiles 
that Serebryankov had tried to represent . 3 
1Augustin Hamon , Le socialisme et le Con res de 
Londres: e tude histori ue aris: Ancienne Librairie 
Tresse Stock, 1 97 , pp . 128, 247- 249 . 
2Thorne, 22 . 
3 . ' L ' or ganisation socialists et ouvr1ere en Europe , 
Amerique et Asie par le 3ecretariat international (Brus-
sels: Secretariat socialists international, 1904) , p . 16 . 
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Once all the permanent dele gates were seated the 
Congress turned to the business of hearing the reports 
of the Commissions whi ch had been appointed to consider 
matters of po l i cy . The deliberations of these corrunis-
sions were c onfusing , for even if the members could 
agre e on a general policy sta t ement , the varying cir -
cumstan ces i n t he di ffer en t countries made it almo st 
i mpossible to agree on a common course of ac t ion. Hence, 
t he Agr arian Commission a greed t ha t t he land should be 
social i ze d , but coul d not suggest the means to this goal . 
With the report of the Po l itical Action Commission the 
Dutch delegation under pro-Anarchist Nieuwenhuis with-
drew . There was considerable discussion of the report, 
particularly of its demand for political independence 
and condemnation of imperialism , but after the rejection 
of several amendments the report was accepted unaniln.ously . 
Vladimir Lenin , 1who was just be ginning his rise in 
Russian Social Democratic circles , expressed his satisfaction 
lvladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) (1870-1924) was born 
in the town of Simbirsk . He was the third of six children, 
his father being a schoolmaster and provincial superinten-
dent of schools and his mother the daughter of a doctor . 
Nothing in his family life indicates why he or his brother 
should have been attracted to the revolutionary cause . The 
execution of his brother for involvement in an attemp t on 
the life of Alexander III made a great impression on Lenin . 
He entered Iillzan University to study law in the year of his 
brother ' s death , only to be expelled in a few months for 
his participation in a student protest . With both his re-
cord and that of his brother hanging over him, Lenin had a 
difficult time being reinstated as a law student . Through 
the efforts of his mother he was allowed to re - enter Kazan 
and to take the law examinations at St . Petersburg in 1891 , 
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upon hearing of the a c tion taken by the London Congress 
on the nationality question: 
The Congress upholds the full right of self-
determination of all nations and expresses its sym-
pathy for the workers of every country now suffer -
ing under the yoke of military , national or other 
despotism • • • and calls upon the workers of these 
countries to join the ranks of the class- conscious 
workers of the entire world in order to fight •
1 
.. 
for the aims of international So cial Democracy . 
Among the resolutions left behind by the arrested members 
of the 1898 Congress of the Russian Social Democrati c 
Labor Party was one asserting the right of national self-
determination , whi ch was i nspired by the similar resolu-
tion of this London Congress of the Second International . 2 
The Education Commission report , presented by Sydney 
V.ebb , called for "a complete system of education under 
democratic control . " The Organization Commission proposed 
the establisrunent of a permanent organization, with a 
permanent International Committee , a responsible secretary 
and a fixed headquarters . London was named the seat of 
the International, but no further action was taken by the 
Congress . The vfar Commission affirmed tba t the basic 
whi ch he passed with honors . Already involved in karxist 
activity , he went through the motions of estab l ishing a 
law practice, but soon gave it up to spend all his tine 
among the St . Petersburg workers . L~ 1895 he went abroad 
and came into contact with Plekhanov and Akselrod . Upon 
his return to Russia the same year he was imprisoned and 
then sent to Siberia . 
lBertram D. Wolfe, Three Who :r,1ade a Revolution (Bos-
ton : Beacon Press , 1955) , p . 591 . 
2 Cole , III, Part I , 421. 
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causes of war were economic and advocated the abolition 
of standing armies and the establishment of a citizens' 
militia. Vfith some amendments, this report was accepted . 
The report of the Economic and Industrial Commission was 
very detailed and covered everything from "socialization 
of the means of production, transport, distribution, and 
exchange" to the nationalization of trade unions and 
their admission of women to membership . A minority re-
port was submitted calling for a study of the general 
strike, and although it was rejected in summary fashion, 
it inaugurated a debate on this question that was to oc-
cupy the Second International in the future. A Russian 
proposal was passed by the Congress declaring that hence-
forth the May Day demonstration should be at one and the 
same time a demonstration against militarism and for the 
eight-hour day . 1 There was no mention of the fact that 
this same action had been taken by the previous Congress . 
The final report was from the l~liscellaneous Commission, 
which was primarily concerned with civil rights . Since 
British Socialists and trade unionists served as chairmen 
for most of these commissions , they had a great deal to 
say concerning what issues should be discussed and, hence, 
the nature of the commission report . This British domi-
nation of the commissions resulted in the inclusion of 
many issues of particular interest to the British, e . g . , 
1Hamon, 167-68 . 
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universal suffrage , national self - determination, emanci-
pation of women, and education . The Continental delega-
tions tended to consider this to be provincialism on the 
part of the British , as many of them had not achieved 
the advanced parliamentarian role of British socialism 
and were not yet so greatly concerned with these issues . 
The Congress closed with provisions being outlined 
for the next international gathering , provisions which un-
questionably excluded Anarchists . 
CHAPTER IV 
REFOR1VIIS1'J AND REVISIONISM 
During the early years of the Second International 
the ~~rxian Social Democratic element was dominant. 
With time and success, however, the character of Social 
Democracy began to c hange from that of a revolutionary 
socialist movement to t ha t of a democratic socialist re-
form movement . Two historical facts about :C.iarxism should 
be kept in mind in seeking an understanding of this re-
vision of the original essentials of lilarxism. The first 
is t.ha t Marx himself contributed to the reformism of his 
followers. After the failure of 1848 Marx be gan to con-
centrate his thoughts on the building up of a strong 
labor movement that would be ready to promote its own 
interests vvhen cap italism crumbled . He began to give 
increasingly less attention to the nature of communism 
and to concentrate on his criticisms of capitalism and 
on encouraging the growth of the trade union movement. 
This encouragement was his aim in the First International. 
In followin g this course IvlB.rX played down the revolution-
ary aspect of his thought and prepared the way for hope 
in non-revolutionary means . The other fact whi ch par-
tially explains the many changes in the thinking of 
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western 'European lViarxists is that the Iv:!arxian analysis 
of society and capitalism was based on data found in the 
British Museum pertaining to industrial growth in the 
first half of the nineteenth century . As the century 
drew to a close conditions in western Europe began to 
belie some of Marx ' s conclusions and his disciples had 
to adjust their thoughts accordingly . This fact also 
explains to a degree why Russian Social Democrats re -
mained true to "orthodox N~rxi sm," because conditions 
in their industrially backward homeland still tended to 
validate Marx's original analysis in the minds of Russian 
Socialists . 
In light of this background the Social Democrats of 
western Europe began to find it necessary to adjust to 
the events of their time . Support received from unsus-
pected sources , a close collaboration with the trade 
unions, and the winning of political concessions caused 
them to modify their position . This condition was 
especially true of the German Social Democratic Party, 
where certain cultural traditions contributed further to 
this transformation . As the German Social Democratic 
Party had become the leading element in the Second Inter-
national , the change was felt there as well . The Bol-
sheviks of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the 
Bulgarian "Narrowtt Socialist Party, and the Dutch Lefts 
remained consistently to the Left and tried to organize 
a solid bloc to check the . accommodating Center and the 
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revisionist Right . Those who considered themselves to 
be "orthodox" l'darxists , e. g . , Bebel , Kautsky, and Plek-
hanov, prided themselves in their Marxist stands . How-
ever, they consistently showed tendencies which really 
placed them in the Center . Although they were always 
expressing their alarm over the threat of the Right, 
they tolerated a great number of revisionist moves, and 
men like Kautsky , Guesde, and Plekhanov never became 
post - 1917 Communists . 1 
The first indications of reformism and revisionism 
might be said to be the Second International's delibera-
tions over May Day . The desire to shift it to the first 
Sunday in ~~y and the final decision to leave the nature 
of the celebration to the national parties indicates a 
~2essening of the revolutionary spirit . The same might 
be said of the conflict with the Anarchists. Although 
there were basic ideological differences between the two 
schools of thought, the Social Democrats seldom brought 
them to the fore . Their basic objection to the Anarch-
ists seemed at times to be that they felt them to be too 
violent . The first major manifestation of this growing 
reformist tendency was the case of Millerand's partici-
pation in a bourgeois government in France. This incident 
was followed by the struggle in Germany between the Bern-
stein "Revisionists" and Bebel and Kautsky . In a sense 
1Foster, 154 . 
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the Bolshevik-lvienshevik split in the Russian Social Demo-
cratic Labor Party in 1903 was a phase of this general 
trend . 
The Formation of 
Russian Radical Organizations 
The final years of the nineteenth century saw within 
Russian revolutionary circles the formation of relatively 
united, organized and disciplined political parties . The 
first major step in t his direction came in 1898 when nine 
rather insignificant delegates from various So cial Demo-
crati c groups met in Minsk to hold what was to be considered 
the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor 
Party . All of the delegates were arrested almost immedi-
ately, and their newly-founded organization disappeared, 
leaving behind only a few resolutions. Nevertheless , the 
desire to found a centra l organ for Russian So cial Democracy 
was in the air, and with his release from exile in Siberia 
in 1900 Lenin took the lead in trying to accomplish this 
end. He consulted with various Marxists both within and 
outside of Russia and by the end of the year was able to 
issue the first number of Iskra. 
Iskra was to be a journal, essentially propagandistic , 
independent of any group control save that of its editorial 
board, which was representative of Russian Marxists of 
both the domestic (Lenin, Idartox , Aleksandr N. Potresov) 
and the exile variety (Plekhanov, Akselrod, Zasulich). 
This group stood definitely to the left of the Economists 
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and Legal Marxists and the Kri chevsky group in the spec-
trum of Russian Social Democracy . In 1901 Iskra was 
joined by a companion ideological journal , Zarya . The 
founding of Iskra precipitated further dissensions among 
Russian Marxists , and as the factionalism increased, so 
did the pressure to hold a full congress to settle matters . 
Lenin and the Iskra editors wanted to postpone such a 
gathering until the Economists could be eliminated and 
the Iskra group could control the situation . Factional 
pressures increased until a Second Congress of the Russian 
Social Democratic Labor Party was convened in London in 
July , 1903 , on a draft program prepared by Lenin and Plek-
hanov . On the eve of the Congress the struggle between 
the Iskra group and the Economists continued, the latter 
being encouraged by widespread industrial strikes . 
There were also increased indications of peasant un-
rest , which encouraged the Narodniki, or Socialist Revo l u-
tionaries as they called themselves , and caused them to 
be dist i nguished from the Social Democrats . In the mean -
time a loosely- knit Socialist Revolutionary Party was 
founded . Its origins are obscure, but it seems to have 
begun with a conference of Narodnik groups in 1898 , when 
a loose union was founded and a journal was started . 
Parallel movements started in other parts of the country . 
In 1900 a more widely representative secret congress de -
cided to establish a national Socialist Revolutionary 
Party. An Agrarian School for agitators was established 
and two delegates were sent to the Paris Con gress of the 
Second International . This wing of the Kussian revolu-
tionary movement had lost much of its support amon g the 
industrial workers , but led by intellectuals it cont inued 
to possess the loyalties of the artisans and wealthier 
peasants . The Socialist Revolutionary Party , or Social 
Revolutionary Party , as it came to be popularly known , ,; 
remained loosely organized, and its doctrines incorpor-
ated a wide range: a grarian socialism, decentralized ad-
ministration , moderate support of Zemstvo activity . It 
also had terrorist and Anarchist wings . 
The Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic 
Labor Party was plagued with disagreement and dissension . 
Nevertheless , certain major principles were affirmed amidst 
the tumult: the principle of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat as the stage following the socialist revolution, 
the principle of nationalization of all land as a goal of 
both the political and sociali st revolutions, and the 
principle of national self-determination . During the 
course of the discussion of these precepts there were two 
significant withdrawals of delegates . Five Bund delegates 
left the congress when they were not recognized as repre-
senting all Russian Jewish workers . Three other delegates 
walked out when the League of Russian Social Democrats was 
not recognized as the foreign section of the Party . These 
withdrawals were significant because they affected subse-
quent decisions . Although Lenin and Plekhanov lost by a 
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narrow vote to 1>.1.artov and Trotslcy in their efforts to 
have party membership defined on a narrow , disciplined 
basis , they were able , due to the departure of those 
delegates who would have opposed them, to get Zasuli ch , 
Akselrod and Potresov dropped from the Iskra editorial 
board , leaving themselves in a majori t y . Zasulich , 
Akselrod , and Trotsky , therefore , refused to have any-
thing to do with t he elections of the Central Comnittee 
of the Party , and a majority of Lenin ' s supporters were 
elected , gaining for themselves the name Bolsheviki. 
These steps toward disunity alarmed Plekhanov , who used 
his greater authority to reinstate the old crembers of 
the editorial board . This action c aused Lenin to resign, 
and his resignation made Iskra a l.lenshevik organ . The 
Central Committee remained Bo lshevik . 
For the next t wo years the Bo lsheviks and L:ensheviks 
engaged in a bitter controversy , each claiming to be the 
true representatives of Russian So cial Democracy . Both 
desired a Congress to settle the issue , but neither would 
attend such a gathering convened by the other . Bolshevik 
control of the Central Committee weakened , and Lenin 
founded a nev; Organizing Comrai ttee to c hallen ~;se the 
authority of the Central Corr.unittee . \ihile the tsardom 
staggered under the setbacks of the Husso - Japanese \fa r , 
Lenin c alled a full Bo l shevik Congress i n London in 1905 
and l aunched Vperyod to rival Iskra . The I~·~ensheviks vvere 
invited but staged their own rival congress in Geneva . 
By this ti~e the Revo l ution of 1905 had begun . 
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The Paris Congress of 1900 
This congress of the Second International convened 
in the aftermath of three national incidents and issues 
of strategic importance to the cause of international 
socialism: lVi illerand' s Reformism and his acceptance of 
an office in the Vlalde ck_rtousseau cabinet; Bernstein 's 
Revisionism and its condemnation by the German Party , 
although this issue had not yet made its full impact on 
the international socialist movement; and the stand taken 
by various French factions in r egard to the Dreyfus Affair. 
It was within the conte~t of the atmosphere of these issues 
that the delegates to the Paris Congress deliberated and 
made three notable accomplishments: they handled the 
crisis arising out of the lVlillerand affair in a seemingly 
satisfactory manner; they founded the International Social-
ist Bureau; and they reflected a degree of solidarity on 
certain issues that were soon to c ause a great deal of 
dissension. 
The Congress convened September 23, but it was not 
until after the usual amount of delay over the seating of 
the disunified French delegation that the delegates could 
turn to the above -mentioned matters . The delay was par-
ticularly embarrassing on this occasion as the French 
Socialist s were the hosts for the Congress. Russian 
socialism was represented by its largest delegation to 
date. Although all other sources declare that there were 
twenty-four members in the Russian section, the official 
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minutes of the Paris Congress quote delega te Danevich, 
who reported for the Russian delega tion on the valida-
tion of its credentials , as saying : 
In spite of the great difficulties which hinder 
the Russian labor movement , the Russians have been 
able to send twenty- three delegates and twenty-
nine mandates , of which nine are for the Revolu-
tionary Social Demo crati c Party, t we lve for the 
Jewish Bund , five for the Revolutionaries (sic)) 
thrie for the Social Revo l utionaries . 11 are va l-
id . 
There is no available l isting of the complete Russian 
section, but it included delegates Plekhanov, Zasulich , 
Akselrod, I~ichevsky , KOltsov , Danevich, oubanovich , 
Schitlovsky , Rappoport , and l..ia.ndelstam . 2 Krichevsky was 
nruaed president of the Russian section , and Plekhanov 
secretary , making them members of the International So-
cialist Bureau , organized later in the congress . At the 
first plenary session of the Congress on Sep tember 23 
they both rep or ted in the name of the Russi an section . 
Plekhanov reported that the working classes of ussia 
were consciously united with the world proletariat . 
\Jhereas it had been students who had begun the .rtussian 
international tenu a 
Compte rendu analytique 
de librairie et 
2Ibid . , 94l Bushuev, 3 5 . 1.artyn Nicolaevich l._andel-
stam (1872- J was one of the organizers of the first 
workers ' union in Iv:oscow in 1893 . For his activities he 
was exiled for five years . Upon his return he joined the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and was active at 
most of its congresses . 
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revolutionary movement , it was now the workers who were 
leading the struggle against despotism . Their goa l was 
not only economic emancipation, but the liberation of 
all people suffering the knout of the Russian aristocracy . 
To this Krichevsky added special greetings to the Congress 
from Russian, Jewish and Polish exiles who had celebrated 
Iv:ay Day in Siberia and from the workers of St . Peters-
burg . 1 These reports were so enthusiastically received 
that later in the year the International Socialist Bureau 
issued a call "To the Labor Parties of All Countries" to 
ratify a motion expressing sympathy for the cause of the 
Russian proletariat . 2 
The first major issue was that of I~dllerandism, and 
Kautsky was given the task of drafting a resolution that 
wcJuld soundly condemn ~-illerand' s participation in a bour-
geois government , but would not close the door on partici-
pa tionism entirely . .i:illerand had clearly been in the 
wrong in the eyes of most of the delegates in that he had 
accepted a cabinet post without consulting his party, and 
it was on these grounds that he was chastised . However , 
to follow the sentiments of the majority of the powerful 
German Party and condemn all forms of participationism 
1compte rendu st enograBhique non officiel de la 
~sion fran1aise du cinguieme Congr~s socialiste inter-
national tenu a Paris du 2 au 2 tembre 1900 (Paris: 
Suresnes , 1901 , pp . 22- 23 . 
2rnternational Socialist Review (Chic ago) , Vol. I , 
No . 12, June 1, 1901, pp . 795 - 94 . 
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would have forced a split in the French movement and 
jeopardized the unity of the International . Jaures had 
reluctantly supported Eillerand on the grounds that all 
must rally around the Republi c in ligh t of the crisis 
caused by the Dreyfus ffair . 
Plekhanov was a member of the commission on minis-
terialism which reviewed Kautsky ' s drafted resolution 
and after amending it referred it to the Congress . At 
his insistence the following qualifying amendment was 
attached to Kautsky ' s draft resolution . 
In any case , the Congress is of the opinion 
that, even in extreme cases , a 3ocialist must leave 
the ministry when the organized Party recognizes 
that the latter gives obvious proof of partiality 
in the struggle between capital and labor . 
This amendment was adopted in the comraission by a vote of 
twenty-four to four . 2 
The resolution was brought before the full Congress 
on the afternoon of September 27 , a day on which Plek-
hanov happened to be assisting the presiding officer 
Van Kol . Immediately, a rival resolution, which condemned 
ministerialism under any circumstances, was presented by 
Ferri and Guesde . Each national delegation was granted 
t wo votes . The Kautsky resolution was passed by a vote 
of twenty-nine to nine, with the Russian delegation divid-
ing its votes between the two resolutions. There is no 
lcompte rendu stenographique • • • , 102 . 
2van der Esch, 39 . 
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record of the exact nature of this split in the Russian 
delegation . Those voting for the Kautsky resolution 
must have been those delegates who followed Plekhanov . 
The supporters of the Ferri - Guesde resolution must have 
been Social Democrats who stood further to the right in 
their Marxism , since the .SOcialist Revolutionaries had 
withdrawn from participating in the Congress . 
On the same day that this action was taken there 
came before the Congress two minor i terns involving mem-
bers of the Russian delegation . When the morning session 
of September 27 had been opened , Chairman Van Kol proposed 
that a date and meeting place be set for the next Congress . 
The Austrian delegation suggested Vienna . Krichevsky 
gained the floor to state: 
I point out that if the Congress is held in 
Vienna, Russia c annot be represented by any delegate 
because of the reports of the police existing be-
tween Russia and Austria. That is vJhy I a sl\: that 
if the Congress does not want to prevent the Russian 
Socialists from being represented at the next Con-
gress , it must vote in favor of Amsterdam . ! 
No doubt the selection of Amsterdam was to some degree 
made in deference to the wishes of the Russian delegation . 
The other item came during the afternoon session when 
Secretary Furnemont took a few moments from the discussion 
on ministeria lism to read this letter addressed to the 
Congress: 
1compte rendu stenographique ••• , 144. 
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The delegates of the Russian Social Revolu-
tionary Union to the International Congress of 1900 
declare that after the Russian delegation refused 
to give a vote to the Social Revolutionaries and 
the representatives of the "People's 'Hill", united 
ad hoc, the delegates of the Social Revolutionary 
Union have not taken part in the vote of this dele-
gat ion and demands that the Congress take action . 
We declare at the same time that of the exist-
ing organizations in Russia and represented at the 
Con gress, the Social Democrats alone are represented 
in the International Secretariat . 
The letter was signed by delegates Schi tlovsky , Rappoport 
and hJ.8.ndelstam . 1 Evidently the Socialist Revolutionaries 
had sought a separate vote in the Russian delegation, 
where they were outnumbered by Social Democrats. The Con-
gress returned to the order of business without discussion 
of this matter . 
The next issue to be discussed was that of colonial 
imperialism . The resolution which was passed unanimously 
called upon every possible means to combat the colonial 
expansionist policies of the capitalist powers . It also 
called for the establishment of socialist parties in the 
colonial states . It is interesting to note that at the 
previous London Congress the British delegates of the 
Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour 
Party were divided upon this issue, but that by 1900 the 
South African war had consolidated their position . A few 
years later the German Social Democrats were to come to 
the defense of colonialism, and the Belgians and Dutch 
Socialists were to be divided over their attitudes toward 
libid . , 181. 
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the Congo and East Indies respe ctively . Hence, the matter 
was not closed as far as the International was concerned . 
Another commission was appointed to draft a resolu-
tion on the role of co- operatives , with Krichevsky as one 
of its members . Vfu en the commission ' s resolution reached 
the floor of the Congress, Krichevsky was one of its de-
fenders . He refuted the charge by dele ga te Lafargue that 
production co-operatives were dan gerous and should be 
labelled so in the resolution . He also reiterated wha t 
he had been insisting on in the commission, i . e . , that 
the final goa l of socialization of the means of produc-
tion should be stated in the resolution. He attempted to 
amend the resolution a ccordingly, but the amendment was 
rejected , while the draft resolution was passed .1 
In the debate on anti -militarism Rosa Luxemburg de-
clared that the final collapse of capitalism would pro-
bably not result from economic collapse, but more likely 
from the imperialistic rivalries of the great powers . 
Accordingly an anti-militarist resolution was presented 
calling for an all - out offensive against militarism in 
any form . This resolution was also passed with unanimity 
and with no realization that it would be on this issue 
that the Second International would eventually st~ble . 
The final session of the Congress opened with the 
introduction of the debate on the use of the general strike 
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as a tool against war . This issue was to occupy much of 
the International ' s time in the future . Br iand and the 
Left wing of the French delegation argued in favor of 
this function for the general strike , but chiefly as the 
beginning of a proletarian revolution . They were supported 
by the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries , evidently emerg-
ing from their self-imposed silence, and the Left wings of 
the Italian and Spanish delegations . The major ity still 
felt that the socialist organizations were not strong 
enough to conduct a general strike , so the weary delegates 
decided to table Briand ' s motion pending its discussion 
by their national parties . 
The other a ccomplishment of the Paris Congress was 
the resolution which led to the establishment of the Inter-
national Socialist Bureau the following year . Brussels 
was to be its seat , and Victor Serwy was named its first 
secretary . It was to include an International Committee 
composed of delegates from the national sections and an 
Inter -Parliamentary Commission . The International Com-
mittee was to select a Secretariat which was to act as 
the voice of the International between con gresses and was 
to implement the action taken by the congresses . The 
International Socialist Bureau was never any stronger than 
the Second International itself , but its influence steadily 
increased as it sought to preserve unity between the nation-
al groups and various factions . 
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The Amsterdam Congress of 1904 
The first meeting of the International Socialist 
Bureau was held on December 29 , 1901 . Russia was one of 
the twenty-one nations represented , her delegates being 
Krichevsky and/or Ple.khano v, who served as leaders of the 
Russian section at the Paris Congress vvhich had founded 
the Bureau . Secretary Serwy reported that among the 
several manifestoes issued during 1901 in the name of 
the Bureau there was one reporting the unrest present in 
Russian universities . The Russian delega te proposed that 
the Bureau issue a protest against the enslavement of Fin-
land by Russia . 1 A second bulletin on Russian affairs was 
issued in 1902 . It referred to continued tsarist oppres-
sion of the proletariat as verified by reports of working-
men ' s organizations and others, forwarded to the Inter -
national Socialist Bureau by its Russian delegates , Kri -
chevsky and Plekhanov . 2 Some time during this period 
I~ichevsky dropped his activities in the International . 
The last mention of his name as a delega te to the Bureau 
was on the report of the Russian Social Democratic Labor 
Party in mid -November, 1902 . 3 The next listing of the 
Russian dele gates to the Bureau was on the Bureau's in-
vitation to the Amsterdam Congress, issued after the 
1 rnternational Socialist Review, Vol . III, No . 8 , 
Feb . 1, 1903, pp . 482- 83 . 
2 Ibid ., Vol . III, No . 2 , Aug . 1, 1902, 86-88 . 
3L'organisation socialiste & ouviere ••• , 104 . 
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fourth meeting of the Bureau on February 7, 1904 . Plek-
1 hanov's name appears alone . 
At this fourth meeting of the Bureau another pro-
test was issued on behalf of the Russian Socialists . 
This one protested "the persecutions suffered by Russian 
Socialists in Germany at the hands of the poli ce and 
government . " It condemned the police of Germany for be-
coming instruments of ussian despotism by assisting in 
the arrest and extradition of these revolutionaries . At 
the same time it praised those German and Italian ocial -
ists who had interfered to thwart such arrests and called 
upon all Socialists to combat the spreading influence of 
tsardom . 2 
Then the sixth Congress of the econd International 
convenedJthe dominant spirit which permeated its deliber-
ations was the desire for unity, both within the Inter -
national and within its member groups . This desire made 
itself manifest as Revisionism replaced l,:illerandism as 
the cause celebre. By 1904 the writings of Bernstein 
had drawn the attention of the socialist world and had 
relegated Lillerand's actions of a few years before to a 
place of minor concern. 'ince the Paris Congress the 
1Aux organisations socialiste et ouvrieres (Brus-
sels: International Socialist Bureau, 1904) . 
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German Social Democratic Party had concerned itself to 
an increasing degree with the issue; until in 1903 at 
its Dresden Congress , it had condemned the Revisionist 
heresy, but in such a way as not to expel the Revision-
ists. The passage of this resolution meant that the 
German Party could come to Amsterdam having emerged vic-
tor ious over the elements of disunity. 
The Russian delegation to the Amsterdam Congress 
was a rather large one, consisting of forty-five members . 
There were thirty-one representatives of the Sociali st 
Revolutionary Party; six Social Democratic delegates, 
representing some forty-seven organizations ; and eight 
Jewish Bund members , representing twenty-seven organiza-
tions, fifty-six groups and 22,990 members . 1 For some 
reason the French edition of the minutes of the Congress 
listed only about half of the delegates and their man -
dates: 
General Council of the Socia l Democratic Labor Party: 
Plekhanov, Zasulich, Akselrod, Leo Deutsch, 
Feodor Dan 
Central Committee of the Social Democratic Labor Party: 
Friederich Rosin 
Russian Social Revolutionary Party, Foreign Committee: 
Roubanovich (sic) 
Committee of Odessa: Terechkovich 
Committee of Be loston, Nijni-Novgorod , ~fuscow , Pensa: 
0. lviinor 
Committee of Volyne: 
Committ ee of Kiev and 
Committ ee of Saratov: 
Ustinov 
Baku: Vera Gotz 
Gross 
lrnternationaler Sozialisten-Kon ress zu Amsterdam 
14 bis 20 August 1904 Berlin: Buchhandlung Vorwarts, 
19 04) ' p . 12 . 
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Committee of Tula , Agrarian Socialist League: 
E. Iazarev 
Groups from Chernigov , Berdichev, Tver: Gri gorovich 
Central Committee of the Social Revolutionary Party: 
Breshkovsky 
Committee of Ekaterinoslov and Vitebsk: Volkhovsky 
Committee of Smolensk, Ural and groups of school-
teachers of ~loscow and of Tula: Chickho 
Committee of I~arkov, Bryansk, Poltava, St . Peters-
burg , and Kursky: Rubanovic~ 
plus eight delegates of the Bund . 
Iliya Rubanovich, the leader of the large Socialist 
Revolutionary group in the Russian section, made one of 
his first appearances on the international socialist 
scene . At this Congress he attracted tile attention of 
many when he spoke at an open- air meeting, and in a few 
years Hyndman was to consider him the principal voice of 
lsixieme Congr~ s Socialiste International tenu a 
Amsterdam du 14 au 20 ao nt 1904: Com ete rendu anal tique 
Brussels: Seer tariat Socialiste International, 1904 , 
p . 12 . 
Ekaterina l~nstantinova Breshko- Breshkovsky (Cather-
ine Breshkovsky; 1844- 1934) was born in the Ukraine of a 
wealthy noble family . She became concerned with the wel-
fare of the Hussian peasant and left her home to spread 
revolutionary doctrine . In Kiev she became a follower of 
Bakunin, was arrested , imprisoned and sent to Siberia. 
Upon her release in 1896 she became identified with the 
growing Socialist Revolutionary movement . She returned 
from travelling in the u . s . to participate in the Revolu-
tion of 1905, was imprisoned and banished to Siberia for 
a second time, but was released by the Kerensky govern-
ment in 1917 . 
Fedor Ilich Dan (1871- )was a physician who had joined the Lea gue for the Emancipa t ion of Labor . He later 
became a member of the R. S. D. L.P . and a permanent member 
of the l:-lenshevik Central Commit tee . He was arrested and 
exiled several times, and after the Revolution of 1905 he 
aligned himself with the Ri ght Menshevik faction . 
Iliya Aldolfovich Rubanovich (1860- 1920) was a mem-
ber of the ocialist Revolutionary Party from its origins . 
He became a member of the International Socialist Bureau 
and resided in Paris , where he edited La Tribune Russe . 
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the Russian peasantry outside Russia . 1 Plekhanov was 
elected third vice- chairman of the Congress and was one 
of the auditors who presented a financial report to the 
Bureau. The slightly limping form of Vera Zasulich also 
attracted special attention at this Congress . She had 
become a familiar figure at socialist gatherings, and 
her brother General Zasuli ch had just been killed in the 
Russo - Japanese War . At this Congress , as at the previous 
one , the Jewish workers ' delegates in the Russian section 
demanded a separate voice , but their demand was rejected . 2 
The Congress opened with a plenary session on Sunday , 
August 14 , at whi ch a dramati c moment occurred involving 
Plekhanov . As a vi ce - president of the Congress, he 
shared the platform at this firs t session with Sen Katayama, 
another vice - president , and Van Kol, the presiding officer . 
The Russo - Japanese War was at its height at this time, and 
the Congress had named Plekhanov and Katayama honorary 
presidents of the Congress as a symbolic protest to the 
imperialist war . When the two met upon the platform Plek-
hanov enthusiastically seized Katayama's hand , and the 
delegates responded with rapturous cheers. There is 
scarcely a reporter of this Congress who fails to comment 
on the incident , whether it be N~x Beer , who appreciated 
lH . 11 . Hyndman , Further Reminiscences (London: Mac -
millan & Co . , Ltd ., 1912), p . 379 · 
2sixieme Congre s Socialiste, • • • 28. 
the symbolism of the gesture , or Daniel De Leon, who wel-
comed the break in Van Col's boring speech .1 lekhanov 
then addressed the Congress on the issues of the war . He 
declared that it wa s not the Russian people , but the 
Russian government that waged the war . The set-backs 
being experienced by the Russian forces revealed the true 
nature of tsardom's superficial strene th . The proletariat 
of the world would have no sympathy for it; only the con -
servative bourgeoisie that dealt with it "~ould care . In-
stead , the proletariat looked to the class struggle as 
"the cause of the liberation and progress of all mankind . " 
This declaration was greeted by great acclamation from 
the assembled delegates . 2 That afternoon a public meet -
ing took place in Linna us Park under open skies . In the 
four corners of the large field speakers' platforms in 
large wagons were erected , from which the speakers , in-
eluding Plekhanov and Rubanovich , addressed the crowds . 
At Amsterdam Bebel and Kautsky wanted to achieve 
the same degree of unity that their party had achieved at 
Dresden through the International ' s acceptance of the 
Dresden resolution, and in so doing , impose German leader-
ship upon the international movement . They felt they could 
lmx Beer, Fift Years of International Socialism 
(New York : Ivmcmillan Co ., 1935 , p . 125; Daniel De Leon, 
Flashli hts of the Amsterdam International Socialist Con-
gress New New ork Labor News Co . , 1929 , p . 43 . 
2Internationaler Sozialisten- Kongress zu Amsterdam 
• • • ' 10 . 
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count on the support of the Russian delegation, among 
others . Bernstein's revisionist theories had been intro-
duced in October, 1898, in a letter to the convention of 
the German So cial Democratic Party . He called for a "re-
vision" of lviarxist theory and advocated a "gradualist" 
approach to "socialism," including so cialist participation 
in bourgeois governmen ts. A struggle resulted within the 
German Party in which Bernstein was defeated with the 
passage of the Dresden resolution, which clearly condemned 
his views. Nevertheless, the struggle spread to other 
national groups and to the international movement . In 
Russia it was manifest in the Bolshevik-Iv1enshevik conflict. 
A crucial aspect of this issue was the insistence that al-
though Bernstein should be condenmed, unity must be main-
tained. Lenin felt that unity with the revisionists pre-
sented a danger, and during the crisis over this issue 
the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party became divided 
in 1903. Within the German Party Lenin's attitude was 
shared by Rosa Luxemburg, who had advocated the expulsion 
of Bernstein . Plekhanov had unofficially supported her , 
although he was to side with the 1\ ... ensheviks in the Russian 
struggle . Kautsky and Be bel thwarted her efforts, however, 
and preserved the unity of their party. 
At the .Amsterdam Congress the body that was to give 
preliminary study to this problem was the Commission on 
the International Rules of So cialist Poli cy, of which 
Plekhanov and Rubanovich were members . Both of these 
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Russian delegates part ic ipated vigorously in the dis -
cussion of the merits of the Dresden resolution . At the 
first meeting of the commission Rubanovich endorsed it 
in the name of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party . 
He declared that an approval of revisionism would be an 
abandonment of the socialist principles to which the 
Russian terrorist movement had always been sympathetic . 
He then pre sented an alternate form to the Dresden reso -
lution which prohibited a l l permanent alliances with 
bourgeois parties and all participation in bourgeois 
governments , but no a c tion was taken on it . 1 The follow -
ing day he reproached Jaure s for accusing him of recom-
mending tsarism to moderation . Rubanovich declared that 
this was a perversion of his words , that he had insisted 
upon the preservation of socialist principles, v~hich ex-
eluded any alliances with bourgeois elements for mutual 
policy and any socialist participation in bourgeois 
governments . 2 Pleldlanov was also a strong supporter of 
the Dresden resolution . The fruits of lvdllerandism in 
France had caused him to see the merits of a sharper con-
demnation of revisionism than was found in the Kautsky 
resolution of the previous Congress . Adler and Vander-
velde argued that the Dresden resolution contained certain 
lsixi eme Congre s Socialiste ••. , 138 . 
2Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Amsterdam 
• ' 62 . 
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passages whi ch would stigmatize Bernstein and his follow-
ers and threaten socialist unity. They, therefore, pro-
posed an amendment that would transform the Dresden reso -
lution into an endorsement of the Kautsky resolution. 
Plekhanov refuted their arguments by declaring that even 
with a microscope he could find no stigmatizing passages. 
He unleashed a sarcastic and satirical attack upon them, 
labelling their attitude one of "systematic doubt ." Le 
insisted that the resolution was im ersonal and dealt 
only with the logical applicat ions of socialist theory. 
Adler and Vandervelde replied that it was easy for lek-
hanov to talk about a unified party because he expelled 
from his party all those who disagreed with him . Jaures 
had said that if the Congress was to pass this resolution 
that would interfere in the factional disputes of the 
French Party , it should also interfere in the factional 
disputes in the Russian movement . lekhanov responded 
with the argument that the Russian situation was Quite 
a different matter , as no Russian revolutionary had sat 
in a minister's chair or bowed before the tsar. 1 
In the final stages of the discussion Anseele criti-
cized those minority groups in the International who op-
posed ministerialism , well knowing that no such op or-
tunity would.ever be presented to them in their countries 
1Ibid.' 64 . 
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due to the natures of their governrr1ents . Rosa Luxemburg 
rep lied with this s ta temen t : 
In the name of the Russian Social Democracy, 
the Polish Social Democracy, the Spanish ~iorkers' 
Party , and the Social Democratic Party of Japan, 
we protest this attempt to divide the members of 
the Congress into the active and passive and to 
form , so to speak , a European Concert of the great 
Socialist powers which alone has the right to de-
cide on the fundamental questions of international 
socialism . 
The statement was signed by Plekhanov, Luxemburg , Iglesias, 
Katayama , and Rakovsky . 1 
On the morning of August 19 Vandervelde reported to 
the Congress on the discussions of the Commission on 
International Rules of Socialist Policy . He mentioned 
the unsuccessful effort of Rubanovich to present an alter -
nate form to the Dresden resolution . The Adler-Vander-
velde amendment was then voted on by the Con gress . The 
Russian delegation cast its two votes against the amend-
1:1ent , and it failed by a tie vote of t\venty-one to twenty-
one . This tie vote probably reflected the true syrr~athies 
of the delegates toward the issue of revisionism . 2 Before 
the vote was taken on the Dresden resolution, a resolution 
was presented by Bebel, Troelstra, et al . calling for 
socialist unity and implying there were to be no e~~ulsions 
for those who would ac cept party and international dis-
cipline . Rubanovich immediately gained the floor to declare 
1Lenz , 64 . 
2Cole , III, Part I , 54 . 
that he "must abstain from voting, since in Russia an 
amalgamation with the Social Democratic Party is im-
possible at this time . nl The resolution was passed 
unanimously . In the spirit of this resolution the Inter-
national endorsed the Dresden resolution by a vote of 
twenty-five to five , with twelve abstentions . Generally 
speaking, those delegations most ardently supporting the 
endorsement, with the exception of Italy, were those 
representing nations where parliamentary traditions were 
relatively weak and where Socialists had little chance of 
obtaining political power . This group included the 
Russian delega tion , which cast both of its votes for the 
resolution . Those voting against the resolution tended 
to represent nations with stronger parliamentary tradi -
tions . 
At Amsterdam the issue of the general strike was 
raised again , with all its implications regarding the 
trade unions and the Anarchists . Henriette Roland-Holst, 
on behalf of the Dutch dele ga tion , p resented a resolution 
warning of the consequences of the instrument of the gen-
eral strike on the workers themselves and suggesting that 
an extensive strike in key industries might prove to be 
the better technique . Ustinov , a Russian Social Revolu-
tionary, supported the majority of the French delegation 
which opposed the resolution . 
• • 
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My party shares in the interpretation of the 
French on the general strike and will vote against 
the Dutch resolution, which is illusionary and 
utopian , because it constrains in advance every 
armed insurrection of the p eople as dangerous . We 
are of the opinion of Karl Marx, that knowing the 
required time and conditions , the weapon of criti- 1 
cism will be supported by the critic ism of weapons . 
later in the debate Roland-Holst referred to Ustinov ' s 
statement . Clara Zetkin translated his comments, but 
Ustinov objec ted to her translation of the comments about 
his statement . Clara Zetkin refuted Ustinov's accusation 
that she had made a false translation, and he received no 
satisfac tion . The resolution was carried by a vote of 
thirty-six to four , with three abstentions . If Ustinov's 
position was upheld by his fellow Socialist Revolution -
aries , the R~ssian vote should have been split , one for 
and one against the resolution . The record does not in-
dicate whether or not this was the case . 
The Congress also approved a somewhat controversial 
report embodying demands for unemployment, sickness, acci-
dent and old- age insurance . The British , Americ~~, and 
Spanish delegations and a faction of the French dele-
gation cast the only negative votes . A comprehensive 
resolution condemning imperialism and colonialism was 
unanimously passed , and it was decided to establish a 
Colonial Bureau in connection with the International So-
cialist Bureau to promote more liberal treatment of 
colonial peoples . 
llbid.' 28 . 
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Before the Congress adjourned the International 
Secretariat reported on its activities , some of whi ch 
were related to the Russian movement . It reported on 
the two manifestoes it had issued in 1901 and 1902, the 
first relating to the university troubles in Russia and 
the second protesting the enslavement of Finland by the 
tsarist government . In 1903 it had responded to the 
Kichinev massacres by issuing "an energetic protest 
against these outrages against hwnanity committed with 
the complicity of the Russian government . " Secretary 
Serwy also reported that when two ussian ocialists, 
Burtsev and Krakov, had been arrested in Geneva , the 
Secretariat had intervened with the Genevan government 
to prevent the surrender of the two outlaws to the tsar-
ist officials . The final report for the first six months 
of 1904 mentioned that a committee of Russian political 
refugees had petitioned the Bureau to rouse public opinion 
"against the odious pretentious of Russian absolutism . " 
The Secretariat also recognized as legitimate the Russian 
socialist journals 1skra , Rabochee ·nelo and La Tribune 
Russe . 1 The International Socialist Bureau submitted 
its financial report , declaring that the Russian section 
was among those assessed 200 francs annually and stating 
1Ra norts et ro ·ec ts de resolutions sur les ques-
tions de l ' ordre du ·our ar le Seer tariat socialiste 
international russels : Bureau socialist international , 
1904), PP • 11- 31 . 
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that since the last Congress its payments had been made 
in 1901 , 1902 and 1903 . 
The Amsterdrun Congress was often heralded for the 
degree of socialist unity achieved regarding the Dresden 
resolution, but this unity , both international and 
national , was deceptive . Continued intra-party conflicts 
illustrate this point . In addition, the continued inclu-
sion of dissident elements almost guaranteed further 
strife . The Russian movement was one of those which re -
sisted unification, except for a brief period following 
the Revolution of 1905 . However , since the Amsterdam 
Congress had passed a resolution declaring that in every 
country there should be only one socialist party, the 
Second International did become interested in the split 
in the Russian Social Democratic labor Party . 
In the summer of 1905 the Secretariat of the Inter-
national Socialist Bureau began its efforts to rew1ite 
the Russian Social Democratic labor Party . The develop-
ments that ensued also marked Lenin's emergence into the 
international socialist movement . On July 8, 1905, he 
replied to a letter sent from Brussels two days earlier 
by the Bureau which in some way still recognized Plekhanov 
as the representative of Russian Social Democracy on the 
Bureau . Lenin answered by pointing out that this was no 
longer the case, that in issue No . 101 of 1skra Plekhanov 
had stated that he could no longer remain the Party 's 
representative unless both factions wished it . The 
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question of Plekhanov's continued representation had been 
referred to the Central Co.mrnittee of the Farty, vJhich was 
still Bolshevik-dominated, and Lenin informed the Bureau 
that its decision was still pending . He then requested 
that until the question was decided all correspondence 
from the International Secretariat should be sent to him 
in Geneva •1 
The Secretariat of the Bureau , on July 9, offered to 
act as mediator between the Bolsheviks and lv.ensheviks at 
a conference of representatives of both factions . A simi-
lar offer had come from Bebel and the German Social Demo-
cratic Party . The Bolsheviks hesitated, as they believed 
both parties to be sympathetic to the 1.~.ensheviks . The 
offer of Bebel was eventually rejected outright, but since 
the Bureau had declared that only "moral influence" was to 
be brought to bear on the factions, Lenin gave its offer 
some consideration . On July 24 he replied to the Bureau 
by repudiating Plekhanov 's charge that the Third Party 
Congress had been convened "quite arbitrarily" by the 
Bolsheviks on the grounds that the Bolshevik-dominated 
Central Comlllittee was the legal governing group of the 
Party . Lenin went on to ask for a clarification of the 
Bureau 's offer to mediate . He wanted to know whether the 
Bureau's use of the term "interventiontt meant only 
1v. I . Lenin, Selected Letters, trans. & ed . Eliza-
beth Hill and Doris Mudie (New York : Harcourt , Brace 
and Co • , 19 3 7 ) , p • 2 40 • 
conciliatory mediation and advice having merely moral 
and not binding force or whether it meant a court of 
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arbitration. Lenin also inquired whether the Secretariat 
of the Bureau planned to submit the matter to the Bureau 
for final decision without the right of appeal . His con-
eluding remarks were a warning that the German papers 
from which the Bureau was getting its information regard-
ing the Russian split were pro-11.enshevik . 1 
No further development occurred for six weeks . Then 
on October 8 Lenin addressed a letter to the Central Com-
mittee of the Party . He notified it that the ~~1ensheviks 
had asked Plekhanov to represent them on the International 
Socialist Bureau . Feeling certain that he would agree, 
Lenin saw this as a good thing, because it would end 
Plekhanov 's neutrality , which he felt reflected poorly 
on the Bolsheviks . He declared that the thing to do was 
for the Bolsheviks to name a representative of their own . 
Then both factions would be represented separately on the 
Bureau, and the positions of each would be clear . Lenin 
suggested that Orlovsky be named, because "he knows 
languages, is a good speaker, and possesses dignity ." 
The Central Committee need not fear that it vwuld be 
relinguishing any of its authority with such an appoint-
ment . Most of the business of the Bureau was done in 
1v. I. Lenin, Collected Works (New York: Inter-
national Publishers , 1935-39), Vol . III, pp . 448-50 . 
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writing, which would give the Central Committee the op-
:portuni ty to weigh most of the decisions that would have 
to be made. As far as Lenin was concerned, representa-
tion on the Bureau was merely a formality. He concluded 
by citing the fact that Plekhanov had often delegated his 
representation on the Bureau to K6ltsov and no thing went 
wrong , even "though Ko ltsov is a good-for-nothing par -
liamentarian and in general an impossible, clumsy fellow."1 
On October 25 he wrote again to the Central Com-
mittee in response to their notification that he had been 
named as their delegate to the International Socialist 
Bureau. Lenin expressed his regret that his nominee Or-
lovsky had not been selected, but deferred discussion of 
that until he could meet with the Committee. He declared 
that he would write the Bureau that very day to inquire 
as to the date of its next meeting. 2 Actually, he did 
not pen his letter to t he Bureau until two days later. 
In it he acknowledged Huysm.an's letter, received on 
August 5, which stated that intervention of the Bureau 
into the affairs of the Russ ian Social Democratic Labor 
Party would be only for mora l effect. In light of this 
the Central Committee of the Party had voted to accept 
the Bureau 's mediation proposal and had na.rned Lenin, 
1olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher , The Bolsheviks 
and the Wor ld 'viar (Stanford University, Callf.: Stan-
ford University Press, 1940), p. 49. 
2Lenin, Selected Letters, 246-47. 
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Vasilev and Schmidt as its representatives . Lenin con-
eluded by stating that he would have to have at least 
three weeks notice of the date of the mediation confer-
ence , because, while he and Vasilev were in .SY.Ji tzerland, 
Schmidt was in Russia •1 As it was, the mediation con-
ference was never held , since the developments of the 
Revolution of 1905 precipitated direct negotiations be -
tween the Bolsheviks and l.~ensheviks and the calling of 
the "unifying congress" of the Party in April, 1906 . 
1Gankin and Fisher , 50 . 
CHAPTER V 
MILITARI 8rv.l AND THE THREAT OF HAR 
Developments in Russian Radicalism 
The Russian Revolution of 1905 was a source of great 
encouragement to the Russian revolutionary movement , but 
it was also cause for frustration . This frustration was 
evident in the diverse opinions regarding what subse~uent 
action should follow . At their April Congress the Bol-
sheviks took a strong anti -Menshevik stand, despite the 
degree of cooperation being practiced by the two factions 
in Russia . This c ooperation became increasingly importan t 
with the repression following the end of the October gen-
eral strike, and almost simultaneously the Bolshevik and 
Menshevik conferences decided to re-establish unity in the 
Social Democratic Labor Party . A "Unity Congress" met in 
Stockholm in April, 1906, and as its delega tes were 
elected by the rank-and- file membership rather than by 
local party committees , as Lenin would have preferred, 
the Bolsheviks found themselves in a minority . The sev-
eral differences between the two factions were in no way 
resolved . lenin was forced to accept Menshevik leadership 
for the time being , but he immediately be gan to plan to 
reverse the situation . 
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The Revolution of 1905, spontaneous and unexpected 
as it was , presented certain other problems to those 
radical groups advocating revolution for so long . They 
had little control over this revolt; they were decidedly 
hostile to the bourgeois parties that supported it; and 
they were skeptical about the Duma that was promised in 
the tsar ' s October Iv.ianifesto . These revolutionary parties 
were not at all satisfied with the events of 1905 and con -
tinued to advocate an armed uprising which would result 
in the institution of a Constituent Assembly . Despite 
these feelings , they had to dec ide what practical atti-
tude should be taken toward the forthcoming 1Jwna elections . 
Socialist Revolutionaries , Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike 
decided to boycott the elections and hoped that this action 
would result in the uprising they desired . 
This decision was made by the So cialist Revolution-
aries at their congress in January 1906, but the boycott 
failed at election time . Few of the peasant supporters 
of the Socialist Revolutionary Party were disciplined 
enough to follow the party ' s dictates , so they voted in 
great numbers . 1any , not finding a more radi cal faction 
on the ballot, voted for the Kadet candidates . Others 
ele cted Socialist Revolutionaries who did not feel bound 
by the decisions of the party . These delegates formed an 
unofficial faction of So cialist Revolutionary persuasion 
known as the Labor Group (Trudoviki) . 
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About this time factionalism began to plague the 
Socialist Revolutionaries . At their congress late in 
1906 a majority had voted to suspend terrorist activity 
due to the discredit it had brought upon the Party 
through the infiltration of agents provocateurs . The 
majority who accepted this position became known as the 
Minimalists, i . e ., agreeing to work for a minimum pro-
gram . Those who refused to give up terrorima and other 
forms of direct action , e . g ., theft , extortion, became 
known as the 1~aximalists . Since some Social Democrats 
had engaged in similar practices , short of assassination , 
their party experienced a similar debate . 
The Social Democrats determined their policy toward 
the Duma elections at the aforementioned "unifying con-
gress" in Stockholm in April , 1906 . The Bolshevik, l\1en-
shevik and Bund factions were temporarily drawn back to-
gether as a result of the developments of the previous 
year . Some elections had already taken place in which 
the Social Democratic Labor Party had taken no official 
part , although some Social Democrats had been elected. 
Elections had not yet taken place in the Caucasus, where 
the k enshevik wing of the party was strong . Hence, the 
congress voted to take an active part in these elections, 
and a number of Social Democrats were elected to the Duma . 
This con gress was dominated by a I~:enshevik majority . Hhen 
the next Social Democratic Labor Party congress met in 
London in 1907 the Bo lsheviks regained control of t he 
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Central Commit tee and once again adopted a strong anti -
liberal line , whi ch renewed the split with the hl.ensheviks . 
This development occurred after the First Duma was 
dissolved and in response to the calling of a Second Drnna. 
Hhen the Second Duma was proposed a special conference was 
called to determine what policy should be followed . The 
lviensheviks , in control of the Central Cornraittee, wanted 
to form a coalition with the 1Cadets . The Bolsheviks 
wanted to form a Left-wing coalition against both the 
Kadets and the autocracy. With these proposals in mind 
the Russian Social Democrats convened their Fifth Party 
Congress in London in 1907. The Bolsheviks slightly out-
numbered the lv~ensheviks this time, but the Poles , Latvians 
and Bundists held the sway . Generally speaking , the Bo l-
sheviks were able to gain the support of these groups . 
Their proposals received the majority of the votes cast, 
and they regained control of the Central Committee. Never-
theless, major differences of opinion were still evident 
between the factions, and Trotsky tried to warn the Party 
against running tovvard a split again . Those persons in 
the Social Democratic circles who vvanted to minimize il-
legal party activity and to concentrate on developing 
connection s v1ith the trade unions and co-operatives were 
known as "Liq_uidators . " 
The Revolution of 1905 caused the Bolshevik leader 
Lenin to alter his theories of revolution in such a way 
as to lead him further away from the position upheld by 
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the leaders of the Second International . The way in which 
the October ~~nifesto placated the Octobrists and Kadets 
made him change his theories concerning the alliance be-
tween the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the bourgeois 
revolution . Lenin had felt that the bourgeoisie, sparked 
by the proletariat , would be forced to oppose tsarism, 
but now they had joined with the tsarist forces to become 
counter- revolutionary . This could only mean that hence -
forth the two classes would be open enemies rather than 
temporary allies . Lenin eventually stated that the bour-
geoisie were bound to sell out to the tsarist regi me . 
This result had been only a possibility in his previous 
thought , not an inevitability. At the same time he was 
revising his attitude toward the revolutionary role of 
the peasantry. In 1905 the peasants joined with the pro -
letariat to place unforeseen pressures upon the tsarist 
re gime . Up to this time Lenin had compared the Russian 
peasantry to the conservative peasantry of ~/estern Europe 
and had discounted any role it might play in the revolu-
tion , save from the point of view that the peasants were 
potential urban proletarians . With this new development 
he changed his attitude . The peasantry took the place 
of the bourgeoisie as allies of the proletariat in the 
promotion of the bourgeois revolution . The concept of 
the nproletaria t" was broadened; in fact , the term was 
gradually dropped in favor of "workers'" "toilers' n 
etc •1 
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The rlevolution of 1905 had an impact upon the inter-
national socialist movement, even though the nussian posi-
tion calling for armed revolt ran counter to the general 
policies of the Second International . It tended to speed 
up the ideological differentiations within the ~nter-
national and the various parties and to cause differences 
of opinion to become more crystallized . The Russian neva-
lution of 1905 became a symbol of hope to those who felt 
themselves oppressed , and it put the Ri ght on the defen-
si ve. The Right became more conscious of the radical 
threat and more aggressive as it sought the support of 
the Center. The Left, on the other hand, saw new hope 
and began to organize its members with renewed fervor . 
Thus, this Russian development contributed to the accen-
tuation of the factional struggles that were to dominate 
the socialist movement in subsequent years . This can be 
seen particularly in the manner in which the Revolution 
of 1905 resulted in increased support for t he general 
strike . Inspired by the successes of the Russian strik-
ers, Rosa Luxemburg now chanpioned the general strike in 
the Second International, where it had always been re-
jected . In Austria a general strike was used to gain 
universal suffrage in 1907. The question of its use 
lAlfred G. keyer , Leninism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press , 1957) , pp . 120-128. 
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came to a head in the German Social Democratic Party at 
Jena in 1905 , where Bebel, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara 
Zetkin gave it renewed support . Despite vigorous opposi-
tion a resolution of limited endorsement of the mass 
political strike was passed . This act was ineffectual, 
because the next year Bebel and Kautsky agreed with the 
trade unions to abandon any support or discussion of 
the general strike . Thus, the enthusiasm for the general 
strike eventually waned and the leadership of the German 
Party, and conseQuently the Second International, passed 
more firmly into moderate hands . 1 
With the dissolution of the First and Second Dumas 
and the restrictions plac ed upon the Third and Fourth , 
the Russian socialist movement was once again forced 
underground , and the various parties withered as the 
revolutionary spirit of 1905 waned . Vii th the decline 
of mass agitation and with the presence of a strong hand 
on the tsarist hel.ril , the prospect of revolution faded . 
This situation prompted new disputes within the revolu-
tionary movement , and Russian Social Democracy in par-
ticular , as to what course to take . l.wst of the social-
ist leaders were again forced to emigrate and to suffer 
the inactivity of exile , a factor which contributed to 
their involvement in doctrinal bickering . From 1906 to 
1914 there was a long series of bitter doctrinal struggles 
1Foster , 195 - 199 · 
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on a multip licity of issues . No further congresses were 
held in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, only 
conferences, and by 1912 the Bolshevik-Menshevik split 
was final and complete . 
The Stuttgart Congress of 1907 
Between the Amsterdam and Stuttgart congresses sev-
eral historical events occurred that had great bearing 
upon the course taken by the delegates at the seventh 
congress of the Second International . The Russian Revolu-
tion of 1905 had failed to overthrow the tsarism, but , as 
has been pointed out, the important part played by mass 
strikes in this unsuccessful coup caused certain leftist 
elements to demand that the general strike be reconsidered 
as a political weapon . The Second International was drawn 
into the Russian Revolution of 1905 almost as soon as it 
began . The day after Bloody Sunday the International So -
cialist Bureau issued a manifesto condemning the massacre 
and predicting t hat the tsar , with the shooting of peace-
ful workers , had written his own death sentence .1 In 
April Father Gapon issued a call through the Secretariat 
of the Bureau for all Russian Socialists to unite, and 
there was some criticism leveled at the Bureau for asso -
ciating itself with Father Gapon . 2 The Bureau continued 
lThe International Socialist Review, V, Mar ch 1, 
1905' 5 9 . 
2Ibid ., June 1, 1905, 705 . 
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its concern for developments in Russia during 1906 by 
issuing a bulletin of protest following the dissolution 
of the First Duma and calling upon the "laborers of all 
countries" to prevent the tsarist government from 
strengthening its financial resources and to extend 
financial aid to Russian socialism. 1 
At the meeting of the Bureau held on 1,1arch 4-5, 
1906, Rubanovich was the only voting Russian delegate 
present . Garske and Lew represented the Lettish and 
Armenian Social Democratic Parties, but without the right 
to vote. Among the fiscal matters discussed, 1,500 francs 
was set as the share the Russian section was to pay 
against the proposed budget. Rubanovich reported on re-
cent events in Russia. He pointed out how the relaxed 
policies of the regime had allowed the Russian socialist 
movement to pass from its clandestine stage into one of 
open activity. The bulk of the report was an account of 
the Revolution of 1905, how it was socialist in character 
from its beginning, and how the workers and peasants had 
labored together to keep the struggle alive , while the 
bourgeois class remained impotent, relying completely on 
the working class for any achievements. He concluded 
with a plea for socialist solidarity and financial aid 
to the Russian revolution, whi ch the Bureau endorsed. 2 
libid., VII, Sept . l, 1906, 172-174. 
2fleunion Pleni~re des 4 et 5 mars 1906. Compte rendu 
officiel (brussels: Bureau socialiste international, 1906), 
pp . 22-24. 
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At the Bureau meeting of November 10, 1906, the 
following Russian delegates were present: Rubanovich 
and his substitute Ivan Serguevoky, representing the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party, and Ple.Y..hanov and his sub-
stitute .nngelica Balabanova , 1 representing the l.1enshevik 
wing of the Social Democratic Labor Party . The first 
item on the agenda was the preliminary plans for the 
forthcoming Stuttgart Congress . It was decided that 
official reports would be published in German, French, 
and English. Rubanovich colliaen ted that if there were 
any delegates who would need an analytic report of the 
Congress , it would be the Russians, and if there was to 
be no official Russian account of the proceedings , the 
two Russian sections would publish such a report them-
selves. Plekhanov then noted that each national section 
was expected to submit its report to the Bureau during 
the first two weeks in February. He pointed out that 
the situation in Russia was so tenuous that if his sec-
tion's report was submitted in February, important sub-
sequent events might go unreported to the Congress. 
1Angelica Balabanova ( 1878- ) was born near Kiev 
and raised in Chernigov. She was the youngest child of 
an aristocratic family. In her youth she was repulsed 
by the inequality of the existing social conditions and 
turned to socialism. She became extremely proficient in 
linguistics and left home to study in Zurich, Brussels , 
berlin , Leipzig, and London . In 1900 she joined the 
Italian Socialist ·arty and with -.~ussolini edited .. vanti! 
.::>he became well - known by the 3ocialists of practically 
every European country and served as a member and official 
translator of the International Soc iali st Bureau . 
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Therefore, he requested an extension of the deadline for 
the Russian section . The Secretary of the Bureau declared 
such an extension would be impractical, but agreed to 
allow the rlussians to submit suppler:J.entary notes to their 
report whi ch could be presented to the Congress . Plek-
1 
.banov was satisfied with this arrangement. 
Before the preparations for the Stuttgart Congress 
could be considered final , certain decisions concerning 
orGanizational policy had to be made by the Bureau . ne 
such matter was the .manner of voting and representation 
of affiliated parties in the congresses and on the Bureau. 
Again, the primary aim of the discussion which ensued was 
to achieve maximum unity within the national parties and 
v1i thin the International . Clause IIA of the regulations 
of the International read: 
ssociations and organizations of each nation-
ality form a section whi ch pronounces itself on the 
admission of all the associations and organizations 
of the nationalities concerned. The associations 
and organizations not a&Jitted by the competent sec-
tion m.ay lodge a complaint with the International 
Socialist Bureau , whose decision they will accept . 
ht this meeting of the Bureau , Vaillant proposed to amend 
the clause so it would read : 
The parties and organizations of each country 
or nation form one section which itself decides on 
t he admission of all parties and or~anizations in 
the countries or nations concerned. 
lcom te-rendu officiel de la Re union Pleni re du 
10 Nov. 190 russels: Bureau socialiste international, 
1907)' p . 8 . 
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Plekhanov began the discussion by pointing out the dangers 
of eliminating the right of appeal, which Vaillant's pro -
posal would do . He went on to say that since Vaillant 
had already reco gnized two subsections in the Russian dele-
gation, his proposition would be complete if it acl'"..now-
ledge d such cases and granted full autonomy to such sub-
sections within their respective national sections . Ruban-
ovich repeated essentially the same thing, only with more 
detailed explanation . He pointed out that although he 
fully endorsed the principle of unity , such unity could 
not be achieved by a vote of the Bureau. Although the 
Russian parties act in accord on many measures , their 
"different conceptions of the peasant elemen t" prevent 
them from achieving complete unity . Since tsarist re -
pression continues to force them to operate in secret, any 
attempt to determine their respective weight in the Russian 
section on the basis of numerical strength would be im-
practical . Rubanovich went on to say that it would be 
best to allot the two subsections an e qual vote within the 
Russian section , noting that increased unity was being 
achieved within the Russian movement through the union of 
the Bund and the Lettish and Polish Social Democrati c 
Parties with the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
and through similar action by the Socialist Revolutionary 
factions . 
From these beginnings heated discussions followed . 
Bebel declared , somewhat sarcastically , that if every 
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national group in the Russian Empire were given repre -
sentation, Russia would "take over the Congress . " 
Vaillant replied to Plekhanov and Rubanovich by saying 
he recognized such situations as that of Russia, but 
didn't want to anticipate or encourage them by including 
provisions for them in the regulations. Paul Singer, 
Chairman of the Central Committee of the German Party, 
stated he felt that sections should be constituted by 
each political state , leaving nationality problems to 
the members of the respective sections. This v.;as a 
natural response for him , as the German state possessed 
no grave nationality problem. I Antonin N mec, the Czech 
representative, immediately voiced his violent objections 
to Singer's attitude. Van Kol seconded Plekhanov's ob-
jection to the removal of the right of appeal . 
A major criticism of Rubanovich's analysis of the 
Russian situation came from Stanislas Kursky of the Bund . 
He pointed out that all Social Democratic parties had not 
united with the Russian ocial Dernocra tic Labor Party and 
these parties should receive their due recognition . Ee 
declared that Rubanovich' s proposal would give an undue 
advantage to the Socialist Revolutionaries simply because 
it was the only non- Social Democratic party in the Russian 
socialist movement . Rubanovich was quick to deny this , 
but Kursky insisted it wa s so . He ·went on to argue that 
the Bund had lost none of its strength by uniting with 
the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and should not 
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lose any of its recognition and representation in the 
International . Kursky said he did not see why Bebel 
wanted to exclude the Bund from the forthcoming congress . 
Bebel replied tha t this was not his intention. Kursky 
insisted that the agreement between the Bund and the 
Social Democratic Labor Party would allow the -Bund to 
retain its own representation at international con-
gresses . Bebel refuted this statement . 
As the discussion continued to go around in circles, 
no decision could be reached and the matter was referred 
to a commission which was to present a compromise to the 
afternoon session . At that session the following was 
presente d and accepted without any comment by the Russian 
delegates . 
IIA . The parties and organizations of each country 
or nation constitute one section which itself de-
cides upon the admission of all other parties and 
organizations of the countries or nations concerned . 
The parties and organizations not admitted by 
the section have the right of appeal to the Inter-
national Socialist Bureau , which decides in the 
last resort. 
After all its discussion and debate the Bureau had merely 
reiterated its orig inal stand, only in a little clearer 
1 terms . 
The action taken on this issue was typical of the 
course of much of the activity of the Second International 
and its Bureau . The representatives of the various nation-
al sections upheld the interests of their particular 
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national party, but in the name of international unity 
they felt they had to assume a posture that would symbol-
ize such unity. Real unity was only nominal because 
their international policy was so broadly stated that it 
allm"'ed each group to do as it desired or left the power 
of decision in the hands of those who controlled the 
International . In this case the Bureau ended its action 
exactly where it began . _Dnity was the byword, but auton-
omy was the actuality . 
Closely connected to the question of the formation 
of national sections was that of representation on the 
Bureau . The regulations of the International stated that 
"each section can send two delegates to the Bureau" and 
that they "may be replaced by substitutes, mandated by 
the affiliated parties . " At the conclusion of this 
session of the Bureau, its secretary received a resolu-
tion from. the Bund and the Lettish Social Democratic Party 
proposing that representation on the Bureau should be 
proportional to the votes allotted to the respective sec-
tion in the International Congress . If this action was 
talcen the sponsoring groups of this resolution would be 
represented on the Bureau as well as the Russian Social 
Democratic Labor Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries . 
It was argued that direct contact with the four Russian 
parties , rather than just two , would strengthen the 
authority and influence of the Bureau . The note was 
signed by Kursky and Leo Bergmann for the Bund and endorsed 
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by 0 . Braun for the Foreign Committee of the Social 
Democracy of Lettland . Although all the signatories 
presented their case, no discussion or action followed . 1 
One further action pertaining to Russian affairs 
was taken by the International SOcialist Bureau prior to 
the opening of the Stuttgart Congress . This action oc-
curred in the summer of 1907 when the Bureau issued a 
manifesto condemning the duplicity of tsarist foreign 
1 . 2 po J.cy . In addition to the impact of the Russian Revo-
lution of 1905 the dele ga tes to the Stuttgart Congress 
gathered under dark clouds that were gathering on the 
diploma tic horizon . The memory of the Moroccan crisis, 
which had been patched up by the Algeciras Treaty of 
1906, served to remind the dele gates that the inter-
national situation was becoming increasingly tense and 
that the threat of European war was very real . Although 
tsarist Russia had been decidedly defeated in the Russo -
Japanese War, France and Great Britain were coming to her 
aid with subsidies for Stolypin's program for economic 
development . The division of forces that eventually 
formed the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were 
beginning to take shape . Hence , the Stuttgart Congress 
met under the shadow of a serious threat of war, and 
1Ibid . , 79 . 
2International Socialist Review, VIII, Aug . 1, 
1907 , 88- 91 . 
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although its agenda called for the primary discussions 
to be centered around the relations between the social-
ist parties and the trade unions , most of the debate 
focussed on the issues of war and colonialism . If a 
war was about to break out , the members of the Inter-
national had to decide whether their primary loyalty 
lay with the defense of their respective countries or 
with their socialist hatred of imperialist wars and the 
governments which waged them . In close connection with 
this choice they also had to decide whether they were 
opposed to all forms of colonialism or whether they would 
sanction certain forms of co loniali srn that might bring 
advantages to certain "have- not" nations . 
It should also be mentioned that this was the first 
congress to be held on German soil, and the Germans did 
everything they could to make the most of it, including 
the singing of all the favorite German hymns in modified 
form, e . g . , "Ein fe ste Burg i st u.n.ser Bun d." If the Ger-
man bid for leadership made at the previous congress was 
to be sustaining, this was their opportunity to make it 
so. 
Nearly nine hundred delegates attended the Stuttgart 
Congress, representing twenty-four nations . The reports 
submitted indicated substantial growth in labor and 
socialist organizations throughout the world . The Russian 
delegation was composed of sixty-three representatives 
from all factions and parties : Russian Social Democratic 
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Labor Party - Vergeniya Bosh, Deutsch, Khrustalev, Lenin, 
Litvinov , .J.andelberg, l1.artov, lv1artynov , lv.Latveev, Lesh-
kovsky, Plekhanov, Ruben, Starover , Toussaint, Trotsky , 
Voinov , \'Iallin , Yakovlev; Lettish Social Democratic 
Party - Braun, Stegmann; Ukrainian Social Democratic 
Organization - Rybalka; Armenian Social Democratic Organ -
ization - Bolt , Lev; Bund - Berg , Gergmann, Blumberg , 
Gisser, Kossovsky, Kursky, Lodsinsky, I ... arkov, Heimann , 
Nellin, Schitov; Trade Unions - Petrov, Petrovsky, Rykov-
sky, Stepanov , Tomsky; Russian ocialist Revolutionary 
Party - Ananeva , Andreev , Araratokl, Baranova , Bratev , 
Bystrenin , Dalekov , Ivanov , Kondratiev, · .. ischailova, 
Rubanovich, Sarov, Sidorov, Siverskaya , Tchubarov, Temnov, 
Yegorov; Armenian Socialist Revolutionary arty - Aknuny, 
Lernian , Varanian; Socialist Revolutionary Professional 
Unions - I.lanin ; Russian Jewish Socialist \iorlcers ' Party -
Brenner , Schitlovsky, Yudovich . 1 
1se tieme Con o-res socialiste international tenu a 
Stuttgart du 1 au 24 ao t 1907 brussels: deer tariat 
of the International ocialist Bureau , 1908), pp . 68-70 . 
Yevgeniya Bogdanovna Bosh (1879-1925) was a member 
of the R. S. D. L. P . and particularly active in the Ukraine . 
In 1912 she was exiled to Siberia, but soon escaped to 
the United tates . 
V. Kossovsky (L. Y. Levinson; b . 1867) was a founder 
and member of the Central Committee of the Bund . He rep-
resented the Bund at the Second Congress of the . s . D. L.P . 
l\axim l.:aximovich Litvinov (1876-1951) was one of 
seven children of a proletarian family . He finished 
secondary school and became in teres ted in harxi sm while 
in the army . Upon his discharge in 1898 he joined the 
Russian Social Democratic movement . he vJas arrested in 
1901, but escaped the following year to western Europe, 
where he resided until 1918, except for a two year return 
to Russia . He was active in the c ircula ticn of Iskra and 
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The following commission appointments were made to 
members of the Russian section . The Hussian members of 
the First Com.mi ssion on .dli tar ism and International Con-
flic ts were Aknuny , Bystrenin , Lenin , and I~:artov. '.:hen 
joined the Bolshevik faction of the II Congress of the 
R. S. D. L.P . He was secretary to the Russian section at 
the Stuttgart Congress of the International , and later, 
as secretary to t he Bolshevik group in London , he was 
named its delega te to the I . S. B. 
L . 1,~artov ( Yuly Osipovich Tsederbaum; 1873-1923) 
began his revolutionary career in 1891 . In 1895 he joined 
;,.vith Lenin et al . to form the Petersburg League of Struggle 
for the Liberation of the orking Class . He spent 1897-
1900 in Siberian exile, returning to join with Lenin in the 
efforts to reconstruct the R. S .D. L.P . which led to its 
Second Congress in 1903 . He was one of the original mem-
bers of the editorial staff of Iskra and at the Second 
Party Congress emerged as the leader of the l1.enshevik fac-
tion. Until his death he remained the leading exponent of 
I.1en sheviki sm . 
Alexan Samoilovich l.Iartynov ( 1865- ?) vvas once a mem-
ber of the Narodnaya Volnya , but joined the Russian docial 
Demo cratic movement in 1899 and sided with the 1.iensheviks 
in 1903 . 
Leon Trotsky (Lev Davidovich Bronstein; 1879-1940) 
was born near Elizavetgrad to a middle - class Jewish family . 
He received his education at the Peter and Paul Real Schule 
and at the university in Odessa . As a student he became 
involved in revolutionary activity , was arrested in 1898 
and sent into Siberian exile . In 1902 he escaped to Eng-
land on a for ge d passport bearing the name Trotsky . In 
London he became associated with Plekhanov and Lenin and 
assisted in the publication of Iskra . He returned to 
Russia in 1905 to be elected to- the St . Petersburg Soviet 
of Worlcers' Deputies and was chairing a meeting of that 
body when the entire group was arrested . Once again he was 
sent to Siberia , but escaped immediately and mad e his way 
to Vienna . He renewed his activities as a So c ial Democratic 
journalist , but remained apart from the Bolshevik-Menshevik 
struggle , upholding a position mid -way between the t wo 
camps . 
Voinov (Anatoly Vasilevich Lunacharsky; 1875 -1933) 
was a dramatist and member of the Bolshevik wing of the 
R. S. D. L.P . He attended all the Party con gresses held after 
1905 and emigrated to western Europe in 1906 , where he 
joined with the organizers of the Vperyod group . 
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a sub-commission of this coiDJniss ion was formed during 
the course of the Congress Russia was represented by 
Bystrenin and Rosa Luxemburg, the latter holding a proxy 
from the Russian Social Democrats . On the Second Com-
mission on the Relations between the Trade Unions and 
the Party was Plekhanov, Rubanovich, Ternnov, and Voinov . 
The Third Co~~ission on the Colonial ~uestion also had 
four Russian members: Bra tev , Kondra tiev, Me shkovsky, 
and Trotsky; as did the Fourth Commission on Emigration 
and Immigration in Gisser , Petrov, Schitlovsky, and 
Yudovich. Russian members of the Fifth Commission on 
Woman Suffrage were Ananeva , Mandelberg , 1\"ischailov , 
and Lodsinsky . 1 
At the Stuttgart Congress a new voting system was 
employed . Leading nations were allotted twenty votes 
each, while lesser nations we re graded down to a mini-
mum of two votes each . Russia was among the five lead-
ing nations receiving twenty votes. During the course 
of the Congress the Bureau was called upon to arbitrate 
the allocation of these twenty votes to the factions of 
the Russian section. The Social Democrats received ten 
votes, the Socialist Revolutionaries seven, and the 
trade union representatives three . 2 Another procedural 
problem arose when it was realized that since the Russian 
and Polish sections had no national secretaries, as did 
libid., 105-109. 2Ibid ., 5. 
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the other nations, they were unable to procure tickets 
of admission to the Congress under the system of distri -
bution that had been established . The Bureau announced 
that tickets mi ght be procured through their respective 
Bureau representatives. 
The first meeting o f the Stuttgart Congress was held 
at the Canstatt Green , and the leading national reports 
were presented to the delegates. As the texts of all 
the national reports are not included in the minutes of 
this gathering , it appears that only the major reports 
were presented orally , while minor O.Lles were merely sub-
mitted to the secretary . Plekhanov reported for Russian 
Social Democracy . He actually was reporting for only one 
faction of that movement , for included in his report was 
a lvienshevik in terpre ta tion of the Russian Revolution •1 
Rubanovich spoke for the Russian Socialist Revolutionary 
Party . Since the official report of his party was lengthy, 
he made but a short statement lauding the openness of the 
International's deliberations in contrast to the secret 
diplomacy of the monarchial powers and expressing the 
gratitude of the Russian proletariat for the moral support 
it had received from the members of the International . 2 
The official report submitted by the So cialist Revolution-
aries was an extensive one because since the Amsterdam 
Congress they had held two party congresses at whi ch they 
1 Ibid.' 103. 2Ibid .' 93-94 . 
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were able to agree on several provisional statutes and 
some resolutions . They reported the strengthening of 
their organizational structure and the official abandon-
ment of the policy of terrorism . There was also a report 
submitted by the Armenian Social Democratic Organization •1 
Fith the development of systems of international 
alliances the threat of general Jar had become increasingly 
obvious and had drawn the attention of the econd Inter -
national each time it met . Several methods of dealing 
with the threat of war had been proposed over the years . 
By the time of the Stuttgart Congress most of the members 
of the International felt that the old Anarchist proposal 
of a general strike had been done away with . Nevertheless , 
as the threat of war seemed more imminent than ever, there 
were many who ·were not satisfied with the earlier policies 
adopted by the International . The First Commission of the 
Stuttgart Congress i•vas assi6lled the issue of militarism 
and war . 
Gustav Eerve set the tone of the commission's dis-
cussion of these issues . he raised the question of what 
Socialists could do beyond stating that war was an in-
herent aspect of capitalism and urgfng the substitution 
of militias for standing armies when he proposed that 
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any declaration of war should be met by a socialist re-
volt and ~eneral strike . At the same tine he gave vent 
to his French nationalism by making a sweeping attack 
on the bureaucracy and embourgeoisement of the German 
Party . Bebe l replied to the question raised by Herve 
by declaring that the issue of the general strike had 
been adeQuately dealt with by previous con gresses and 
that the only thing whi ch needed to be done was to re-
affirm previous resolutions, i . e ., to do nothing . A 
stronger reply was made by Vollmar, leader of the German 
Right-wing , who attacked Herve's suggestions essentially 
because he did not want to see his party involved in any 
activity that would jeopardize its relations with the 
German government . 
The issues of war and militarism were never squarely 
faced by the Congress , since the discussions centered 
around the merits of the suggested responses to a declar-
ation of war and not the question of what the socialist 
attitude toward war should be . 
Eventually four factions appeared in the Co~~ission, 
each representing the major opinions expressed as to what 
course of action should be fo llowed if war was declared . 
Eerve's proposal represented one extreme . Guesde and 
Bebel represented another in their advocacy of a continued 
socialist program to remove the causes of war . Vaillant 
and the ever-optimistic Jaures rejected the absolute pac i-
fism of Herve by declaring that the working class of one 
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nation had the right to defend itself . But they would 
not go along with Bebel and say that war could be averted 
by doing nothing . They insisted that a militia system 
would provide an adequate safeguard . If for some reason 
this function of the militia system failed , the Inter-
national Socialist Bureau would be able to organize the 
appropriate international action , including a general 
strike if necessary . The other activist position was 
represented by Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin , who "~anted to 
see agitation , insurrection and strikes on the outbreak 
of war used not only to end the war but also to foster 
the end of the capitalist regimes involved . This last 
attitude was in a sense an extension of the position 
taken by Eerve and the majority of the French Party , 
which had declared precise methods to be taken in case 
of war . Naturally , the Russians agreed with this idea , 
because they had seen how the revolutionary strikes of 
1905 had not only contributed to the termination of the 
Russo-Japanese \;ar , but had also fostered domestic reform . 
Thus , Lenin and the Russians wanted to go beyond E.erve' s 
position to use these r.1ethods to bring about revolution 
as well as to terminate war . Since the majority of the 
Commission and the Congress stood closer to Bebel's 
attitude than to Herve 's , this proposal of enin and the 
other Left -wing extremists was pre sen ted as an aiuendmen t 
to Bebel's proposed resolution to give it more meaning . 
:erve ' s proposed resolution was not accepted by the Com-
mission . 
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This issue marks the emergence of Lenin as a major 
figure in the affairs of the Second International . He 
was now thirty-seven years old and since leaving Russia 
in 1900 had gained a reputation as a journalist and also 
through his quarrel with the Lensheviks and the subse-
quent split in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Par ty . 
He was now well-known in Russian emigre' circles, and be-
ginning with the Stuttgart Congress he became a member 
of the Left -wing of the International . In his memoirs 
Vandervelde declares that Trotsky also began to play an 
important role in the Left -wing faction at this time , but 
it is difficult to see how he can be classified in im-
porta.."lce ·with Lenin in 1907 . 1 Lenin had returned to 
iussia durin0 the last days of the St . Petersburg 00viet , 
and Rosa Luxemburg had gone back to Poland to supervise 
the socialist movement there . They both returned to 
•iestern Europe dedicated to an activist policy and saw 
in the international situation of that tir.1e the possible 
fulfilln;.ent of Engels 1 prediction that a European war 
would weaken the capitalist states involved and present 
an opportunity for successful socialist revolution . ..ar-
tov agreed with Lenin on this point , marking one of the 
few notes of harmony between the tvw rivals . 
n \ edne sday afternoon , AuGust 21, at the third 
session of the Con1r.1ission osa Luxemburg gained the floor 
1Emi le Vandervelde , ouvenirs d 1 un nili tan t social-
iste (Paris: Les Editions Denoel, 1939} , p . 167 . 
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to express these feelings in the name of the Polish and 
Hussian delegations . She reminded her listeners of their 
recent tributes to t he Russian revolutionaries of 1905 
and contrasted the spirit of those tributes with t hat of 
the speeches of Bebel and Vollmar . She stated dramati-
cally , "If the bloody shadows of the fallen revolution -
aries were here , they would say : 'We can do without your 
praise , but learn from us . ' And it wo uld be treachery to 
t he revolution if you were not to do so." nasa Luxemburg 
reminded the Commission that "the Russian Hevolution not 
only arose out of the war; it also served to stop the war" 
and made a special point of reminding Vollmar that at the 
Jena Congress of his own party , its revolutionary character 
was reaffirmed and the general strike \Nas endorsed as a 
useful instrument under certain circumstances . LQ light 
of these statements she announ.ced that an amendment would 
be offered to give Bebel ' s ambiguous resolution a clear 
revolutionary character . 1 Rubanovich rose to declare 
that the amended resolution would be acceptable to the 
Socialist Revolutionaries because it alone "meets the 
actual situation in Russia , where we need revolutionary 
an ti-mili tar ism . "2 At the end of the debate amendments 
to Bebel's resolution were handed to the secretary of the 
1septi ~me Congr~ s socialiste international ••• , 
152 - 155 . 
2 Ibid ., 175 . 
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commission . The amendments elaborated on Bebel's refer -
ences to the causes of war by adding militarist competi-
tion in armaments, by stressing the value of the education 
of socialist youth and by rewarding Bebel 's final para-
graph regarding action to be taken upon the outbreak of 
war . They were signed by Rosa Luxemburg , Lenin and l\.lartov . 
In view of the differences of opinion on this i ssue of 
war and militarism , the leaders of the commission became 
concerned that vvha tever stand was taken on the issue, it 
should not jeopardize the unity of the International. 
Therefore, a sub-commission was appointed to draft a reso -
lution that wou ld satisfy everyone . Lenin rose to state, 
"I put the mandate of Russia at the disposition of Citi-
zeness Luxemburg . " Since it was known that Lenin spoke 
only for Russian Social Democracy, Bystrenin was also 
named to the sub-commission to represent Russia .1 
The sub-commission produced the Stuttgart Resolution, 
which vvas passed unanimously by the Congress . It con-
tained some element of the thoughts of each faction of 
the International, including the amendments submitted by 
Rosa Luxemburg, and committed no one to anything concrete. 
Rosa Luxemburg's amendments were supported not only by 
Lenin, but also by Mar tov. This was one of the few oc -
casions on which Idartov and Lenin were backers of the 
same proposal. The adoption of the amendments was the 
libid ., 164-65 . 
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first victory for the radi cal Left-wing faction that was 
forming in the International , principally under Lenin's 
leadership . In the text of the resolution these amend-
ments can be found in the second and third paragraphs 
which state that wars result from the rivalry for world 
markets and competition in armaments, and that wars are 
promoted to divert the proletarian masses from their own 
class problems; in the statement in the sixth paragraph 
which declares the duty of the working classes to educate 
their children in the spirit of socialism; and in the final 
two paragraphs which call upon proletarians to do all they 
can to a vert the outbreak of war , but if vvar should come 
to strive to use it "to hasten the abolition of capital-
ist class rule . 11 Nothing was said about the general 
strike or about insurrection, but the Luxemburg-Lenin 
amendments did call for action beyond parliamentary pro-
tests and gave the reso l ution a decidedly revolutionary 
spirit . The delegates to the Stuttgart Congress fe lt 
t hey had taken a very heroic stand . The wor ld had to wait 
until 1914 to discover whether they were willing to back 
their stand with heroic action . 
Hhile the resolution on war and militarism was being 
worked out in the sub-commission , the Congress turned its 
attention to other ma tters . During the fourth plenary 
session of August 22 , Secretary Huysmans mentioned the 
receipt of a tele gram from the Central Committee of the 
Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, but there is no 
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record of its content . 1 That afternoon the report of the 
Commission on Colonialism. was presented , and the dis -
cussion which followed revealed further the limitations 
of the apparent unity of the Second International . The 
rJ.ajority of the Commission favored sor:1e kind of positive 
socialist c olonial policy , feeling that colonialism was 
alraost a given state in society and that in some cases it 
had had positive consequenc es . The minority of the Com-
missions , whi ch incl uded its Russian IL.embers , stood firmly 
behind the earlier condemnations of colonialism by the L'l -
ternational. rrhey objected to it root and branch and moved 
to amend the .lllajority report to conform vd th their opin-
ions . The Russian delegation gave its full support to 
this amendment . In the discussion Yihich followed the 
Russian - born ke.mber of the German delegation, Parvus , 2 
1 Ibid .' 308 . 
2Parvus (Alexander He lphand ; 1867 - 1924) was born in 
Berezin and Jrew up in Odessa as the son of a Jewish 
mid.dle -c lass family . He became involved in illegal poli-
tical c ircles and in 1887 settled in l.iestern Europe as a 
refugee , becoming a journalist in the German Socialist 
movement . He was closely associated VJith Rosa Luxemburg 
and led the. attack a gainst Bernstein ' s ttrevisionism" at 
the Dresden Party Congress in 1898 . In 1899 he returned 
to Russia to study the Volga famine re gions , but returned 
to Luni ch in 1900 , still representing the left wing of 
Social Democra c y . he sided viJi th the 1·-ensheviks in 1903 
and heralded the coming of socialism to~ ussia in 1905 . 
At that time he returned to ussia , where he was vvelcomed 
by the kensheviks and made Chairman of the Second Soviet 
of Jorker ' s Deputies in St . Petersburg . In 1906 he vvas 
arrested and sent to Siberia , but within a year he had 
escaped and returned to Germany . 
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sought to prove that modern colonial policy was not only 
in contradiction to the tenets of socialism , "but that 
it did not even lie in the interests of the capitalist 
economic order . " 1 The amendment passed by a vote of 127 
to 108, thus overruling the majority of the Commission . 
The amended resolution soundly condemning colonialism in 
any form was passed unanimously with one abstention . 2 
This final vote gave the appearance of unity , but the 
voting on the amendment revealed the actual division of 
thought within the International. 
The relation between socialist parties and trade 
unions was also discussed at Stuttgart, although this 
issue did not occupy the prominent position suggested by 
its position on the official agenda . Again, the basic 
issue was that of the function of trade unions . Uas their 
role to be purely economic or was it to be pol itical as 
well? Those Vlho argued the latter were , in turn, raising 
the general strike issue again . The Belgians and the 
French agreed that there was a growing sphere of activity 
which was of common concern to both political parties and 
trade unions . The Germans and Austrians insisted that 
trade unions should be concerned only with the economic 
1Julian Reichesberg, Der international Sozialisten-
kongress i n Stutt gart (Berne: Buchdruckerei Scheitlin, 
Spring & Cie., 1907) , P • 24 . 
2
septieme Congr~ s socialiste international ••• , 
325 - 26 . 
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struggle . Each faction proposed a resolution to the 
Second Commission , to which this topic had been assigned . 
As the Tuesday session of this commission closed , 
Voinov declared : 
I represent the Russian Social Democratic Party 
here , of whi ch the majority are generally in favor 
of the Belgian motion . But if Belgium combines its 
motion with that of Austria , I will vote for the com-
promise . l 
This is essential ly what was done when de Brouckere , the 
sponsor of the Belgian proposal , was faced with the re -
fusal of the Germans and Austrians to accept his draft . 
Before this compromise was reached the other Russian mem-
bers of the commission had their say . The \Jednesday ses-
sion of the Second Commission opened with this statement 
by Rubanovi ch : 
I have the advantage , in the name of the Revo -
lutionary Socialist Party , of proposing an amendment 
to the resolution of the French majority saying that 
an understanding between the party and the trade 
unions ought to be sought . In this sense , the Bel-
gian solution is the ideal sol ution . But such accord 
cannot be imposed . I do not believe that the Belgian 
tactic is possible in France at this moment . In 
Russia all socialist parties are occupied with the 
trade - union question , and they are trying through the 
contents of their political ~rograms to attract all 
the laboring masses to them . 
This was not a formal amendment to the French proposal , 
although Rubanovich used the word . He was simply endorsing 
the French proposal , which was not as strong as the Belgian 
statement in calling for unity between socialist parties 
libid ., 206 . 2 Ibid . , 207 . 
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and trade unions . Plekhanov spoke for the lvienshevik 
position at this same session: 
Russians, as on all the other questions , have 
divergent ideas on the subject of the relations be -
tween the party and the trade unions. He have, in 
Western Russia, at least fifteen parties , of which 
eleven function concurrently in certain regions. 
If you would bring the trade unions intimately 
close together with the parties, you would cut the 
Russian trade union organization into fifteen power -
less pieces . Tie must wait for political unity in 
order to execute the decision of the International 
without danger to the labor organization . Our trade 
union movement in Russia is still in its infancy, 
and seeing the circumstances which I have indicated 
to you , I believe that the professional organization 
ought to be neutral here . To be sure , our trade 
unions are not neutral in the bourceois sense of the 
word , because most of the members of these organiza-
tions have played a role in the revolutionary move-
ment , but the trade union unity that you want to 
realize will have a considerable influence upon the 
realization of political unity, and it is hoped that 
the 253 ,000 organized workers of Russia will not be 
divided because they belong to different parties . 
It is for these reasons that I wan t to add to the 
Austro-Belgian resolution, at the end of the third 
paragraph, the following text: ' without endanger-
in g the necessary unity of the trade-union movement . ,1 
Plekhanov's amendrnent was added to the compromise resolu-
tion that was beginning to emerge from the combination of 
Austrian and French proposals . Further discussion favor-
ing the compromise followed , and shortly before the session 
was adjourned Rubanovich announced: 
I am won over to the Austro-Belgian motion , but 
I demand that the words ' Social Democrat' or ' Social 
Democracy' be replaced by the word Socialist , because 
the terms used can bring about confusion in Russia . 2 
1Ibid ., 208 - 209 . 
2 Ib i d • ' 212 • 
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This amendment , like Plekhanov ' s , was adopted Wlanimously , 
and the compromise draft resolution was forwarded to the 
next plenary session of the Congress . It upheld trade 
union independence , which left the real quest ion up in 
the air but satisfied the divided delegates , and was 
passed enthusiastically . 
'I'vvo other reports were acted upon, one on the Question 
of the franchise for women and the other on immigrat ion . 
Some desired to set aside the cause of the right of women 
to vote until universal manhood suffrage was achieved , but 
this tactical proposal was rejec ted . The Congress declared 
tha t when a general campaign for franchise reform was 
launched , it should include a demand on behalf of both 
sexes . Draft resolutions were presented to the Commission 
on 'Emigration and Immigration of Vorkers by Argentina , the 
United States , Belgium , and the Bund . The Bund resolution 
was presented at the first commission meeting on l1.onday , 
August 19 . It de clared that despite the exploitation of 
immi gration by capita list interests , the Internat ional 
should stand in opposition to all le ga l limitations on 
emi gra tion and immigration which prevent workers from 
seeking relief from their oppression . It included a rec-
ommendation that all socialist and labor organizations do 
wha t they can to aid immigran ts seeking freedora of entry , 
jobs , citizenship , and membership in workers ' organiza-
tions . When the discussion continued the following day 
Gisser of the BWld took the floor to say: 
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This question is extremely complex . It will 
be extremely difficult to find a resolution appli-
cable to all contingencies . I think that one must 
distinguish between European immigration and Ameri-
can imrnigration . European in@igration has only a 
relative importance and can be resolved by the 
establishment of a minimwn salary, arwng other 
things . Then it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween immigration giving proof of the economic con-
ditions and immigration exploited by the capitalists . 
But , on one hand , it is extremely difficult to limit 
irrunigration based on economic necessity . Just like 
immigration organized by the capitalists always 
finds the means to divert the law . 
'rhe trade unions are almost powerless in this 
matter . I think, therefore , it is better to effec-
tively supervise the emigration agencies, to estab-
lish a legal minimum salary , and to act closely with 
our American comrades in order that they renounce 
their corporate egoism. This would be better thfl 
erecting cardboard barriers against iriliTiigration . 
Bather than place unrealistic regulations on iirunigra tion, 
Gisser advocated removing , as much as possible , the evils 
that necessitated it and the opportunities to exploit it . 
As it was , none of the proposed resolutions were adopted 
by the commission . As with the consideration of the 
issue of militarism and war , a sub - commission vvas appointed 
to draft a resolution acceptable to all . This was done 
and the Congress ac cepted a resolution rejecting all pro-
posed rac ial and national restrictions on immigration and 
condemning the deliberate importation of immigrants to 
lower living standards . The statement was very general 
and therefore was objectionable to no one . 
At the sixth plenary session of August 24 a matter 
was raised which was related to the issue of immigration , 
1Ibid ., 232 - 254 . 
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but was not directly connected with the discussion of the 
report of the Fourth Commission . Paul Singer of Germany , 
who was presiding , :presented a statement submitted by the 
En0 lish, ustrian , French, and Dutch delegations express-
ing their sympathy and fraternal greetin6S to the parti-
ci:pants in the recent Russian revolution . he then re-
marked that the Bureau had received the following declara-
tion for insertion into the minutes: 
The police of the Tsar are not content to per-
secute every liberal movement inside Russia in a 
bloody manner . They are trying novi to remove from 
the revolutionaries every :possibility of emi6rating . 
The right of asylum, whi ch accords a certain ~uietude 
to emigres persecuted from country to country and 
the importance of whicL is so considerable to all 
revolutionary circles, ought to be available to them . 
pretext is now looked for to allow the goverrunents 
of 3witzerland , France and other countries where 
liberal traditions exist to so.r::e measure to chase 
emigres out of these countries en masse into the 
arms of the Russian police . From certain indica-
tions we can affirm that agents provocateurs work to 
organize incidents and so-called expropriations in 
countries where the right of asylwn exists with the 
obvious aim of discrediting the revolutionaries . 
It is for this reason that the signatory organi-
zations of this document declare that every act of 
this kind -- and especially the so-called expropri -
ations -- is a betrayal of the revolution, an act of 
coviardice directed at e.migra tion, because it allows 
the governments and their police to restrict or 
suppress the right of asylum. 
~very individual who participates in si£ilar 
projects is a rovocateur or an insGrument of provo-
cation . It is i mperative that every revolutionary 
hinder the intri0ues of tsarism, maintaining the 
right of asylwu against every outrage, combatting 
ener6etically agents :provocateurs and their endeavors. 
This plea in defense of political err~icre s '·as signed by 
all the delegates of the - ussian section. After listening 
to this sta te.men t the Congress unanimously endorsed the 
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motion to extend fraternal greetings to the Russian revo-
lutionaries . 1 
At this same session a reso l ution addressed to the 
Ameri can miners expressing feli citations to William D. 
Haywood as an "innocent man condenmed for the services 
he has rendered to the cause of organized labor" was pre-
sented and adopted . 2 Lenin was one of its sponsors . 
Angeli ca Balabanova came to the Stuttgart Congress 
as an observer , but due to the language difficulties among 
the delegates she became involved as a translator . At the 
request of Clara Zetkin she had already translated for a 
convention concerned with the problems of working women 
which had been held prior to the regular sessions of the 
Congress . 3 During the Congress the need for an inter-
national movement of socialist and labor youth was 
stressed . Karl Liebknecht invited J~gelica Balabanova 
to help him elaborate on a rough draft which he had 
drawn for such an organization . At the conclusion of the 
Congress about twenty delegates , including Balabanova , 
remained and met in a small hall to launch this project . 4 
Another meeting held in conjunction with the Stutt -
gart Congress of the Second International was that of 
1Ibid ., 401 . 2Ibid.' 403 . 
3Angelica Balabanova , ,;.y Life as a Rebel (tlew York: 
Harper & Brothers , 1938) , p . 80 . 
4Ibid ., 85 . 
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the affiliated Inter-Parliamentary Commission on August 
17 . H.ussia was represented by LJ.andelberg and Rubanovich . 
bandelberg was a deputy to the .Second Duma and submitted 
an extensive report on the persecution of the Social 
Democratic deputies, which was read by Chairman Vander-
velde and accepted by the Commission . Rubanovich pre-
sented no report but called the attention of the Com-
mission to the "Report on the Activities of the bocialist 
Revolutionary Groups of the Duma," written by Deputy 
Cherskt of the dissolved Second Duma and published jointly 
with the report of the Socialist Revolutionary Party to 
1 the Stuttgart Congress . 
Actually, little advance was made at Stuttgart toward 
a clearer definition of international socialist policies, 
except in the case of militarism and war . The Stuttgart 
Resolution remained vague on this issue, leaving many 
questions unanswered rather than jeopardize the unity of 
the International, but by implication it carried the Inter-
national much further than it was actually willinc; to go, 
as the events of seven years later would prove . 
From the perspective of the nussian revolutionary 
movement the IJlost significant development at the Stuttgart 
Congress was the emergence of Lenin and Trotsky into the 
activities of the 8econd International . At this time 
1septieme Congres socialiste international ••• , 
12- 18 . 
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Lenin's attitude toward the Second International was 
still positive, and he made a generally favorable report 
of the Stuttgart Congress . He said it was the best Inter-
national Congress ever held , for "it marked the final con-
solidation of the Second International and the trans-
format ion of International Congresses in to businesslike 
meetings . " He felt it had made "big strides forward" in 
its condem....11ation of "ministerialism'1 and that it was not -
able for the resolutions it had passed on the issues of 
imperialism , militarism and war , and colonialism. In 
reference to the last -mentioned issue he declared, "let 
us note this welcome feature, that all the Socialists of 
Russia , unanimously and on all questions , voted in a revo-
lutionar y spirit . " For Lenin to use the word "Socialist" 
in such an inclusive sense was unusual and reflects his 
generous mood at that time . He did say, however , that a 
"remarkable and sad feature" of the Congress was the fact 
that the German Socia l Democrats wavered on the issues 
of colonialism and war . Bebel appeared to him to be 
cautiously equivocal , if not opportunistic, and he con-
demned Eduard David's efforts to include a "monstrous 
sentence" condoning colonialism under a socialist regime . 
He was proud that the Russian section was amon g those who 
prevented its adoption . 1 Lenin's wife , Y~.Xupskaya, con-
firmed his approval of the Stuttgart Congress by stating 
1Lenin, Collected Horks , IV, 314- 23 . 
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that he "was very satisfied with it" and by .mentioning 
his particular approval of the resolutions on trade 
unions and war . She went on to comment on the close 
relationship Lenin achieved with Rosa Luxemburg through 
their work together, and she quotes Lenin as saying: 
The Stuttgart Congress had brought out in a 
sharp relief , on a whole number of important ques -
tions, the opposite positions of the opportunist 
and revolutiona ry Win6S on interna tional Social 
Democracy . And it has given a decision on these 1 questions in the spirit of revolutionary l._arxisn . 
·~lhile Lenin was being impressed by the proceedings 
of the Stuttgart Congress , at least a fe\J of the delegates 
were being impressed by him . Angelica Balabanova remarked 
later that although he "did not participate in any of the 
public discussions, ••• he influenced the \Wrk of some 
of its subcommittees indirectly by advising more active 
delegates like Luxemburg and Liebknecht . " ..:).he also noted 
that it was Lenin who tried to organize a Left-wing fac-
tion among those who did not feel the International to be 
sufficiently revolutionary . This effort \las Llore or less 
clandestine, as the leaders of the International would 
have considered such a move devisive and ille6al . Lenin 
co.m.municated with Rosa uxemburg , Liebknecht and some of 
the Dutch delegates , but no organized faction was formed . 2 
Clara ~etkin also claimed to be impressed by Lenin at 
1U . 1: . Krupskaya , , ... emories of Lenin , trans . by E . 
Verney (London: l1~artin Lawrence , 1930) , pp . 178-82. 
2Ba l abanova , 82 . 
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St u t tgar t , a lthough her memor i es of the event were re-
corded many years l ater and include obvious inaccuracies 
and , therefore , must be interpreted in light of the 
stature Lenin eventually attained . Nevertheless , she 
remembered him at Stuttgart as excelling "in his a tten-
ti ve observation and following of the proceedings , in 
his great self- confident c a~1 , his concentrated , as it. 
were , internal participation , energy and f l exib i lity . n1 
It was in 1907 that Lenin began to attend the meet -
ings of the Bureau as the Bolshevik representative . His 
first Bureau meeting was held immediately following the 
Stuttgart Congress . Plekhanov was still a member , now 
representing the l\:ensheviks , and Rubanovich was the 
Socialist Revolutionary delegate . Vandervelde , who met 
Lenin at the se meetings from time to time , described him 
as "unobtrusive , in short ; very seldom heard , not giving 
then ••• the impression of a person of great prominence . " 
He went on to say that Lenin 
took part in the meetings industriously enough . To 
tell the truth , not much attention was paid to him . 
No one imagined what would happen to this little 
man with the slits of eyes, a red beard , a monotone 
voice , always expounding the traditional r~rxist 
do~Tias with a precise and cold politeness . 
A report of Lenin ' s attitude toward these meetings was 
.._.-l 
made by Zinoviev , although one cannot help but suspe c t 
l clara Zetki n , Reminiscences of Lenin (New York : 
International Publishers , 1934) , p . ?. 
2Van der Esch , 56 . 
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that his thoughts were expressed in retrospect . he saw 
Lenin as a new comer to the International , who was re -
garded by its older members as the individual responsible 
for the Russian Party split , which caused them to pay 
little heed to his proposals . Zinoviev declared that 
Lenin 
went to the meetings of this Bureau with a heavy 
heart and always returned from there practically 
ill . It was possible to sense from his accounts 
that he witnessed disgraceful scenes there , wit -
nessed how the greatest international organization 
which united twenty million vJOrkers was b eginning 
to rot . l 
'rhe re is no record that anyone was i mpressed by 
Trotsky at Stuttgart , and his impression of the Congress 
was much more critical than Lenin's . Trotsky was still 
somewhat of a lone-wolf in 1907 and the d01r inance of the 
Con gress by the Germans and its false appearance of unity 
repulsed him . He wrote of the event : 
The International Congress was li lte a school 
class , the naughty boy was put out the door and the 
others vvere silent . Behind the force in nwnbers of 
German Social Democracy , one cou~d discern only too 
clearly the shadow of impotence . 
He was , however , much impressed by the oratory of Jaure s , 
despite his reformism . After 1907 Trotsky became a 
familiar figure among the Russian dele ga tions to gather-
ings of the Second International , and in the long run, he 
was perhaps the most international in his perspective of 
all the Russian revolutionaries . 
1Gankin and Fisher , 67 . 2;r 88 van der ~sch , • 
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The Copenhagen Congress of 1910 
The activities of the Second International between 
the Congresses of Stuttgart and Copenhagen centered around 
the meetings of the International Socialist Bureau. The 
most sigrdficant of these meetings was held in Brussels 
on October 11, 1908. The Russians attending this meeting 
were: Rubanovich, representing the Socialist Revolution-
ary Party; Schitlovsky, representing the Jewish Socialist 
Labor Party, and Varandian, representing the Armenian 
Socialist Revolutionary Party, both members of the Social-
ist Revolutionary Party sub-section; Lenin, representing 
the Social Democratic Labor Party; B. Nelin and G. Barsky, 
representi...'1g the Bund; K. Sutte, of the Lettish Social 
Democratic Party; and V. Pereverzev, of the Professional 
Unions of Russia . 1 
Secretary Huysmans began the meeting by reporting 
on the correspondence received by the Bureau . A letter 
from Rubanovich informed the Bureau that the Central 
Bureau of the Russian Railroad Union had delegated to its 
past-president Pereverzev a consultative vote in the 
Bureau on the delegation of professional unions . This 
latter group had been admitted to the Stuttgart Congress 
and was therefore entitled to be represented in the Bureau . 2 
11 
2 Ibid ., 24 . 
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One of the principal matters b efore the Bureau at 
this time was the application for admission to the Inter-
national by the British Labor Party. This application 
was supported by the British Independence Labor Party, 
but it ran into the opposition of a group of leftists 
led by Hyndman who felt it did not declare itself to be 
sufficiently socialist . Kautsky introduced a resolution 
that admission should be gran ted "because, although it 
does not explicitly accept the proletarian class struggle, 
nevertheless, it carries it on in practice and by its 
organization, which is independent of bourgeois parties, 
and bases itself on the foundations and principles of 
international socialism." Lenin agreed, since all trade 
unions in general had been admitted to previous congresses. 
Rubanovich tried to clarify the debate . He felt 
that the real issue was whether a group which did not de-
clare itself to be a socialist party and did not recognize 
t h e class struggle could be admitted to the Second Inter-
national, since admission would seemi ngly sanction this 
attitude. It is true, he declared, that trade unions had 
been freely admitted, but the I.abor Party was a political 
party, although it represented the interests of the trade 
unions, and should have to meet the s ame standards as 
other parties. Kautsky's resolution labelled the Labor 
Party as unconsciously sociali s t, a l abel tha t Rubanovich 
was not sure it would accept. He went on to s a y tha t he 
feared admission on this basis would le a d only to confusion, 
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and although he did not necessarily want to exclude the 
British Labor Party , he felt its admission must be with-
out mental reservations and without obscurity . 
Hyndman , feeling he was getting support from 
Rubanovich, repeated his attitude against admission of 
the Labor Party , to whi ch Lenin replied by endorsing 
Hyndman ' s reco&~ition that the British Labor Party did 
not follow a policy entirely independent of bourgeois 
class interests . Lenin felt , however , that Kautsky' s 
resolut ion could still be a ccepted by r ecognizing this 
fact in an amendment which would justify the admission 
of the British Labor Party "be cause it represents the 
first step of the truly proletarian organizations of 
En gland toward a c onscious class po licy and toward a 
so cialist labor party . " In the subseq_uent discussion 
Lenin was forced to abandon this proposed amendment, 
partiall y because he was unable to gain the support of 
his own colleague Rubanovich . 
Finally Kautsky's reso lution was voted on in two 
parts . The first part , reaffirming the q_ualifica tion 
for admission to the International to be a cc eptance of 
the class struggle and of the nece ssity of the political 
struggle, was passed with only three negative votes and 
Rubanovich absta i ning , probab ly in protest to the entire 
resolution . The second part , calling for the admission 
of the British Labor Party although it did not accept 
this Qualification , was also passed . The stated reason 
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for this exception was that it was felt that t he labor 
Party was fWldarnentally in agreement with the principles 
of the International . Again , Rubanovich abstained, and 
Lenin joined the three who had voted in the negative on 
the first part to vote against the second part . 1 
During the afternoon session the resolution cover-
ing the Bureau's general analysis of the world political 
situation was presented . Both Russian sub - sections felt 
that t he original French draft did not adequately call 
attention to the Russian situation . Therefore , they pre-
sen ted the following amendment, which wa s passed by the 
Bureau . 
That tsarism , desiring above all new loans, de -
pends more and more on confusing the situation in 
order to be strengthened in its struggle a gainst the 
Russian revolution . 2 
The President of the Bureau , Anseele, speaking for 
the executive committee , then proposed that &~eden be 
allotted twelve votes in the International and that the 
votes of Hungary also be increased . Rub anovich supported 
the proposition , saying : 
At one of our earlier meetings I, with the 
Secretary of the Bureau , pointed out the insufficient 
nlliaber of votes allowed to ~Jeden . I am happy to 
state that it seems unanimous at this time to enter 
on the way indicated and to vote t h e proposition of 
the executive committee . 
The proposition concerning Sweden was passed unanimously , 
as was the proposal concerning Hungary, although the 
1Ib i d • ' 42 - 46 • 
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1 Russians took no part in the discussion of the latter . 
There was one other item on the agenda of this 
meeting of the Bureau which was of direct interest to 
the Russians . The Secretary of the Bureau reported that 
the Zionist Socialist Labor Party had been admitted to 
2 the Stuttgart Congress with a consultative vote and 
that it was now asking for admission into the Social 
Democratic sub - section , but the So cial Democrats would 
not accept it . He went on to say that the Zionist group 
did not want to join the Socialist Revolutionary sub -
section . Thus , the situation existed that it was not a 
member of either sub- section , although it had been ad-
mitted to the Russian section at Stuttgart . The issue 
was on the agenda for this meeting , but the Zionists 
were now requesting that the debate be postponed . Borsky 
was the first to speak to the matter. He expressed his 
desire to have the motion clarified before any action was 
taken, since he felt the conditions under which the Zion -
ist Socialist Labor Party had been aQ~itted at Stuttgart 
were not at all clear. Rubanovich quickly declared that 
although he wanted to remain neutral on the matter as he 
had at Stuttgart , he questioned the morality of making a 
1Ibid.' 58 . 
2The conditions of this admission were not discussed 
in the section on the Stuttgart Congress because they were 
not reported in the available records of that gathering . 
The only reference to this matter is found in the minutes 
of this meeting of the I . S. B. 
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decision in the absence of representatives of the Zion-
ists. He could not see how any harm could come to the 
Russian revolutionary movement by a delay in the decision 
on the status of the Zionists, since its activities were 
almost entirely underground , and, therefore, he favored 
the postponement of the debate until the next meeting of 
the Bureau . 
Adler made a more deliberate move by proposing a 
resolution stating that the admission of the Zionists at 
Stuttgart was for that Congress only and that the Zionists 
were not connected to the International Socialist Bureau . 
Rubanovich immediately replied that , because there was 
some doubt on this matter , it should be postponed until 
the interested comrades could be present . Lenin argued 
that the Zionists had been admitted only on a temporary 
certificate at Stuttgart, as had been the case with some 
German organizations. Adler reminded the group that al -
though the Russians had disagreed on many things, they 
were generally united in the opposition to the permanent 
admission of the Zionists to the International and vvhen 
the matter was raised at Stuttgart, Rubanovich was absent 
and Lenin had cast a negative vote. Rubanovich repeated 
that he was non-partisan on this issue and he did not 
want to see the Social Democratic subsection forced into 
accepting a group against its vvi ll, but in all fairness 
he felt that his proposal for postponement should be voted, 
and if it was not , he would seek to amend Adler ' s resolu-
tion accordingly . 
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Dr . Schitlovsky then tried to mediate the situat ion 
by supporting his co - religionists and by endorsing the 
authority of the Bureau to act, while mainta ining neutral-
ity for the Socialist Revolutionaries . Be declared that 
the admission of the Zionists had not been on a temporary 
basis and that the Bureau could decide on this issue with-
out determining to which Russi an sub - section the Zionists 
should belon g • .At the same time he said he believed the 
Zionists to be orthodox Iv1arxist-Social Democrats and that 
they ought to belong to the Social Democratic sub-se ction , 
but the So cialist Revolutionary sub - section would abstain 
from. voting "for the sole reason that it does not wi sh to 
impose a rival organization on the Socia l Demo crats . Lenin 
denied this , declaring that the central committee of his 
party had very clearly stated that the Zionists were not 
Social Democrats . lie then proposed t rillt the discussion be 
cut short and Adler ' s proposition voted upon . Roussel of 
France agreed , so did Diamand of Po l and , who pointed out 
that in several districts the Zionists had "supported the 
nationalist and c ap italist candidates against the social-
ist candidates . " Borsky reentered the O.iscussion to 
register the Bund ' s opposition to the admission of the 
Zionists with a very lengthy discourse on the ideological 
failings of the Zionists . Dr . Schitlovsky endorsed Bar-
sky ' s criticisms of the Zionists , but seconded Rubanovich ' s 
plea for postponement . 
145 
The discussion was finally closed with a vote to 
postpone any debate or action on the agenda item. Post -
ponement was soundly rejected with only Vaillant of 
France , Branting of Sweden and Rubanovich voting for 
the proposal . Rubanovich then tried to amend Adler's 
resolution to make it essentially a postponement of the 
issue, but his efforts were thwarted . Adler ' s resolution 
was passed unanimously, with Rubanovich and Vaillant ab -
staining . 1 
There were two subsidiary conferences held in con-
junction with this meeting of the International Socialist 
Bureau. Conferences of Socialist J-ournalists were called 
in connection with international socialist mee tings dur-
ing the first decade of the century . The second such con-
ference was held on October 10 , 1908 , the day before the 
Bureau was to meet . The Russians constituted one of the 
more active groups at these ga therings, since agitating 
in the press and propaganda was one of the principle out -
lets of their energies . This was particularly true among 
the Russian exiles who had virtually unlimited tline to 
write and study . There were seven Russians in attendance 
at this Second Conference of Socialist Journalists , in-
cluding Rubanovich , representing la Tribune russe and 
~namia Truda; Nelin of Das Parteileben; and Lenin of Le 
Prole taire . 
lcompte - rendu officiel de la 10 me ••• , 59-67 . 
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The only record of Russian participation at this 
meeting is in connection with a request from the Inter-
national Socialist Bureau that delegates compose a list 
of reliable correspondents in each country upon whom 
socialist newspapers could depend and that they do what -
ever else they could to further the e~change of informa-
tion on national movements . Delegate Boussel expressed 
his fear that the Bureau could not assume the responsi -
bility of selecting such correspondents and that each 
socialist newspaper would have to give considerable 
space to foreign correspondents as a consequence of this 
move . Rubanovich replied that Boussel's fears that the 
selection of authorized correspondents would alienate 
those socialist groups not represented were exaggerated . 
He declared that not only should the correspondents be 
named, but the list of journals issued by the member 
parties should be enlarged . He concluded by pointing 
out that the fact that the French press is so poorly in-
formed on the international socialist movement is reason 
enou&~ for these measures . 1 
On October 12 , 1908 , the day after the meeting of 
the Bureau , the Interparliamentary Committee met . This 
organization had been proposed at the London Congress of 
1896 . Vaillant served as its temporary secretary until 
1oom te - rendu officiel de la 2 me r eunion des 
Journalistes Socialistes , 10 Octobre 190 Ghent : 
Societ~ Coop ~rative , 1909) . 
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it was formal l y foWlded , along with the Bureau , at the 
Paris Congress. At the Amsterdam Congress in 1904 it 
became a distinct organization with a permanent secre-
tariat of its ovm in the etherlands . Its function was 
"to facilitate common action on principal international 
econonic and political questions," and its members were 
to be those nations having socialist parliauentary rep-
resentatives . 1 Those Russians in attendance at this 
meeting were the same ones who attended the Bureau meet -
ing of the previous day . There is no record of articular 
Russian participation in this meeting . 2 
There was another meeting of the Bureau on October 
28 , 1909, but the number attending was only six, and 
Rubanovich was the only Russian resent . 3 here is no 
record of this gathering available . 
~ ossibly due to the small attendance at this gather-
ing, another meeting of the Bureau was scheduled for 
November 7-10 . On November 6 , before the Bureau met , the 
Socialist Journalists met again . Lenin was present at 
this meeting, but he did not sign the list circulated 
among the dele -sates . Van der Esch wonders whether this 
1van der Esch , 64- 68 . 
2com te-rendu officiel de 
Commission Inter arlementaire 
soci te Cooperative , 1909 • 
3 me conference de la 
ctobre 190 Ghent: 
3camille Huysmans , The olicy of the 
(London: llen & Unwin, 1916) , p . 14 . 
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. t . 1 was an oversight or ~n ent~onal . ,A. t the Bureau meeting 
which followed the Left Ving of the Dutch Social Demo-
cratic labor Party applied for admission to the Inter-
national as the Dutch Social Democratic Party . Adler 
moved to refer the matter to the Dutch section and if 
it could not be vvorked out there , the new party could 
appeal to the nureau . Lenin attacked the motion as being 
opportw1istic and unfair to the Dutch orthodox l1.arxists 
and also the Bureau for its failure to admit this Marxist 
group immediately . Hevertheless , Adler's motion was car-
ried by a slight maj ority . 2 There is no further informa-
tion available on this meeting . 
The final meeting of the Bureau before the Copen-
hagen Congress was held in Copenhagen on August 26 , 1910 , 
just before the Congress convened . The Russians present 
were Lenin, Medem and Rubanovich . !l-ost of the time at 
this meeting was consumed with laying the final plans for 
the Congress . The only specifically Russian contribution 
to these plans was Rubanovich's proposal that a fifth 
commission be selected to deal with those miscellaneous 
resolutions which the Bureau felt necessary to refer to 
't 3 ~ . 
1van der Esch , 68-70 . 




As at Stuttgart, the issues that were supposed to 
receive primary consideration at the Copenhagen Congress 
were over shadowed by the condition of t he problems of 
militarism and war .- Two topics were placed foremost on 
the a genda : the relationship between socia list parties 
and the co- operative movement and the questi on of indus-
trial and social le gislation . But by 1910 the threat of 
-vvar had taken new dimensions , and its consideration 
dominated the proceedings of the Con gress . Three years 
earlier it was supposed that the capitalist war would 
probably start over some colonial issue like those raised 
by the Fashoda and h~orocco crises , but recent events 
changed socialist expectations on this matter . The Aus-
trian annexation of Bosnia and Herze govina in 1908 and 
the frantic naval rivalry developing between Britain and 
Germany indi cated that war might as easily develop from 
the Balkan situation or the armament race . Far seemed 
more imminent than ever , and the resulting tensions were 
evidenced in the bitter disputes between national groups 
at the Congress , each failing to really understand the 
problems of the other . 
There were thirty-nine members of the Russian section 
at Copenhagen . The representatives of the Socialist Revo-
lutionary Party were Araratsky, Avk sentev, Bobrov, Hunakov , 
Dr a tov, Vic tor Chernov , Nikolayevich, Pa vlovsky, Rubanovich , 
Steblev , and Volkhovsky . Ratner and Yemanuilov represented 
the Jewish Socialist Labor Party . Dele gates serving as 
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the sole representatives of their organizations were: 
Chirakuny of Dachnaktzoutioun (sic) , Duman of the Ar-
menian Socialist Revo lutionary Party , Pereverzev of the 
Russian Railroad Union , and Semel of the Lettish Social-
ist Revo l utionary Party and the Lettish Social Democratic 
Union . The maj ority of the Russian section was c~mposed 
of the dele ga tes of the .Social Democratic Labor Party, 
which included: Davidov , Fridender (Bund) , I goev, Kamenev , 
Kollontay , Lenin , lvmrtin (Letti sh Social Democratic Party) , 
.1\:artov, Maslov, lviedem (bund), Natanson (Bund), Olgin I, 
Ol gin II (Bund ) , Petrov , P l ekhanov , Trotsky , Varsky, 
Vasilev, Voinov , Yememe , Zaharov , and Zinoviev .1 
lIb i d • , 2 8- 2 9 . 
Nikolay Dmetrievich Avksentev (1878 - 1943) was a Social-
ist Revolutionary leader who participated in the Revolution 
of 1905 . He became a worker 's deputy in the retersburg 
Soviet and served as the leader of the Right-wing faction 
of the S. R. Party. 
Bobrov (Ma rk Andreevich Na tanson; 1850-1919) was a 
member of the revolutionary movement from the early 1860's . 
He was one of the founders of the Zemlya i Volya , and he 
later joined the Narodnaya Volya . Several times he was 
arrested and exiled. tle was a member of the Central Com-
mittee of the Socialist Revo l ut i onary Party from its found-
ing and after 1905 ·was a member of the Left v.;ing of that 
group . 
Viktor fu ikhailovich Chernov (1876-1952) was the fore -
most theoretician of the Socialist Revolutionary Party . 
He began his political career in the 1890's in the ranks 
of the 1'-Jarodnaya Volya . In 1899 he emi grated to ~~·~ estern 
Europe where he joined the S. R. Party and became a member 
of its Central Committee and editor of its central organ , 
Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya . 
Lev Borisovich Kamenev (1883-1936) was the son of an 
engineer, vvho received a technical education before join-
ing t he H. s .D. L .P . in 1901. He sided with the Bolsheviks 
and in 1908 was arrested and forced to emigrate . lie con -
tributed to ma..'1y Social Democratic pub l ications and was a 
staunch supporter of Lenin . 
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The Conc;ress divided itself into five com.1'ilissions , 
one to deal wit!J. each o f the main issues on the a.;enda 
and one to deal with the miscellaneous resolutions thQt 
were received . The Russian dele..;ates assigned to the 
First Cor;unission on Cooperatives were Chernov, Lenin , 
Pavlovsky , Voinov , and ~inoviev (alternate); to the decond 
Conmission on International So lidarity and Trade Ur-ion 
ur.~.ity Viere Avksentev, 1.artin , Ledem (alternate)' lekhanov, 
and Ratner ; to the Third Commission on An tiraili tarism v1ere 
Araratsky , Igorev, Pokrovsky and Volkhovsky ; on the Fourth 
Commission on Labor Lq;isla tion and Abstent ion from 'riork 
Aleksandra l\iikha ilovna Ko llontay ( 1872-1952) was born 
in St . Petersburg and joined the revolutionary movement 
in the 1890's. She was a member of the R. s . n .L.P . and 
origina lly sided with the Lensheviks , although she later 
shifted to the Bol shevik camp . She emigrated in 1908, 
living in Enc;land , Derunark , Norway , and nmny other coun-
tries , and becar.:e a familiar fit:;ure in the European women ' s 
socialist movement . 
Peter ?avlovich Laslov (1867-1946) was a Russian 
econo1:•ist , specializing in aE5rarian questions . In 1 889 he 
was arrested for revolutionary activity and in~risoned for 
three years . Upon his release he travelled to Vienna , 
where h e studied economics . After tv o years a broad he re -
turned to R.ussia to become involved in :. • ..arxist activit~r , 
contributing to several Soc ial Democratic journals . In 
1901 he v1a s arrested again and served s.nother three- year 
sentence. In 1903 he sided with the :,:ensheviks and re-
r.mined on the extreme Right in that fa c tion . 
Varsky (.r-..dolf varszawski ; 1868- ) \:as a nember of 
the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Li thu~.ilia and 
its Central Committee . He was editor of Przt;t l.lad Jocyal 
Demokratyczny and c ontributed to several other r."arxist pub-
llcations . In 1907 he vvas elected to the Central Committee 
of the R. S . D.L .? . v.here he sided vJith the Bolshevik faction . 
Gr i gory Yevseevich Zinovi ev (1883-1936) \'Jas a Bolshevik 
who played an a ctive role in the 1905 revo l ution as a member 
of the St . Petersburg committee of his party . In 1906 he 
was for ce d to emigrate to \:estern Europe . 
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were Bunakov , Olgin I , Vassilev , and Yemanuilov; and on 
the Fifth Conunission on Resolutions were Bobrov , Kamenev , 
I~~artov , Rubanovich , and Varsky (alternate) •1 
As was the custom at congresses of the International, 
the opening meeting was a great outdoor rally on Sunday 
afternoon, August 28 , at nearby Sondermarken . Plekhanov 
was on the first platform. He expressed the gratitude of 
his party for the testimonies of S%1pathy whi ch Danish 
Socialists had extended during the Revolution of 1905 . 
He pointed out how all capitalists dread such revolutionary 
threats and declared that the thing which keeps the Tsar 
and his "army of executioners" in power is the subsidy re-
ceived from reactionary French bourgeois interests . He 
made a special plea that the Congress should demonstrate 
against the death penalty , for every Russian town served 
as a monument to assassinated comrades, whose execution-
ers were paid by the go l d of all of Europe . Speaking 
from the second rostrum, Rubanovich briefly smamarized 
the historic struggle of the Russian proletariat . 2 
In addition to these oral reports on the Russian 
revolutionary movement , the Central Committee of the 
Russian Social Democratic Party circulated a report in 
French on the state of affairs in Russia. By this time 
the Russian movement was experiencing serious internal 
disunity, and the Social Democratic report was designed 
1rbid., 76-88 . 2 Ib .' 
____2:.£. . ' 67 -69 . 
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specifically to analyze and refute the Liquidator pro-
gram . The report claimed that the Social Democratic 
movement was hampered by persecution and by the diffi -
cult situation of trying to defend the revolution and 
socialism in an essentially counter-revolutionary Duma 
dominated by "landed proprietors and capitalists in a 
stage of social decadence and democratic indifference." 
Despite these handicaps, the report argued, the Party 
does its task with honor and be comes the true spokesman 
of the proletariat . 1 
Another indication of the concern of the Social 
Democrats over the question of internal party unity can 
be seen in a letter from Lenin to Grigory L. Shklovsky 
in Berne, dated Paris, October 14, 1910: 
Lt1 Copenhagen Plekhanov and I spoke about the 
publication of a popular newspaper . It is essential . 
(Trotsky has openly moved toward the Liquidators, to 
the support of the "Golos" people to breaking the 
Party bloc of the Bolsheviks and Plekhanovites . ) 
Plekhanov and I full2 agree that we cannot do any-
thing about Trotsky . 
There is nothing in the records of the International to 
substantiate such a move by Trotsky or to indicate its 
significance to the role of the Russians in the Inter-
national. 
The discussion of the cooperative movement raised 
many issues regarding trade unions which had been discussed 
1Jean Longuet, Le movement socialiste international 
(Paris: A. q,ui llet, l913), pp . 377-380 . 
2Lenin, Selected Letters, 288 . 
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at other congresses. At this time Socialists were almost 
exclusively concerned with consumer cooperatives . There 
was some discussion of agrarian and producers ' coopera-
tives in the meetings of the First Commission, but men-
tion of them was dropped from the final resolution . Some 
delegates advocated the founding of socialist-sponsored 
cooperatives, but others were quick to point out that 
rival ele.n:..ents were bound to do the same , so in the name 
of working- class unity the proposal \'as abandoned . The 
majority of delegates favored complete cooperative auton-
omy, but this disturbed those socia list groups which had 
already founded cooperatives . There was also an elerJ.ent 
that wanted to assure subordination of the function of 
the cooperatives to that of the political parties . There 
was considerable general uncertainty concerning the func-
tions of the cooperatives, and until this was settled , 
there was little the International could do except encour-
age cooperative growth and endorse its autonomy . Several 
resolutions were proposed in the commission, including 
one by the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party , but 
since the commission was unable to reach any agreement, 
the natter was referred to a sub-comuission under Anseele 's 
chairmanship. Voinov was the J.ussian member of this sub -
. . l 
COID.ffil SSlOn . 
1Huitieme Congres •.• , 116 . 
155 
In the early discussions of the full commission 
Chernov clearly restated the position taken by the So-
cialist Revolutionaries in 1908 , which supported both 
full autonomy and equality of importance of function for 
the cooperative movement . 1 This position, alone; with a 
brief historical sketch of the cooperative move~ent in 
2 Russia was later published in the or~an of the Bureau. 
Voinov expressed his sympathy for the belgians , VJho ·were 
reluctant to give up their socialist cooperative socie-
ties . 3 Lenin's attitude became clear wh en the subcom-
mission's proposed resolution was read to the full com-
mission . \:hile the deliberations of the subcommission 
were in progress he tried once again to form a Left- wing 
bloc , this time through the maintenance of rapproachment 
with the Left wing of the German delegation . \. orm, the 
editor of ~eue Zeit, served as mediator, and a meeting 
of about ten delegates was held to discuss the issues 
before the commission on cooperatives . The common con-
cern of this group was that the function of the coopera-
tives be clearly subordinated to that of the political 
revolutionary movement . The thing that brought Lenin to 
his feet was the statement in the proposed resolution 
1
rbid .' 114-116 . 
2
.bu11etin o eriodi ue du Bureau Socialiste Inter-
national Brussels : Bureau uocialiste Internationa , 
1912 ), No . 8 . 
3Ruiti eme Congres ••• , 112- 113 . 
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assigning among the functions of the cooperative move -
ment the task of "educating the workers for the fully 
independent management of their own affairs, thus help-
ing them to prepare the democratization and socialization 
of the powers of exchange and production . " For Lenin, 
this was the function of the socialist political movement , 
so he tried to amend the resolution by proposing that the 
democratizing and socializing role of the cooperatives 
be recognized only after the expropriation of the capital-
ists . Lenin's failure to organize a Left-wing bloc now 
became evident , for his proposal was rejected, and only 
he and the Czech l~dracek voted against the adoption of 
the proposed resolution by the commission . In the long 
run, even Lenin succumbed to the spirit of socialist unity 
and voted for the resolution when it was presented to the 
full Congress , making its passage unanimous . 1 
The Commission on Trade Unions was concerned with 
two aspects of trade union affairs . One aspect was the 
absense of substantial international support for the awed-
ish general strike of 1909 . The Swedish trade unions had 
been soundly defeated , and the International Trade Union 
Secretariat was called to task for failing to render any 
aid . The need for increased international cooperation in 
this area was obvious, but it was virtually impossible to 
take any positive steps as long as the International was 
1 Ibid .' 116-117 . 
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still divided on the basic question of the functions of 
trade unions . The second aspect was raised by Czech 
trade union representatives who wanted to establish 
their own national trade union movement within the greater 
Austrian framework . Practically all o f the other dele -
gates were vigorously opposed to such divisions within a 
state, not only because they felt it would weaken t he 
economic position of the workers within that nation , but 
also because such nationalism was the greatest threat to 
L~ternational unity . 
This second issue had even broader i mplications , be-
cause it subtly raised the question of whether Austrian 
Social Democracy , with its German majority , could effec-
tively lead a genuine international movement . The Aus-
trians naturally came to their own defense, hoping to 
settle this trade union question as a domestic one with-
out interference from the outside . Vic tor Adler was able 
to marshal support from Legien , the leader of the German 
trade unions , and from. Plekhanov , and was able to defeat 
the Czech proposal. Plekhanov was one of the leading 
critics of the proposal in the meetings of the Second 
Commission , pointing out the divisive results of follow -
ing such a policy in a multi - national state like the 
Russian Empire . He expressed understanding of the Czech 
argument which indicated that they were having trouble 
amassing an ade quate treasury for their o-..•m needs while 
sharing their contributions with all the other unions of 
Austria , since Hmoney is certainly an a greeable thing 
for the proletariat as well as for the bourgeoisie . " 
(This latter comment brought resoundin g laughter from 
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the members of the corrunission . ) Nevertheless , Plekhanov 
argued that the practical ne cessity of trade union unity 
was the primary concern . 1 At the third meeting of the 
commission Plekhanov , along with \falecki of Poland, moved 
to amend the Austrian resolution endorsing trade union 
unity with the addition of this statement : 
In the polyglot of states , the united trade unions 
must evidently take into consideration the educational 
and linguistic needs of all their members . 
The rurrendment and the resolution were adopted, and Plekhanov 
was appointed reporter for the commission to the plenary 
session of the Congress . On the followin g day Plek.1.anov 
was scheduled to preside over the continued discussions of 
the c ommission , but he was indisposed and was replaced by 
Troelstra of the Netherlands . 2 
The next day , September 2 , he did appear before the 
third plenary session of the Congress to present the major -
ity and minority resolutions of this co~~ission . In a 
rather lengthy report Plekhanov presented both sides of the 
question and noted that both the Czechs and the Austrians 
cited as the authority for their respective positions the 
Stuttgart resolution on trade unions . The Czechs turned 
1 rbid ., 142- 143 . 
2Ibid ., 158-159 · 
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to it because it advocated close union between the poli -
tical parties and the trade unions , and they interpreted 
this to mean that the trade unions should be organized 
on the sarae basis of nationality as the parties . The 
Austrians cited the Stuttgart resolution because they 
saw in its admonition that the unity between unions and 
parties should not be achieved at the expense of the in-
terests of the trade unions , a direct refutation of the 
Czech proposal . Plekhanov endorsed the Austrian inter-
pretation of this resolution and related tbBt the nustrians 
had the support of the majority of the commission , which 
felt that division of the trade unions by nationality would 
destroy them . His appeal to the Congress for the adoption 
of the majority resolution was greeted with enthusiastic 
applause . 1 
Durin~ the discussion of his report , lekhanov , along 
with Eart sky , De Brouchere and Adler, submit ted an amend-
ment to the Austrian resolution , designed to clarify the 
confusion over the use of the ·words "nat ions" and n states . " 
The Czech trade unionists used the discussion of this pro-
posed fuTien~ent as a final expression of t heir position . 
The discussion of the amended resolution was brought to 
an end 1,vhen the floor was returned to lekhanov for his 
closing renarks . he beGan by stating there was no attempt 
to make a blanket conder,mation of the Czechs , as Neme 
1Ibid .' 337 - 40 . 
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suspected , and his amendment was designed only to clarify . 
But then he assumed a tone of increased firmness as he 
reminded the Czechs that the amendment had been passed 
unanimously and warned that although the International 
had no bayonets or canons with which it could force them 
to desist in their divisive agitation , their continued 
activity in this direction would alienate them from the 
Czech workers , who would con t inue to follow the leadership 
of Czech Social Democracy without the trade unions , if 
necessary . 1 
In ligh t of the increasingly tense international 
situation the Commission on Antimilitarism drew the grea t -
est amount of attention from the Congress . lvlany hoped this 
issue had been settled with the Stuttgart Resolution , but 
the debate soon revealed that there were still some INho 
felt that more than parliamentary action had to be taken 
to avert war and that they wanted the International to 
commit itself to some form of direct action . Vaillant 
asswned the leadership of this faction with support from 
an unsuspected ally , James Keir Hardie , the first Inde -
pendent Labour Party member of the British Parliament . 
These a ctivities propose d an amendment ·which resurrected 
the much debated i ssue of the general strike , but before 
the Congress could flounder on it , the professional medi -
ator Vandervelde was able to have the entire issue shelved 
1Ibid .' 349-50 . 
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by referring the amendment to the Bureau for consideration 
and to the next Congress for discussion. 1 At the same 
time increased reliance was placed upon the Bureau to take 
action in face of the threat of war through the passage 
of a resolution authorizing the Bureau : 
To execute those measures the Congress ctmrges 
the Bureau in the face of threatening danger of war 
and to take the necessary steps to bring about agree-
ment between the workers ' parties of the countri~s 
concerned in order to protect them from the war . 
When the Third Commission convened to prepare the 
issues of war and militarism for the consideration of the 
Congress, it was confronted with a report on the matter 
from the German section, two pr oposed resolutions from 
Great Britain , and one each from France and Italy . A sub-
commission was appointed to digest this material . Volk-
hovsl~y objected ·when the chairman failed to name a Russian 
delegate to this subcommission . He said Russia was one 
of the most militarized nations in the world and should 
have a voice in the preliminary discussions of the issues. 
He , therefore, demanded tba t a dele ga te from the Russian 
Socialist Revolutionary Party be named to the subcommission . 
1'1~ri ting from Berne in the Spring of 1915, Lenin tells 
Kollontay of an argwnent he had in 1910 with z. hoglund 
over the question of ttarming the people . n Hoglund dis-
approved of this policy, and Lenin states that he tried to 
prove to him that his stand was neither Left nor revolu-
tionary, but was "simply Philistinism of the provincial 
petit - bourgeoisie ." This discussion could have taken place 
at Copenha gen in connection with the revival of the general 
strike issue, but there is no evidence to support or deny 
this speculation . (Lenin, Selected Letters, 364 . ) 
2Joll , 143 . 
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This meant either himself or Araratsky, the only Jocial-
ist Revolutionaries on the conunission . Chairman Van Kol 
was firmly opposed to this demand, but Ledebour proposed 
that Volkhovsky be named, and in response to pressure 
from other members of the Commission Van l'~l complied . 
In the subcommission Volkhovsky attempted to amend 
the emereing draft resolution to include an appeal for 
parliamentary guarantee of the civil rights of soldiers 
and sailors and a provision recognizing the necessity of 
socialist propae;anda within the army and navy ranks . 1 
Both amendments were rejected in the subcommission , but 
he proposed them again when the draft resolution reached 
the Commission. In the subsequent discussion he argued 
that the proposed amendment of Keir Hardie and Vaillant 
to encoura0e antimilitaristi c propaganda among the youth 
did not go far enough . J: ... e expressed the belief t.b...a t un-
less this propaganda program was continued v.ithin the 
ranks of the army and navy, military discipline v.ould 
undo the indoctrination of earlier years . He also feared 
that the civil rights of soldiers and sailors, unless 
otherwise protected, would be jeopardized by military 
discipline . The reply of Chairman Van Kol to this latter 
issue was that it did not fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Commission on Antimilitarism, and Volkhovslcy withdrew 
his first anendm.ent . 2 ~'hen Boudin of the united States 
1Huiti me Congres, 190. 2Ibid., 203 . 
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challenged the propriety of his second amenrument on the 
same grounds , Volkhovsky indignantly shouted , ttTo which 
commission should it be deferred? \{ould you say that 
you do not wish to interest yourself in the soldiers?" 
He did not viithdraw this amendment, but no action was 
taken upon it. The Keir Bardie-Vaillant amendment re -
ceived the votes of the Russian. members of the commission, 
but it failed to carry a majority. 1 
The primary issue before the Commission on Industrial 
and Social Legislation was that of unemployment . The 
delegates all accepted, in principle, unemployment insur-
ance , but there was some dispute over who should bear its 
cost, the employers whose interests benefitted by the re-
serves of idle laborers or the genera l taxpayers . The 
final resolution submitted called for compulsory unemploy-
ment insurance , administered by the workers and paid for 
by the proprietors . From this issue the commission turned 
to the advocation of other forms of industrial and social 
legislation : the le gal eight-hour day , the prohibition 
of child l abor , the assurance of the right to organize , 
industrial and agricultural inspection, etc . The attitude 
with which the corrunission approached these matters indi -
cated the degree to whi ch Revisionism had actually become 
the way of the International. This legislation was called 
for vvithout hesitation and without any expression of fears 
1Ibid.' 211. 
of strenGthening the powers of the capitalist states in-
volved . 
The I!'ifth Commission dealt with the miscellaneous 
resolutions that were to be brou6ht before the Congress, 
and its deliberations ranged from a demand for the aboli-
tion of capital punishment to a condemnation of tsarist 
rl.ussia for its policies in Finland . The v1ide range of 
resolutions indicates the breadth of socialist cone erns , 
but their passage as resolutions also indicates that the 
L11 terna tional was completely ' dependent upon the national 
parties for the implementat ion of these concerns . 
t the first meeting of this corr~ission the chairman 
announced a proposed French resolution of protest against 
the treatment of labor organizations by the Japanese 
go vernment . Rubanovich revealed his concern .for procedural 
orthodoxy by declaring that this proposal had to be dis-
cussed by the Bureau before it could be considered by the 
commission. He was no doubt in sympathy with the resolu-
tion and said it would probably encounter no opposition 
in the Bureau . He insisted, however, that the letter of 
the rules be obeyed , and the proposal was referred to the 
Bureau . 1 
The next resolution of special interest to the dussian 
ll:embers of the com..mission was one proposed by Charles 
Rappoport condemning the oppressive policy of the .t ussian 
1Ibid . ' 233-34 . 
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government in Finland and accusing the Great Powers of 
supporting the Tsar in his violation of pledges given 
to the Finns . Rubanovich spoke in support of this reso -
lution , citing the courageous manner in whi ch the Finnish 
Socialists resisted tsarist oppression and in spite of it 
made democratic gains. He called for the accept~~ce of 
this resolution by acclamation , which was done .1 Another 
resolution condemned armed Russian intervention in Persia 
and Turkey . 
Both the Polish and German sections proposed resolu-
tions calling for the abolition of capital punishment . 
Belfort Bax expressed the desire to strike from the German 
proposal the phrase referring to the endorsement of capi-
tal punishment by several representatives of German science . 
He felt this phrase cast undue criticism on the field of 
science . Rubanovich objected by stating that bourgeois 
science had always been the servant of the ruling classes 
and this attack on capital punishment should not be miti-
gated in any way . 2 When the fina l resolution was passed 
by the full Congress every member of the Russian section 
cast an enthusiastic vote of approval . 
The final resolution of special concern to the 
Russians was one proposed by Daniel DeLeon protesting the 
tsarist demand for the extradition of a Lettish Socialist 
named Wesozol. Wilhelm Ellenborgen of Austria asked the 
1Ibid .' 246- 47 . 2 Ibid ., 253- 54 . 
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Russians on the commission to comment on the usefulness 
of such a protest . Rubanovich stated that he felt the 
resolution should be generalized as a protest a gainst 
all vio l ations of the right of asylum , a crime of which 
the tsarist government was particularly guil ty .1 He 
then joined with Longuet , Keir Hardie , and Ellenborgen 
to draft a general reso l ution in defense of the right of 
asylum. It was passed by the ful l Congress . 
Generally speaking , the Copenhagen Congress marks a 
swing to the Right for the Se cond International . On the 
i ssues of war and peace, indust r ial and social legislation , 
and unemployment it took stands that were not too differ-
ent from those bein g taken by bourgeois reformist groups . 
On the issues of trade unions and cooperatives , where it 
had a real opportunity to strike a blow for the c ause of 
the Left , it failed to take any significant action . The 
time had passed when the great Left-wing leaders of the 
Second International were domi nant in their own national 
movements , and this absen ce of leadership was now re -
fle c ted in the International i t self . 
At the conclusion of the Copenhagen Congress a short 
meeting of the Internationa l Socialist Bureau was held . 
Lit t 1 e a c t ion was taken , but a series of d o c Ulllen t s con-
cerning routine matters was submitted without any dis-
cussion . One was from Lenin designating Pokrovsky as the 
1 Ib i d .' 256 - 57 . 
Social Democrati c representative of the Bund to the 
Bureau . P~other from Lenin announced the decision of 
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the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democrati c 
Labor Party to name both Lenin and Plekhanov as its 
representatives to the Bureau . It recognized that the 
Party would retain but one vote , but took this a c tion 
as an indication of its serious desire for unity . How-
ever , the letter was couched in terms indicating that 
Lenin was to be the regular delegate , and it implied 
that Plekhanov ' s i nclusion was a concession to the l11en-
sheviks by the Bolsheviks . Another statement came from 
Rubanovich explaining the composition of the trade union 
group in the Russian section at the Copenhagen Congress . 
A final note from Theophil Medem req_uested separate rep -
resentation on the Bureau for the Social Democratic Party 
of the Ukraine in Galicia and Bukovina and for the 
Ukrainian Social Democratic L:ibor Party in Russia . 1 
The International of Women Socialists met in con-
junction with the Copenhagen Congress , as it had with the 
Stuttgart Congress . At Copenhagen its Russian delegates 
presented a special report . 2 
The Basle Congress of 1912 
Two meetings of the International Socialist Bureau 
were held between the gathering which met at the conclusion 
1Ibid ., 436- 441 . 2van der E soh , 71- 72 . 
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of the Copenhagen Coneress and the special Basle Congress 
of 1912. The first was held in Zurich on Septen~ber 23 , 
1911. Lenin and lekhanov were the only Russians present . 
1 Rubanovich sent a letter of excuse . The only reported 
issue in which the .i. ussians became involved arose when 
Rosa Luxemburg v~as charged with "uncomradely" action for 
her criticism of the German Social Democratic Party when 
it failed to take a pub lic stand against German inter-
vention in hiorocco . Lenin came to her defense before the 
Bureau , and he was chasti zed for doing so . According to 
Zinoviev , whose statement cannot be checked in the absence 
of any other account of the incident, Lenin appealed to 
lekhanov for support in his stand, but Plekhanov replied 
that Russians would have to remain silent on this matter 
and be as "poor relations," because they were in no posi-
tion to challenge the German Party wi t.h its millions of 
members . Upon receiving this reply Lenin left the meet-
ing , slamming the door behind him . 2 There is no further 
record of this meeting . Shortly afteri.Jards the Bureau 
circulated its twenty-first special circular which in-
eluded: Lenin's account of the c;overnment "coup" against 
the Socialists in the Second Duma , the resolution sub -
mitted to the Third Duma which exposed the plot of the 
Okhrana against the Socialists, and the sentences 
1nulletin p {riodiQue ••• , No . 8, 1912 , 127. 
2Gankin and Fisher , 24 . 
pronounced against the Social Democrati c members of 
Second Duma . 1 
The outbreak of the First Balkan rlar in the summer 
of 1912 brought special alarm to the socialist world, 
for it feared that a major capi t alist war might soon in-
volve all urope . The next International Con~ress was 
scheduled to meet in Vienna in 1913 , but since it was 
generally considered that ustria would become involved 
in the Balkan situation if it was not checked, Vienna 
becane a do.nc:;erous place to convene an international con-
gress . A meeting of the Bureau in brussels on October 
28 - 29, 1912 , weighed these factors and decided to call 
an emergency Congress in Basle within a month . The sole 
item on the agenda for this emergency gathering was "the 
international situation and the understanding for action 
against the ·war . " commission was appointed to draft 
a resolution on this subject for presentation to the 
Congress . Plekhanov was a member of this coiT~ission , 
·which accomplished its task in an all- day session on 
November 23 . 2 The Bureau issued a resolution of its 
own in \vhich it expressed its regret over the outbreak 
of the war , demanded the independence of the Balkan 
states , and called upon the members of the International 
to oppose any attempt to further the territorial or 
1Bulletin p eriodique ••• , No . 8, 1912 , 130. 
2 Ibid ., o . 10, 2 . 
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political desi&ns of ussia, Austria , or t he other ~· owers 
in the Ba1kans . 1 ,At this sarae time the Bureau scheduled 
a series of simultaneous international demonstrations 
against war to be held in various capital cities on Sun-
day , November 17 . At each of these demonstrations a 
speaker from another country was to make the principal 
address . Plekhanov was scheduled to speak in both Rome 
d ' '1 2 an L•J. an . 
Before the meeting adjourned Pl ekhanov proposed a 
unification con gress of the Russian 0ocial Democrati c 
Labor Party. He was support ed by Hugo Haase of Germany , 
but nothing ca.r.1e of the proposal. 3 Evidently Plekhanov 
was the only Russian member of the Bureau present , al -
though the official listing of Russian members of the 
Bureau included Lenin , ~ubanovich , Eamenev (Rosenfeld) , 
and three unidentified members l isted as " " "Y , " and 
uz . n4 
On Sunday, November 24 , the s · ecial Con gress opened 
with 555 representatives from twenty- three different 
1J . Bruce Glasier , The 3ocialist Year Book and 
Labour Annual , 1913 (h.anchester : Tational Labour Press , 
1913) , P • 53 . 
2Ibid ., 54- 55 . 
3Gankin and Fisher , 27 . 
4Bulletin p e riodigue • • • , No . 10 , 67 . 
Rubanovich mi ~ht also have been present , as this 
is implied in a letter of Lenin written two months later . 
(Lenin , Selected Letters , 313) . 
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socialist parties in attendance . Russia was represented 
by thirty- six delegates . Those representing the Social-
ist Revolut ionary Party were Araratsky, Avksentev , 
Ka torganov, Khrenov, Kubov , lv1aximov , Nikolayev, Ruban-
ovich , and Volkhovsky . Dissension broke out in the 
Social Tiemocratic subsection of the Russian delegation 
when Gorbunov's mandate from the etersburg Initiative 
Group , an affiliate of the L.enshevik Or ganizing Com-
mittee , was approved , admitting him to the Russian dele-
gation a gainst the wishes of the Bolsheviks and those 
h1ensheviks followin g Plekhanov' s leadership . As a result 
the Bolsheviks and Plekhanovists walked out of the Social 
Democratic subsection meeting and formed their own sub -
section . l It was composed of the six representatives of 
the Bolshevik-doninated Central Committee of the Russian 
Social Democratic Party : Kamenev , Kamsky , Troyanovsky , 
his wife , Shklovsky , and Yury; a dele gate from one _nf the l\1en-
shevik groups., Aleksinsky; and five anonymous delegates . 
The other half of the Social Democratic subsection con-
tained Dan , kartynov and Semkovsky from the I...:enshevik Or -
ganizing Committee; Litvak, Mikaylevich and two unnamed 
representatives of the Bund ; Braun and I11erkel from the 
Lettish Social Democratic arty; Bensya and Tionzov from 
the "Ukrainish Spilka" ; Gorbunov ; Kollontay from the 
1Gankin and Fisher , 80 . 
PetersburG Textile Association; and Aleksandrov from 
Dnevnik Sotsialdemokrata . 1 
The initial meetinG of the Basle Congress opened 
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·with a moment of silence in commemoration of the In.ter-
national's dead leaders, and then Edouard Anseele de-
livered the keynote address, in \oJhich he made a vigorous 
demand for the termination of war and the causes of war . 
1Bulletin p eriodi~ue ••• , No . 10 , 18 . 
anonymous delegates listed were unnamed on the 
roster of the Russian section to conceal their 




G. A. Aleksinsky (b . 1879) joined the revolutionary 
student movement durin6 his youth . By the end of 1905 he 
was active in the Jocial Democratic movement in l .... oscow 
and was elected to the Second Duma in 1907 . \;hen the 
Second Duma was dissolved and its 3ocial Democratic mem-
bers arrested,Aleksinsky evaded imprisonment by fleeing 
into exile, where he joined the Vperyod group . 
Gorbunov is believed to be a pseudonym used by a 
.i. ussian workman from St . Petersburg . Ee was a Lenshevik 
and later a representative of the Petersburg Initiative 
group of the R. s . D. L.P . 
Grigory Lvovich .Shklovsky (1875- ) was a Bolshevik, 
originally active in Belorussia . He was arrested and 
exiled many times, escaping from exile to SWitzerland in 
1908 . 
Aleksander Antonovich Troyanovsky (1882- 1955) was 
born in Tula of a military family . He ·went to military 
school and entered the army in 1903 . The previous year he 
became active in the revolutionary movement, and in 1904 
he joined the R. S. D. L. P . s a result of his contributions 
to several Bolshevik publications T.royanovsky was arrested 
in 1907 and sent into Siberian exile . Escaping in 1910, 
he joined the Bolshevik movement abroad. 
L ... ikhail Fedorovich Vladimirsky (1874-1951) was a 
physician who joined the Social Democratic movement while 
in medical school. Active in r~:oscow 1·--arxist circles until 
arrested, Vladimir sky was sent to Nizkni-.. Jovgorod, where 
he participated in the local . D. organization . He re-
turned to 11 ... oscow in 1898, but then went abroad to partici -
pate in the organization of Iskra . He returned to Russia 
to work in the underground Bolshevik movement and partici-
pated in the Revolution of 1905 . During the repression 
that followed, he fled to France where he remained until 
1917 . 
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The Congress thus began on a very optimistic note despite 
the vagueness which surrounded the Question of the prac -
tical means by which these demands would be met . Follow-
ing the opening session the entire Congress , preceded by 
children in white singing socialist songs , marched to 
the cathedral , which had been made available to then for 
the occasion . After being greeted by tne p ealin~ of the 
great bells of the cathedral they listened to a series 
of dramatic speeches condemning war . This series was 
climaxed by the flowing rhetoric of Jaures, who ended 
the day on a most hopeful , if not religious, note . 
'rhis great demonstration in front of the Basle 
cathedral v~as staged in a similar fashion to the opening 
demonstrations at previous International congresses . 
Several platforms were erected about the SQUare in front 
of the cathedral, and during the course of the afternoon 
a battery of speakers addressed the assenbled crowd from 
each platform . On the first platform was a Russian 
speaker named Antonov , but there is no evidence to indi-
cate which of the anonymous members of the Russian sec-
tion he was. E.e brought greetings from the proletariat 
of ussia to the delegates of the Con6ress and called 
upon them to wage a "war on war . " In his own country he 
felt this could be done through the refusal of the Duma 
to vote monies for the tsarist imperialist machine . He 
re~inded the audience that their countries contributed to 
tsarist i mperialism with any support they gave the tsarist 
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government . 1 From another platform Rubanovich also 
greeted the Congress on behalf of the Russian proletariat 
and expressed a special word of gratitude to the host 
nation which had been so gracious to so many "victims of 
tsarist despotism . " He went on to make a vigorous anti-
war address, accusing the tsarist goverruaent of beli1g 
the chief instigator of the Balkan Kar and the principal 
imperialist power in the world . He concluded with a call 
to proletarians everywhere to struggle against war . 2 
Speaking from the same platform was a Ukrainian named 
Vettig , who was evidently not an official member of the 
Russian section . He condemned the tsar , whom he also 
accused of instigating the war, as the same ruler who 
had been oppressing his people for three centuries . He 
expressed the concern of Ukrainian people for the we lfare 
of the people of the Balkans , but not for their sovereigns , 
whom the Ukrainians also wished to see overthrown . his 
speech concluded with a plea for the proletariat of Europe 
to use its power to stop the war . 3 The other Russian 
speaker that day was Al eksandra Kollon tay, speaking for 
the proletarian women of J: ussia . She assured her audience 
that the forces of reaction had not triumphed in Russia 
and even though many Russian women had suffered on the 
scaffold or in prison or in Siberia , they continued to 
1Ibid .' 7 . 
3Ibid . 
labor with their male colleagues against exploitation 
and tsarism and stood with them now in opposition to 
the war . 1 
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The next day the Congress assembled to reaffirm the 
Stuttgart and Copenhagen resolutions on war, adding amend-
ments particularly applicable to the specific issues of 
the day , i . e ., the Balkan situation , Austro -Eungarian and 
Russian imperialism , and the armament race between Germany 
and Great Britain . In the course of the drafting of this 
Basle Manifesto against war , the Bureau , including Kamenev , 
the Bolshevik representative present , agreed that a mandate 
for a general strike and insurrection should not be in-
eluded in light of the weakness of the Balkan workers ' 
movement . But the resolution did clearly characterize the 
impending general war as imperialistic , the era of national 
wars having come to an end . It stated that : 
Proletarians consider it a crime to fire at each other 
for the benefit of capitalist profits , the ambitions 
of dynasties , or for the greater glory of secret dip -
lomatic treaties . • • • The proletariat will make use 
of all its forces to prevent the destruction of the 
flower of all peoples , threatened with all the horrors 
of mass murder , starvation and pestilence . 2 
The statement on the Russian situation was equally militant . 
The Congress h eartily congratulates the Russian 
workers who organized protest strikes proving that 
the Russian and Polish workers are beginning to re-
cover from the blows received during the Tsar's 
1 Ibid . , 9 . 
2Page 7 . 
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counter-revolution . The Congress re cognizes these 
strikes as a guarantee against the criminal intrigues 
of tsarism, which after having shed the blood of the 
Russian people and after having so often betrayed and 
delivered the Balkan nations to their enemies, is now 
wavering between dread of the consequences that a war 
would mean for itself and the fear of renewed national 
uprisin g which it has itself created. If tsarism is 
once more pretending to play the part of liberator of 
the Balkan nations, it is in order to recong,uer by 
means of this pretext Russian predominance in the Bal-
kans . The Congress exnects that the town and country 
workers of Russia , Pol~nd and Finland, now recovering 
their strength , will tear asunder this fabric of lies, 
will oppose all bellicose tsarist unde~takings , and 
resist every tsarist attack, whether upon Armenia or 
Constantinople, by concentrating all their energy 
towards a renewal of their revolutionary fight for 
freedom against tsarism. As tsarism is the hope of 
all reactionary forces in Europe , so it is also the 
most memorable enemy of democracy and of the peoples 
under its rule , and to bring about its downfall is' 
one of the first duties of the international movement .l 
Although Lenin did not attend the Basle Congress , he 
soon received news of its anti-war stand and expressed his 
reaction to it in a letter to Shklovsky, dated early Decem-
ber , 1912. 
I am extremely pleased with the outcome of the 
Basle Congress, for the Lig,uidator idiots have per-
mitted themselves to be caught in connection with the 
Initiative group . This scum could not be hooked any 
bet~er. But the inaction of our delegates distresses 
me . 
Note that Lenin's appreciation of the results of the Con-
gress was based solely on his partisan concerns in the fac-
tional struggle within the ~ussian socialist movement and 
not on any basis of the socialist theories of antimilitarism . 
1William E . Halling, The Socialists and the \'far 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1915), p . 102. 
2L . enln, Selected Letters , 313 . 
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This was typical of his attitudes during the period 
dominated by this factional struggle . lie had actually 
disassociated himself to a degree from the Second Inter -
national by this time , as can be seen in his statement to 
Zinovi ev after reading the Basle lvJanifesto: "They have 
given us a large promissory note; let us see how they 
will meet it . 11 Kru<'lenev also used the Basle Ivlanifesto as 
a tool in advancing the revolutionary cause in Russia . 
In the Bolshevik organ Sotsial-Demokrat of J·anuary 25, 
1913 , he interpreted the Basle Ivianifesto , subordinating 
its anti-war message and emphasizin,; its call for the 
revolutionary overthrow of the Romanov dynasty. 1 
Angelica Balabanova culminated her activities in the 
Second International at this Congress. As a member of 
the Italian section she presented the Italian position in 
the discussion of the resolution against war , translating 
her statements into German , French and English as she 
went along . At the final meeting of the Congress the 
aged Agnini reiterated the stand taken by the Italian 
Socialists in opposition to the war . Balabanova elo-
quently translated his speech into the three languages , 
and at the end of her translation the entire audience rose 
in applause . It was not until Bebel ca.rae forward and em-
braced her that she realized the ovation was for her . At 
the time of the Basle Congress two Italian syndicalists 
1Page 8 - 9 . 
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who had been leaders in the lawrence strilce in the United 
States were being tried . Balabanova \las the sponsor of a 
resolution, adopted by the Congress , protesting t he "re-
actionary prosecution of their case . "1 
There was little other concrete action that the Con-
gress could consider . It ended on the same religious 
note of the previous day at a public meetin~ in the 
cathedral . Bebel ' s comments c oncluded vdth a statement 
of gratitude to the Church for the use of the cathedral . 
Ee said , "I am frankly of the opinion that if the Christian 
3avior were to reappear today and see the many CLristian 
communi ties , the hundreds and millions who call themselves 
Christians but are so in name alone , he v1ould not stand in 
their ranks but in our army . " 2 
This eathering , more a demonstration than a congress , 
marked the apex of the optimistic self-confidence of the 
International . ·.:ost of the delegates seemed to believe 
that the very existence of the International would prevent 
a general European war . nly Victor ~dler voiced a more 
realistic appraisal of the situation when he declared in 
his Sunday afternoon address , "It w1fortunately does not 
depend on us Social Democrats whether there is war or 
1Balabanova , 87 . 
2compte rendu analytique du Con0re s socialiste inter-
national extraordinaire tenu a B~ le , les 24 et 25 novenbre 
1912 (Brussels : Bureau socialiste international , 1912) , 
p . 42 . 
not . ,,l The events of the swnmer of 1914 were to bear 
him out . 
The bpecial Efforts of the Bureau to 
Reunite the Russians 
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Throughout this period the dissens ions within the 
Russian socialist movement became increasingly acute. 
All efforts to mend the Bolshevik-luenshevik split were 
futile . Such a degree of disunity within one of its 
larger sections naturally disturbed the Second Inter-
national and its International Socialist Bureau . In Janu-
ary, 1912 , an all-Russian Conference of the Russian Social 
Democratic Labor Party met in Prague . As the Party's Cen-
tral Committee continued to be dominated by Bolsheviks, 
this conference fell clearly under Lenin's discipline . 
~vo months later a group of Russian Social Democratic 
dissenters met in Paris and passed a resolution of pro-
test against the position taken by the Prague Conference. 
This resolution was sent to Lenin by Carl Huysmans in 
hopes that the differences within the Russian party might 
be resolved . Lenin's reply revealed hov·J difficult this 
would be . 
As I have already told you , the Conference of 
the R. S.D. L.P . has condemned the Liquidators and 
various groups abroad who brought disorganization 
into our party and who do not represent anything in 
Russia . On the one hand , in Paris, at the pres~nt 
time , it was such groups who voted for the above-
mentioned resolution •••• 
1Ibid., 17 . 
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On the other hand , there were other groups who 
were invited to the Conference , but who did not wan t 
to take part in it . Now they are 'protesting ' and 
are trying to convene another Conference and are 
calling the gods to witness that they stand for unity . 
That is a very original way of showing uni tyt Let us 
see whether they will create anything serious in 
Russia . Just as it is easy to vote for the resolu-
tions of protest in Paris , so is it difficult to 
achieve anything in Russia, and of course the righ t 
to talk in the name of Russia neither belongs to Paris 
nor to Vie~~a, etc . 
Lt1. any case , those who signed the Paris resolu-
tion are in too great a hurry when they begin to speak 
of a 'split' . In order to determine the existence of 
a split , it is necessary to prove that there are at 
least two Central Committees in Russia . So far there 
are not two . 
As for Citizen Plekhanov , the Central Committee 
told him about the resolution of the Conference more 
than a month ago . He has not deigned to answer . I 
am also comp letely i gnoran t as to whether at the pre -
sent Plekhanov has full powers as a member of the 
International Socialist Bureau (and from which Central 
Co.rn.mittee) . 1 
This was not the first time the Bureau had concerned 
itself with the problem of Russian unity . In 1905 Bebel 
offered his services as media tor in . the Bolshe vik-l,~enshevik 
dispute, but nothing had come of it, probably because the 
revolution of that year temporarily restored unity between 
the two groups . It was agreed later that the Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks should each have a representative in the 
Bureau. On November 13 , 1913 , Rosa Luxembur g proposed that 
the question of restoring Russian unity be placed on the 
agenda of the Bureau for its meeting the following month . 
1Lenin , Selected Letters , 300- 301 . At the ?rague 
Conference the Central Com.raittee renamed Lenin as the 
Bolshevik representative to the Bureau . 
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This move was in response to an appeal from sooe of the 
LiQuidator groups that were represented at Paris . 
Lenin did not attend this meeting of the 3ureau , 
held in London on December 13- 14 , 1913 . The place of 
the other Bolshevik delegate Iillmenev was taken by 
Li tvinov , whose rank in the Bolshevik hierarchy was not 
si&~ificant . Lenin did not attend for several reasons . 
It was not because he did not believe in the International 
or in international socialism or because he did not believe 
in Russian socialist unity . In fact it was this unity 
that was his primary concern . But by this time he had be-
come somewhat disillusioned in the "revisionism" of the 
International and felt that Russian socialist unity should 
be achieved only on his terms . He still greatly admired 
the German Social Democratic Party and continued to hold 
Kautsky in high regard, but he was convinced that the Bol-
shevik stand was correct and that it had to be imposed 
upon all of Russian socialism . From his point of view 
the International did not understand this . Therefore, 
when the London meeting of the Bureau was called he was 
much too preoccupied with the break between the Duma fac-
tion and his party to attend . He said, "The Mensheviks 
only want to scold me before the International. I shall 
not give them the pleasure . Besides , it would be a waste 
of time . It is better to serve the cause than to chatter 
He sent Li tvinov with a folder of official 
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Party material "proving" that there was only one true 
socialist party in Russia , viz ., the Bolshevik Party . 
Litvinov distributed this material among the members of 
the Bureau at the opening of the meeting . One other 
personal factor should be c i ted in explaining why Lenin 
did not attend the meetings of the Bureau during this 
period . His faithful wife had suddenly lost her robust 
health and was seriously ill for quite some time . 
On the eve of the Bureau meeting in London Plekhanov 
submitted his letter of resignation as l1ienshevik representa-
tive . His reason for taking this step was that the Liquid-
ators had gained a majority in the Duma group as a result 
of the dissens ions in the Russian Social Democratic Party . 
He saw this to be a final blow to the unity of the Party 
and , therefore , he could no longer represent the Party on 
the Bureau . He called the attention of the Bureau to the 
fact that the Russian proletariat , t hrough their Bolshevik 
and Menshevik representatives , still believed in unity as 
the principal goal of Russian socialism and these factions 
would continue to support the Internationa l in its efforts 
. th" d. t. 1 2n 2s 2rec 2on . In February , 1915 , Trotsky published 
a statement implying that he had rejected a Menshevik in-
vitation to take Plekhanov ' s place on the Bureau, but 
there is no confirmation of this statement available . 2 
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It was Akselrod, representing the L~enshevik Organization 
Co~~ittee , who finally succeeded Plekhanov . Ee submitted 
a statement of the position of that coro~ittee signed by 
r,~artynov under the pseudonym of "Dneprov. " 1 
~~hen the agenda item regarding Russian unity was 
raised, Kautsky introduced a resolution to the affect 
that since the old Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
had virtually dissolved itself in its factional disputes, 
representatives of the various factions should meet under 
the impartial auspices of the International to discuss 
their differences and to attempt a reorganization and 
restoration of unity . Rubanovich , speakinG for the Jocial-
ist Revolutionary Central CorLJ.m.i ttee, supported Ka utsky' s 
resolution in the nrune of the resolution of the A.rnsterdam 
Congress which favored the "unity of all socialist :parties 
in every country." In his statement he also added are-
2 
minder that unity cannot be decreed by a vote ~of the Bureau . 
Nikolai S. Chkheidze, speaking for the Lensheviks in the 
Duma , also supported the proposal on the grounds that the 
restoration of Russian unity was imperative in light of 
the critical situation caused by the withdrawal of the 
six Bolshevik members of the Duma . 3 According to the 
1~ankin and Fisher , 795 . 
2Ibid ., 9 5 . 
3rbid., 97 . Nikolat Semenovich Chkheidze (1864-1926) 
was a Georgian and a member of both the 'fhird and Fourth 
State Dumas. he served as chairman of the Gocial Demo-
crati c Duma group . 
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Bolshevik account , Rosa Luxemburg objected to ~autsky's 
resolution as too general be cause it did not restrict 
the right to participate in such a conference to actual 
Party members . Litvinov was opposed to Luxemburg ' s 
posit ion and supported Kautsky 's proposal on the grounds 
that it was a more "cautious and systematic plan , whi ch 
approached the question of unity by means of a preliminary 
exchange of opinion . " What he seems to have mea.'l. t ·was 
that Kautsky's proposal was harmless . At the conclusion 
of the debate it was passed unanimously . 
Lenin replied to this action by the Bureau in 
Proletarskaya Pravda (Decenber 26 , 1913) in an article 
e.8.titled "A Good Resolution and a Bad Speech . u He ac-
cepted Kautsky' s resolution as cautious and harmless and 
preferable to Luxemburg's call for a formal "unity con-
ference , u but he criticized Ka utsky' s spee ch vvhich de -
clared the :rtussian Social Democratic Labor Party to be 
dead .1 Ee commented on this situation in the same pub -
lication two weeks later in an article entitled uonce 
kore About the International Socialist Bureau and the 
Liquidators . " he attacked the Li q_uidators for trying to 
exploit the decision of the Bureau in their propaganda 
and supported the stand of the Kautsky resolution that 
"any practical step towards unity must be preceded by a 
preliminary elucidation of the existing differences . n2 
1Lenin, Collected \'Torks , IV, 209- 11 . 2 Ib.-
--2:.9.. ' 212-14 . 
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Lenin stated what he felt the nature of these "existing 
differences" to be in a reply to Huysmans' req_uest for 
his views . He included the data Litvinov had circulated 
at the Bureau meeting and then stated that the split in 
his party stemmed from the same differences that "divide 
reforrui st s and revolutionaries a lirlost everywhere . " In 
April he published an anonymous appeal to the Bureau to 
carry through its December resolution and expose before 
the International those elements which were disrupting 
the unity of the workers of Russia . 1 
It was about this time that mile Vandervelde, as 
chairman of the International Socialist Bureau , stopped 
for three days in St . Petersburg to investigate for him-
self the question of Russian socialist unity. He met with 
some prominent Duma members , including the Chairman, 
Rodzyanko, and also interviewed some Bo lshevik and }'"en-
shevik leaders . At a socialist dinner in Vandervelde's 
honor Alexander ohlyapnikov called upon the International 
to insist that the minority in the Russian movement accept 
the authority of the majority of the party. The Len-
shevilcs objected to this statement coming from a Bo lshevik, 
but the guest of honor was able to intercede and restore 
order by declaring that the minority would have to accept 
the wi ll of the major ity, but the majority would not 
lGankin and Fisher, 90-92 . 
186 
necessarily be Bolshevik •1 Evidently Martov was present 
during this visit , because in a letter to Akselrod he 
declared that Vandervelde had privately expressed his 
sympathy with the lVIenshevik position . To Vandervelde's 
suggestion that the Bureau mediate the question of 
Russian unity , the thirty 1lenshevik leaders responded 
favorably on the condition that the issues be fully in-
vestigated . At least this was ~1.1artov' s version of wha t 
occurred . 2 
The Russian Unification Conference convened in 
Brussels on July 16-17, 1914 . The following Russian 
groups were represented by the delegates named : the Cen-
tral Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor 
Party: Inessa F . Armand , 1,1ikhail F . Vladimirsky , and I. 
F . Popov ; the Organization Committee of the r<.ussian Social 
Democratic Labor Party , with the Caucasian Regional Com-
mittee and the Borba group: Yulii 0 . Lartov , Semen Yu . 
Semkovsky, Aleksei B. Homanov , L . D. Trotsky , P . B. Aksel-
rod , Vlas D. ll,lgeladze, and Arshak Zurabov; the Social 
Democratic I\1enshevik group of the State Duma : A1caky r. 
Chkhenkeli; the Edinstvo group : Plekhanov; the Vp ery od 
1 Ibid ., 100- 103 . Alexander Gavrilovich Shlyapn ikov 
(1884- ) was a metal worker and a Bolshevik . He was 
an agitator among the steelworl~ers in St . Petersburg and 
was forced to seek exile in Western Europe in 1908 . He 
returned in 1914 to aid in organizing the Russian Bureau 
of the Central Committee of the R. s . D. L.P . 
2Ibid . 
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group: G. A. Aleksinsky; the Bund: Borisov and Yonov ; 
the Lettish Social Democratic Party: Jan Berzin; the 
Social Democracy of Lithuania: lhickiewicz-Kapsukas; the 
Idain Presidium of the Social Democracy of Poland and 
Lithuania: R. Luxemburg ; the Regional Presidium of the 
Social Democracy of oland and Lithuania: Jakob Hane cki , 
A. Ma lecki, and Dolecki; and the Polish Socialist Party: 
Pavel Levinson . The Bureau was represented by Kautsky , 
Vandervelde, Huysmans , .Anseele , Nemec, and Rubanovich . 1 
lrbid., 104 . Inessa Armand (Elizaveta Fedorovna 
Petrova; 1875- 1920) was a Bolshevik and an active party 
worker both in Russia and abroad . 
Akaky Iv~~ovich Chkhenkeli (1874-
a lawyer and a member of the L1enshevik 
R. s . D. L .P . He was elected to both t he 
State Dumas . 
) was a Georgian , 
faction of the 
Third and Fourth 
Jakob Dolecki (1888 - ) joined the Social Democracy 
of Poland and Lithuania in 1904 . He was active in revolu-
tionary organiza tions both in Poland and TY¥ estern Europe . 
Jakob Hane cki ( 1879- ) wa s a member of the l.;.ain 
Presidiwa of the boc ial Democracy of Poland and Lithuania . 
A. 1Ial ecki ( 1879- ) was a member of the l .. ain 
Presidium of the Social Democracy of Po l and and Lithuania , 
but spent most of his life in \!estern Europe . 
Vlas D. lv1geladze ( 1868- ) was a Georgian member of 
the R. S. D. L.P . and a ~enshevik . lie was active both in 
Russia and Persia . 
Vikenty Semenovich l<~ickiewicz-Kapsukas (1 880- 1935) 
joined the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania in 1903 . 
He was arrested and imprisoned in 1908 for five years, dur-
ing which time he became affiliated vvith the Bolsheviks . 
I. F . Popov (1886- ) was a Bolshevik ·who was 
arrested and exiled in 1907-08 for revolutionary activity 
among students . he escaped and fled to Brussels . 
Semen Yulevich Sem.kovsky (1882- ) was a L1enshe vik 
journalist, who emigrated in 1907 to join the staff of 
Trotsky's Pravda in Vienna . he a lso wrote for several 
Polish , Austrian and American socialist publications . He 
llepresented h1ensheviks on I.S . B. 
•:..rshak Gerasimovich Zurabov ( 1873-1919 ) was a Caucasian 
1.1enshevik who had contributed to the Georgian and Armenian 
3ocial Democratic press . In 1907 he was elected to the 
uecond State Duma and was arrested and imprisoned with most 
of its Social Democratic members . 
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Having little faith in this effort to restore Russian 
socialist unity , Lenin did not accept the invitation to 
attend . By this time he was fully convinced that the 
International was permeated by "revisionismtt and that 
this unity conference would be just another factional 
squabble. In his stead he comrnissioned Inessa Armand to 
be his chief representative, arming her with a prepared 
statement of the Bolshevik stand . According to Krupskaya, 
Lenin picked this little-known member of his movement be-
cause he felt she wou ld stand firm against the ttstorm of 
indignation" that wo uld be cast upon her ; and stubbornly 
repeat his prepared statement and because she VJas fluent 
with foreign languages . If these were his reasons, Lenin 
was correct in his jud~aent . Every tliae the occasion 
arose for Bolshevik comment on a ·matter before the con-
ference Inessa Armand doggedly reread Lenin's statement. 
It accused 11 all of Lenin's opponents of not being Social-
ists, of refusing to accept discipline, of wanting to 
liquidate the underground organization, of wanting to 
form a 'bourgeois labor party ,' of desiring blocs with 
the bourgeoisie , and of wanting to wreck the Party pro-
gram by substituting 'cultural autonomy' for ' nat ional 
self-determination .' " The final sentences were a series 
of ultimatums declaring that those who desired unity with 
the Bo lsheviks would have to accept unconditionally the 
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decisions of the Prague conference and the institutions 
created by it . 1 
Ivw st of the delegates became increasingly disgusted 
with the irreconciliable attitude of the Bolshevik state -
ment . The criticisms of Lenin's position reached such an 
excited pitch that some of the speakers, including Plek-
hanov , were denied the ri~~t to speak by the chairman . 
Despite the original agreement to refrain from adopting 
a binding resolution at this conference , Kautsky presented 
a resolution condemning disunity, declaring that no in-
vestigation should be made of the past and calling on all 
factions to unite in the common cause of Social Democracy . 
It was hoped that this resolution would also refute Lenin's 
charges and demands . The proposal declared that: 
1 . All groups accept the program of the Russian 
Social Democracy .•• 
2 . All groups recognize as absolutely necessary 
that the minority within the unified party always 
accept the decisions of the majority as binding for 
party activity . 
J . The organization of the party must be secret 
at present; it is compelled to be . The activity of 
all party members in lega l institutions should be 
under the leadership and control of the leadinc; party 
institutions . 
4 . All groups renounce any blocs with bourgeois 
parties . 
5 . All groups declare that they agree to parti -
cipate in a general congress whi ch must so 1 ve all que s-
tions now under dispute concerning the in terpreta t,ton 
of the program and the question of national cultural 
autonomy , and which must determine the details of the 
genera l party organization • • • 
1\iolfe, 610 . 
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The International Bureau refuses to investigate 
accusations relating to the past history of the vari -
ous groups •.. as unproductive and even harmful, 
because they are means by which elements who should 
be united by their viewpoints on the present and aims 
for the future are kept divided • • . Ho greater 
crime can be committed against the proletariat of 
Russia than to interfere with and hinder the rally-
ing of its various groups into a single organism . 
Proletarians of Russia, Wlite!l 
before the voting began Huysmans warned "that who-
ever does not vote for this resolution is responsible be-
fore the entire International for the disrupt ion of the 
effort to effect unity and it will be so reported to the 
Congress at Vienna.n All the leader s of the International 
and ten of the Russian gro ups present voted for the reso -
lution. The Central Committee of the Russian docial Demo-
cratic Labor Party and the ettish Central OoLmittee ab -
stained . With the vote on each article of the resolution 
Inessa Armand repeated do;5gedly , "be abstain . In place of 
the resolution we offer our statement . n The other members 
of the conference were shocked and angered . Plekhanov re -
marked , "Lenin desires unity as a man desires unity with 
a piece of bread; he swallows it . " Kautsky and Huysraans 
asked why Lenin was not present and argued that eventually 
he would have to answer the call of the Russian masses 
and the urgings of the International for unity . Neverthe -
le ss , the Bolshevik delec;ations remained firm , sc the other 
ten delegations voted to report the scandalous matter to 
the forthcoming Congress of the International, scheduled 
1-b .d 
.i l • 
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to meet in u gust, 1914 . This vJas t h e l a st effort of 
the International to encourage Russian unity before the 
outbreak of the war . 
The Special lv~eeting of the Bureau to 
Act Upon the Gu tbreak of the 1,:ar 
1.-i thin a for t niJ;ht of the adjournment of the spe cial 
conference to pro mote us sian unity, the issues VJhic h so 
aroused and excited the dele 3ates faded into the back-
ground . \ ;i th the assassination of the Ar chduke Fran cis 
Ferdinand on June 28 , diplomatic ten sion in Europe stead-
ily increased . Cn July 23 the Austrian ultimatwn vvas 
dispatched to Belgrade, and an answer was exp ected viithin 
twenty- four hours . The Hussian government be gan to form 
its poli c y by insistinG that no Serbian territory be 
al lowed to fall to .. ustria . Th e Russian crown council 
decided t hat war should be declared if Serbia was attac ked 
and it received assuranc es of French support. ',Jhen the 
leaders of t he Bureau received news of the rejection of 
the Serbian reply to the .n.ustrian ultimatum, they decided 
that the International must a c t. A special1n. eeting of 
the Bureau was call ed for July 29 . The da y before the 
meeting op en ed in Brussels ustria declared wa r on Serbia, 
and as the dele gates assei:lbled Belgrade was b e i ng born-
barded . 
This meetin :S of the Bureau was hastily assembled, 
and not more t han t wen t y delegates were able to make their 
way to Brussels on such shor t no t i ce. There is eviden ce 
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that four Russian delecates were present: Akselrod of 
the Lensheviks , Rubanovich of the Socialist Revolution -
1 
aries and Bergin of the Lettish Bolsheviks . RO\vever , 
there is some disagreement over the identity of the 
fourth Russian delegate . Boulanger names Braun as the 
fourth Russian delegate, but Bertram Vlolfe declares it 
was Inessa Armand , representing Lenin as she had at the 
unifi cation conference. 2 It is difficult to verify 
either one of these positions . Boulanger was a con -
temporary recorder of the events of this period , but , 
on the other hand , he was not present at the meeting, 
and even direct reports of socialist meetings during 
this period were freQuently unreliable and confusing . 
There seems to be no way to identify the Braw1 of whom 
he speaks, and this was not a known p seudonymn of Inessa 
Armand . ( Boulanger identifies Bergin by hi~ pseudonymn 
Winter . ) Wolfe is attempting to make a s cholarly report 
of t he e vents of this time, although his s cho l arship is 
oc casionally carele ss . Unfortunately, neither reporter 
documents his statement . It is rather difficult to see, 
in li ght of t he accow1ts of the a ctivities of other 
1Jan Antonovich Bergin (1881- ) joined the Lettish 
S . D. P . in 1902 . During the 1905 Revolution he was a c tive 
in the Baltic area . Throughout this period he was re-
pea tedly ar re sted . In 1907 he was named Secretary of the 
Petersbur g Committee of the R . S . D. L .P ., but the following 
year he was forced to emigrate to Western Europe . 
2
omer Boulanger , L ' Internationale socialiste a vecu 
(Paris : not given , 1915), p . 55; Wolfe, 615 . 
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women .Socia list s , how Inessa Armand ' s presence would not 
have been cle arly noted, although she v;as a little-knovm 
figure in \:estern Europe, and this mi ght be explanation 
enough. Fe r prin cipa l biographer, Freville, makes no 
men tion of her participa tion in t his meeting . 1 A tenta-
tive judgment would have to lean toward t he denial of 
her presence . 
Lenin was not present, no doubt because he had little 
faith in any effort t he International mi c;h t make to medi-
ate the war and b ecause he wished to avoid any reprimand 
by the Bure a u for his stand on Russian unity . revealing 
statement is made by Vandervelde i n his memo irs regardintS 
a photo of t he Bureau which possibly was t aken at this 
special meet in c; . The st a tement is revealing because it 
indic a tes that Vanderve lde possessed a very vague under -
standing (or memory) of t he Russian situation, and it 
also i mp lies a similar Va6uen e ss on t he par t of others . 
He begins by noting t ha t neither _ussblini nor Trotsky 
were present and comments t ha t they \Je re "uilitating on 
t he fringe . n Then h e says , 
Lenin f ailed e qually. He •·as or ha d been a 
member, nevertheless, of t he Int erna tiona l Socialist 
Bur eau , t he meetings of hhich he frequented steadily 
eno u~h . To tell t he truth, not much attention wa s 
pa id to h im . No one suspected vhat would subse-
quen tly becone of t his little man with the slits of 
eyes, reddish goa tee, monoton e voice, alv1ays express-
ing with a cold and polite exactness, t he traditional 
formulae of ..arxism. Undoubtedly, in 1914, he had 
!Jean Freville, Une r ande fi -·ure de la Revolution 
russe : Inessa Arraand Paris : Ed itions so cia les, 1957) . 
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been replaced by another Russian Social Democrat , 
Akselrod or Plekhanov 
Then he _;oes on to mention the f a ctionalism vJi thin the 
1 Russian movenent . Evidently , Vandervelde ha d either 
for go tten or had never fully understood :enin ' s role in 
the ~ussian movement . 
Angelica Balabanova was in attendance at this n eet-
ing as a member of the Italian delega tion. She vvas in a 
remote section of Tuscany when she v;a s swnmoned by tele-
gram to the ueeting in Brussels . LrJ. her haste to .:;e t 
there she boarded the wrong train, and only with the aid 
of a socialist conductor who reco gnized her vJas she able 
to make the connections v hich got her to Brussels in time 
for the first session . She reports tLa t t he Russian 
dele ga tion at t his meeting interpreted the news of the 
Russian ultimatum to Austria as an invention of the press , 
because they , like mos t of the members of the Bureau , 
were unconvinced that war between Serbia and Austria 
2 
meant a general international war . This was the ~eneral 
spirit of the ga thering . The Bureau was meeting to de-
cide what the International should do in c ase of general 
war . It did not realize that the c hain of events had 
already be g un to lead Europe in this dire c tion. Bala -
banova raised the old issue of the general strike as the 
antidote for war , but re ceived no support. 
1vandervelde , 172 . 
2Balabanova , 114 . 
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The genera l hope of all present wa s that the out-
break of general wa r would b e postponed until the next 
Congress of t h e Inte rnational con vened , when it was be-
lieved tha t a socialist policy could be declared whi ch 
would prevent the Ba lkan crisis fro m spreading . Recog-
nizing the critical situation developing in Austria and 
the need for quic k action the Bureau advan ced the date 
of the forthcomin g Congress from Aug ust 23 to August 9 
and transferred its meeting place fro m Vienna to Paris . 
The principal agenda, topic , ~as .;.::,.. ttV:ar and the Proletariat, tt 
and the Bureau promised that the Congress would be a 
"vigorous expression of the absolutely p eaceful will of 
the workers of the whole wor ld. nl To hold t he line until 
the Congress met , the Bureau unanimously passed a reso-
lution c a lling for intensification of anti-war demon-
strations, the localization of the Aus tro-Serbian war 
and its settlement by arbitration in order to keep Ger-
many , Russia, France, and En gland neutral . The resolution 
concluded with this statement: 
It i s further resolved t hat t he International 
Socialist Bureau congratulates the Russian worlcers 
on their revolutionary attitude, and invites them 
to continue their heroic efforts a gainst tsarism as 
being one of the most eff~ctive g uarantees a gainst 
t he t hreatened world war. 
1A. Yi . Humphrey, International Socia lism and the \Ja r 
(London: P . s . King & Son, Ltd . , 1915), pp . 32 - 33 . 
2~• a lling, 126 . 
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This final stateNent in the resolution capt ured the spirit 
of the speech g iven by Rubanovich at the mass meeting held 
on the evening of July 29, and on this note the special 
meeting of the Bureau adjourned. For t vw feverish days 
t he dele ga tes had tried to take some stand that ·would 
guide the so cial i st world in preventing a general wa r. 
The final session was another mass meeting, at Vih ich Jean 
Jaures ga ve vvha t \·vas to be the most eloquen t speech of his 
long career . Again he called for a "war against war ," an d 
the thousands -v ho overflowed the Cirque .~.-to yale too~ up his 
cry and marched through ~he streets of Brussels shouting, 
"A bas laguerre! Guerre a laguerre! Vive l'Inter-
nationale Socialiste ! " However, as their shouts r ang 
across the avenues and boulevards t he order to mob ilize 
the Russian army wa s b e ing given , and t wo days later 
Jaures fell victim to an inflamed nationa list assassin . 
E'ocialist Response to the \'ra r 
dh en the leaders of the Bureau called their special 
.meeting in July, they were extremely anxious over the 
tense international situation . t the sar.1e time, they 
maintained the optimistic conviction that in some way war 
would be averted . The weeks of hesitation following the 
Sarajevo incident offered some en co ura.::;emen t, and after 
issuing their anti - war resolution, t hey waited rather 
ca l mly for t he conventi n of the forthcoming Con5ress in 
-
Paris . They eviden tly did not expect an i mmediate crisis, 
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since some of them went on their vacat ions as p l anned: 
Kau t sky to Rome, Ebert to the island of Rugen , Victor 
Adler to Bad Nauhelin , and 3cheidemann to c limb in the 
Alps . Even Lenin did not feel it was necessary to stay 
near t he c enter of activity, as he took Krupskaya into 
t h e Carpathians for her health . 1 
Eowe ver, in Russia the vJOrkers had already begun to 
resp ond to the impending danger . In mid- July they ini-
tiated a new series of strikes for higher wages, but 
within a fe\~ days these strikes had become anti - tsarist, 
an ti -mili t ar i st riots . They were termina ted \ihen St . 
Petersburg wa s plac ed under martial law on July 26 . Ten-
sion continued for a few days until the ~rman declaration 
of wa r on Russia, after whi ch most Russian laborers re-
sp onded to the call to work in the defense of the father -
land . A revived Pan- Slavi c spirit swept over t he Russian 
Empire, and only in the Duma was there any clear oppo si -
tion to the 1.var in its early stages . year before the 
Social 'Democ ratic members of the Duma had addressed a 
letter to t he Socia l Democ ratic members of t he Austrian 
Reichsrat conderming t he imperia list riva lry between 
Russia and Austria- Hungary for hegemony in t he Ba lkans . 2 
At t h e outbreak of the war it appeared t ha t the Soc ial 
Democ r a ts would be joined by t h e So cialist Hevolutionary 
1 Jol l , 159 . 
~Jallinc, 111- 113 . 
198 
Party, VJhich issued an anti-war manifesto denow1cing the 
protection of Serbia as hypocrisy . But when the Duma met 
on August 8 to vote war credits , it was the Social Demo-
crats , temporarily united with the eleven deputies of 
Kerensky ' s Labor Party, who stood alone in abstaining 
from the vote on t he war credits and in disclaiming all 
responsibility for the war . 1.lhen the issue of the war 
credits was raised, the So cial Democratic deputy, Va lentin 
Khautsov, issued a demand for amnesty for all political 
prisoners and for a policy of conciliation toward op-
pressed nationalities. \·vhen t hese demands were refused, 
Khautso v read a declaration stating that "the hearts of 
t he Russian workers vvere with the European pro letariat" , 
and he condemned the war as the result of the provocations 
of the ruling class . Khautsov and the other thirteen 
So cia l Democratic deputies walked out of the meeting and 
on all future occasions abstained, along with the Labor 
Party deputies, from voting for any war credi ts, 1 despite 
Vandervelde's pleas to the Russian Jo cialists to join in 
the confli ct against Prussian Junkerdom. 
Generally speaking, the socialist leaders in H.ussia 
re~ained united in t heir opposition to the war , but their 
comrades abroad did not share such unanimity of position . 
These exiles, many of whom had spent tlirre in tsarist 
prisons , raised the question of where their primary 
1 Thid.' 189. 
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loyalty lay, in international socialism or in the defense 
of the homeland . r here were five members in the Commit tee 
of Bolshevik Organizations Abroad; two enlisted in the 
French army and one resi gned from the Co.r;uni ttee and the 
Party to return ho.r11e to fight . Shortly after the out-
break of the war there was a general meeting of Bolshevik 
exiles in Paris . Of the ninety- four present , eleven favored 
active support of the war and many admitted they were un-
decided . A group of SOcialist Revolutionary exiles - -
Argunov , Avksentev , Bunakov, Lazarev , Iuoiseenko, and 
Voronov -- formed a g roup called "Beyond the Frontier,n 
which advo cated Russia ' s defense . They were joined by 
Breshkovskaya and their Bureau repre sen tat i ve Rubano vich . 1 
Lany members of this g roup joined with Plekhanov and Leo 
Deutsch in addressing a "Russian Socialist r,cani festo 1' to 
the workers of Russia . Plekhanov was probably the princi -
pal author of this lengthy docunent which encouraged the 
workers to defend their homeland . It told them that in 
defending Russia they were defending t hei r freedom and 
warned against succumbing to accusations tha t they we r e 
sustaining a repressive tsari~l , because defeat at the 
hands of Germany would result in greater repression and 
deprivation than they had ever known . 2 A year later some 
1\lo lfe, 628- 629 . 
2A. J . Sack, The Birth of rlussian Democracy (New Yorlc 
Russian Informa tion Bureau, 1920), pp . 160- 166 . 
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of these militant Lussian So cialists in exile met ~ith 
Akselrod , Aleksinsky and Zinoviev and passed a series 
of resolutions justifying their support of Russia ' s de-
fense by citing the resolution of the Copenhagen Congress 
of 1910 which upheld the right of all peoples to defend 
thenselves "against armed aggressions and forced sub -
jugation . "l 
A fev· Russian Socialists abroad rer,iained inter-
nationalist in t heir vie·ws on the war . They included 
Chernov, Lenin , I,:artov, and Tro t sky . The Bolshevik exiles, 
in particular , were shocked by the turn of events . They 
had interpreted tL.e Basle resolution to be an endorseitlen t 
of their belief that world revolution must be~in with the 
overthrow of the tsar and reco gni tion of t he responsibility 
of the international proletariat to he l p that revolution 
take p l a ce . They could not under stand hm• the soc ia 1 Demo-
crati c parties could have abandoned their internationalism 
by supporting the war . Thos e who had supported their 
governments in alliances with tsarist Russia were even 
more enigma tic in their a ctions . The Bolsheviks felt 
t hese traitors to international socialism had sold out 
the L ussian v:orl.ci ng class which had made such sacrifi ces 
since 1905 . 2 Trotsky was the first to t ake an extensive 
anti - war stand in his r;a r and tte International , ·whi ch 
1HUlllanit e (Paris) , Oct. 9 , 1915. 
2 Page, 91 . 
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was written in Zurich where he fled after the outbreak 
of the war . In this short" ork Trotsky particularly 
attac ked the stand t a};:en by the German Social Democrats . 1 
Lenin and l.1artov endorsed his posit ion . Lenin stood 
irrevocab ly against the war as a violation of the princi-
ples of international socialism. At first, he ref used 
to believe t he German So ci al Democrats vvould vote for 
war credi ts only t wo years af ter they had supported t h e 
Basle resolution, which condemned t he par ticipa tion of 
Socia lists in a war tha t would mean t he "shooting of one 
another for the sake of capitali s t profits, for the sake 
of ambitious dynasties , for the accomp lishment of t he 
aims of se cret diplomati c trea ties." He was shown the 
report in the German party organ Vorwarts , but he thought 
it to be a forgery by the governmen t. Vt'hen he heard that 
Plekhanov was urging Russian exiles to join the French 
army , Lenin tried to r a tiona lize these actions by remem-
bering that Plekhanov had once Served in the army . :Fi -
nall y , when he heard that F.arl Kautsky , the intellectual 
heir of I•,.Larx and Engels , had suc cumbed to patriotism , he 
realized the Se c ond International had collapsed . At the 
outbreak of the war Lenin was arre sted in Gali cia as a 
potential spy . Victor Adler was able to se cure his re -
leaue by persuading the Austrian government that Lenin 
was a fanatical opponent of tsarism . lie made his way to 
~Deutscher, 214- 216 . 
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Switzerle.nd , and there, in September , 1914, Lenin be.;an 
to prea ch revolution and a new International, declaring, 
"Overwhelmed by opportunism the Se cond In ternatiunal has 
died. Down with opportunism and lone live the Third 
International! nl 
"The Second International is Dead" 
The realization that the German Party, the model 
party of the Second International, had betrayed the most 
sacred tradition of so ciali sm was a severe blow to Lenin . 
Bu t he recovered almost instantly vJith a revised analysis 
of the socialist world : the Se cond International was 
dead, and it was the duty of those fevv, lilce hinself, who 
remained Socialists, to begin t o build a third and better 
one. Before he found himself in a position to do this, 
he had to give vent to his fury against those cuilty of 
betrayal. \.ith his uTheses on \:ar" of September 1914, 
Lenin beGan an attack upon the leaders of the Se co nd Inter-
national which continued through his "April Theses" of 
1917 . In October he issued a document in the name of 
the Central Comnittee of the Russian Soci al Democratic 
T..abor Party entitled "The .Jar and .ttussian Jo cial Demo-
cra cy . "2 In it he p laced the blame for the collapse of 
t he Second International on those of its leaders v1ho be-
trayed the proletariat by tryinc to substitute nationalism 
1 Joll, 181. 
2Le . '. k n1n , ~;or'"s , V, 123-130. 
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for socialism . He was especially vehement in his attack 
on the Gernan Social Democrats and French Socialists vJho 
took ministerial posts in the bourgeois governments whi ch 
crushed the Commw1e . Lenin called for a new socialist 
w1ity void of opportunism and ncenterism, n because the 
Internationa l had violated its own Basle resolution on 
war and failed to transforn the imperialist war into a 
civil war . In the November 1 issue of Sotsial Demokrat 
another article by Lenin appeared , entitled "The Position 
and Task of the So cialist International..n1 In it he re -
peated that the 3econd International was dead, t he victim 
of opportunism . He recognized , however, that during the 
existence of the Se con d International, it had done its 
share in organizing the proletaria t. 
Writing from Berne on October 27 , 1914, to Alel-csandr 
G. Sh l yapnikov in Stockholm , Lenin outlined the imr1ediate 
strategy he planned to follow in the reorganization of 
the Interna tional . 2 He expressed the belief that damage 
to t he International was irreparable , though Kautsky , 
Troelstra and Vandervelde v;ere nintriguingtt to transfer 
the Bureau to the Netherlands in the hope t.hat the Inter -
national could be saved . He said he was go ing to remain 
aloof from these efforts to revive the Se cond International 
and he advised his correspondent and Litvinov, the Bo l shevik 
1 Ibid.' 84- 89 . 
2Lenin , Sele c ted Letters, 343- 344. 
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representative on t he Bureau, to do the same. "Our main 
task in Russia today," Lenin concluded , "is to organize 
an ideological repulse against the Opportunists of the 
International and Ka utsky . 11 Another letter to Shlyapnikov 
four days l a ter urged him to act in unison Yvith Litvinov 
and advised that "the pat ching up of differences is only 
a miserable intrigue and we must not take any part in it, 
neither directly nor indirectly."l 
However, in a letter to Aleksandra Kollontay in 
Christiana, wr itten in December, 1914, Lenin mention s 
that he is in correspondence with Litvinov in London and 
commen ts on the advisability of ma intaining contact with 
t he Left of the International . 2 One v,onders if Lenin 
really believed the International to be dead or whether 
he hoped to resurrect it on the foundations of its Left 
wing . In a second letter to Kollontay, written in the 
same month , Lenin, again, v!fts not clear v~hether he hoped 
to reform the Second International or whe t her he fea.t ;.:. 
a new one must be creat ed. 
The European Vlar has done a great service to 
International .::3o ci a li s.m in that it has clearly re-
vealed the whole state of rottenness, baseness and 
swinery of Opportunism, thus giving a magnificent 
incentive towards cleaning up the workers ' movement 
and ridding it of the filth ·which has accwnulated 
during the scores of peaceful years .3 
1Ibid ., 344- 345 . 
3rbid., 355. 
2 Ib i d • , 3 54 • 
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Another piece of evidence indica ting t ha t Lenin ' s atti-
tude toward t he International vms not clear is h is con-
cern over bona fide socialist r epresenta tion i n t he 
Bureau , as expressed in a letter to t he editors of ashe 
Slovo i n Pa ris . He re he instructed his corre spondents to 
con tinue to con t a ct Litvinov as the official Bo lsh evik 
on t he Bureau, bu t h e a lso tried to dis credit t he Len-
shevik and ern.i gr~ representatives on t he bure au on t he 
basis of t heir guilt of "social patriot ism . ttl As l at e as 
June 1915, Lenin v;as still referring to Li tvinov as t he 
officia l Bureau r epresen t a tive and was still considering 
himself a "non- menber . " 2 
All during this period , he continued his tirade 
against those socialist leader s who had fallen victim 
to opportunism. In r,.a rch, 1915 , he ca lled a conferen ce 
of r epr esen t a tives of the Bolshevik sections located 
abroad . Le eting in Be r n e , t he tri ed to establish ideo -
lo 5ica l uni t y in fac i ... g t he i ssue of t he V;a r . Lenin p ub -
lished his r eport of t his conference w1der t he title 
"Opportunisn and t he Collapse of the Second In t ernat i ona l . " 
In it he a ccused t he lea der s of the Se co n d LQternationa l 
of "violation of the ruost i mportan t deci sions of t he Inter-
national and t he downrigh t betrayal of soc ia li sn . "3 Con-
tinued statements in t his vein i n di cate t ha t h e he ld little , 
2Thid . ' 366 . 
)Len in , Collect ed ·.iorks , V, 134 . 
if any, hope for the revival of the International . A 
more or less definitive statemen t on this matter c ame 
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from Lenin in the summer of 1915 when he wrote "The 
Collapse of t he Second International . 111 This rather 
leng thy tract condemned the majority of the J ocial Demo -
era ti c parties , and particularly the German Party , for 
betraying the principles of socia l ism and siding with 
the bourgeois g overnments in conducting the imperialist 
war . He presented a detailed indictment telling how 
these social-chauvinists were ignoring the Basle resolu-
tion and included a special indictment of Plekhanov. 
After refuting various attempts made by Right - wing Social 
Democrats to justify their support of the war , Lenin 
traced the infiltration of opportuniam into the 8e cond 
International . His conclusion was a once - and- for-all 
statement t hat the Second International was dead . 
Trotsky was beginning to propound this same thene 
and to advocate the organization of a 'rhird International. 2 
Actually , Trotsky ' s ideas on the outbreak of the war and 
the collapse of the International paralleled those of 
Lenin , but not being of equal stature with Lenin at that 
time , he did not receive the same degree of p ubli c recog-
nition . Ee , also , saw opportunism to be the principal 
weakness of the International and placed special blarae 
on t he Germans for their failure to oppose the war . Lilce 
1Ibid., 167- 221 . ~eutscher, 217 . 
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Lenin, Trotsky also did not dismiss the Second Inter-
national as a total failure . 
The Se cond International has not existed for 
nothing . It has performed an enormous task, to 
whi ch there is no e qual i n history: t he education 
and unification of the oppressed classes . The 
proletariat does not need to begin at the beginning 
now . It will not enter upon the new way with empty 
hands . The recent epoch bequeaths to it a rich ar -
senal of ideas . The new epo ch will cause it to 
associate the1old way of criticism with the new way of criti c ism . 
Never t heless, he felt there must be a new International 
-
which would be true to Marxism , because the Second Inter -
national was dead . 
Lenin and Trotsky were right; the Second International 
was dead . The response_ of its leaders to the outbreak of 
the war had ki lled it. There would be attempts to revive 
-it, but they would all prove futile . Once the French, 
German and Austrian Socialists voted in favor of the war 
credits, the .A . msterdam and Basle resolutions were .nean-
ingless, and Socialists began to join bourgeois govern-
ments . Vandervelde ·was the first leading So cialist to 
t ake such a step , and he was soon followed by others . 
This action taken by its leaders made it impossible f ·or 
the International to retain any spirit of solidarity . A 
few neutral Socialists refused to give up hope . The 
Bureau , under Se cretary Huysmans , was moved to The Hague , 
but no meetings were held after 1914 . The Congress p lanned 
11eon 'rrotsky , Y..r ieg und die Internationale (Chicago : 
Dreifuss , 1914), p . xi . 
for that year never convened , and no one felt he had 
authority to call another . The Second International 
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c eased to exist, except in the minds of those who ~ould 
not a cc ept reality . 
Attemp t s to Revi ve t he 
Se cond I n t er na tional 
In t he mon t hs f ollowi ng t he outbreak of war there 
were several attempts to rally the for ces of the Inter -
national a gainst the ·war . These efforts were made by 
those Socialists who felt they were remaining true to the 
princ iples of international ism and who still believed the 
Second International could be revived . Because of this 
belief the earliest of these attempts vJere made with the 
official sanction of the remnant of the Bureau . As early 
as September 19 , 1914 , the .Ameri can Socialist Party pro-
posed a meeting in Yfashin6ton to try to end the war, but 
nothing came of this proposal . Similar proposals came 
from an Italian- Svviss conference in Lugano and from a 
conference of neutral Socialists in Copenhagen . Several 
sections of the Bureau held special meetings at The Ea gue 
to confront the problem . On February 14, 1915, a group 
of Entente socialist party representatives met in IDndon . 
Socialist Revolutionary representatives were there , as 
well as uninvited delegates from both wings of the Russian 
Social Den~cratic Labor Party . These dele gates are not 
identified in any of the available documents , but the 
Socialist Re:voluti ona:cy delegation probably included ~Ja tan son 1 
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or Chernov, the Bolshevik delegate was 1)re sumably Zinoviev, 
since he had been Lenin ' s leading spokesman in western 
Europe, and the }uensheviks ·were probably represented by 
k .. artov or Akselrod . These efforts to revive the Second 
International were bound to fail . Va nderve lde ' s accept -
ance of a ministry in the Belgian govern.ment was a severe 
blow to the leadership of the International . The transfer 
of the Bureau to The Hague resulted in the assumption of 
leadership by the Dut ch , which was unacceptable to some 
elements in the International. Various sections of the 
International were so divided in their loyalties that any 
coiiLrnon action by them was impossible , and Se cretary Euysmans 
was reluctant to have the Bureau take the lead in any action 
until he could count on the cooperation of the majority of 
each section . These c onditions made futile the efforts of 
the International in taking a c tion against the war . 1 
The most significant of these semi-official efforts 
to revitalize the Second International c ame in barch , 1915 , 
when a Conference of Socialist ·lomen met in Berne . It was 
si gnificant because Socialists from both of the warring 
alliances, as \Nell as the neutralists , were represented . 
Tvvo I.~ensheviks and four Bo l sheviks were present but not 
identified in the re cords , except for Inessa Armand . The 
Bo l sheviks went cor:lpletely beyond the spirit of the gather-
ing when they proposed transforming the imperialist war 
1Rajani Palme Dutt , The Two Internationals (London : 
G. Allen c: Unwin, 1920) , p . 5 . 
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in to a revolutionary vJar . Th eir proposal was soundly re -
jec ted . Nothin g of substance resulted from t h is confer -
ence . 
Th e first unofficial attempt t o revive the .,)econd 
International v1as sponsored by t he It a lian !3oci a li st 
Party , which issued an in vita tion to a ll Socialists to 
attend a conference for this p urpose a t Zi.mmerwald in 
September, 1915 . A planning meeting with t h e Sviiss so -
cialist leaders was held in Berne in July . The Russ i an 
So cia l Democratic Labor Party vm s also r epre sen ted a t t h is 
meeting by Zinoviev and Akselrod . 'rh e Zimrnerwald Confer-
ence ·me t on Se ptember 5- 8 . Russian socialism was repre -
sented by t he Bo lsheviks Lenin and Zinoviev , t h e L=ensheviks 
Akselrod and l•1a rtov , t h e Socia list Revolutionaries Ch ernov 
and Na t an son , Trot sky of the Nashe Slovo group, and four 
Polish and Lett delegates . 1 A series of anti- war resolu-
tions was passed , t h e first of wh i ch wa s a gener a l mani -
festo expressing proletarian solidarity . It was si gned 
on behalf of the Russians by Lenin , Akselrod and Na t anson . 
The delegates at Zi.mmerwald repr esen ted t h e spe c trum 
of s ocialist t hough t , united for the moment in their common 
opposition to the wa r . As long as unity preva iled they 
considered t he ir meeting to be a con tinua tion of the Secon d 
Int erna tional , even t hough they did not have the endor se -
ment of the Bureau . Th ey wan ted to stimulate t h e Bureau, 
1Gankin and Fisher , 220 . 
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not replace it. The Right wing delegates favored orderly 
demonstrations for p eace and opposed any break with 
patriotic groups or t he International. Only Lenin, vvho 
tried to organize the Left wing of the conference, favored 
a more drastic course . He advocated the formation of a 
nevv International on the grounds that the old one had been 
unworthy . The Right wing was in the majority , and it ap -
pointed an International Socialist Commission to implement 
the conference's a ctions and to call subsequent confer-
ences . 1 Tvvo later conferences were held under its auspices : 
at Kien thal in February , 1916, and at Stockholm in Septem-
ber, 1917. 
The lo gi c of the situation in which these Socia li sts 
found t hemselves would not allow the relative unity they 
had a chieved at Zimmerwald to be preserved . Opposition 
to the war forced more of them to break with the capital-
ist goverrunents of t heir respective nations. Lenin's 
revolutionary faction grew steadily whi ch led to a second 
meeting at Kienthal . The Russian delegation included 
.i.\..r .mand , Lenin, and Zinoviev representin g the Bo lsheviks, 
Akselrod and h.:Srtov representing the Jv"ensheviks , and 
Na tanson and t1No unidentified persons using the pseudo -
nyms of Savelev and Vlasov representing the So cialis t 
lnuss ians listed in Gankin and Fisher (p . 377) as 
members of this International So cialist CoirJnission were : 
Akselrod , F . Kon , Lenin, lvlartov , Martynov , Ra dek, Ryazanov, 
and Zinoviev. 
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Revolutionaries.l The increasinG influence of Lenin's 
position is reflected in the Kienthal resolutions, which 
in contrast to the Zi.rn.merwald resolutions, were more 
revolutionary and extremely critical of the Internat ional 
Socialist Bureau . 
The final break with the old International came in 
the wake of the Stockl:o l m Conference of 0eptember , 1917. 
The invit a tion to this conference v1ent out under the 
auspices of the Bureau . It was a ccepted by the Russian 
Joviet or::;aniza tion, and both tt.e Bureau and the Zi.mner -
wald Commission cooperated in plannin ;:; the conference . 
This cooperation was the last instance of n early-united 
international socialist action. The plans of these groups 
failed when the Entente countries failed to issue pass-
ports to many of the leading delega tes. Those VJho t;a thered 
at 3to ckholm, fearing the gains of the Larch 1tevolution in 
Russia would be lost, decided they could not ~ait for the 
old International to arouse itself . They entered upon an 
independent revolutionary course . IJ..'he Bolshevik coup in 
November vies their first step and the culminat ion of the 
activities of this group would be the establishment of 
the Third Internat ional under Russian domination after 
the ·war . 2 
Those Jocialists v1ho did not follow the leadership 
of the Stockholm Conference, v;hich even tually led to the 
lIb i d . , 4 0 7 . 2Dutt, 6-10. 
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formation of the Third International, clung to the hope 
that the Se cond International might be revived . The war 
preven ted them from taking any definite steps in this 
direction, but as soon as the armistice was signed they 
began to agi t ate for such a revival, just as the Left -
wing faction agi t ated for the organization of a new Inter-
national . be~inning in Berne in February, 1919, a series 
of conferences was held with the avowed pur~ose of re-
viving the Se cond International . Hmvever , tlle organization 
formed at Berne never considered itself to be the embodi -
ment of this revival . It was merely an ad ho c conference 
of all kind s of so cialist and labor groups, convened to 
deal with various post -war issues , one of which was the 
revival of the old International . This "Berne Intel'-
national" contained most of the elements of the Second 
International and operated through t he machinery of the 
secretariat of the Second International, still existing 
under Camille Euysroans , but the ext en t of its continuity 
was limited . The Berne Conferen ce was called by l abor 
and socialist elements whi ch l·'i ere independent of the old 
Inter national , and although it 1as planned in cooperation 
with Huysmans , it encompassed a wider repre sen ta tion in 
its membership . It included not only those movements 
whi ch had been affiliated with the old International , but 
also a wide range of industrial and political labor groups . 
Twenty- six countries were represented at Berne . The 
Russian secti on included delegates from both the Lenshevik 
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and So cialist Revolutionary groups . The general com-
p lexion of the gathering was Right-wing , indicating the 
direction in which the international socialist 11ove.ment 
had been moving prior to the war . The conference tried 
to express the views of the international proletariat on 
all the issues that were being considered at Versailles, 
ar1d these resolutions were forwarded to the I'eac e Confer-
ence being held there. Tvvo i teLl S on the agenda were 
particularly perp l exing : the question of socialist re-
sponsibility for the war and the threat posed to socialism 
by the rise of Bolshevism . On the first item the Confer-
ence hedged by declaring the pre s ent socialist movement 
in Germany to be comp letely separate from the old movenent 
whi ch had a share in the responsibility for the war . Al-
though the general opinion at Berne was conde.nmatory of 
the totalitarian nature of the Bo lshevik re gime, it was 
divided on other aspects of Bolshevism . No final vote 
was t aken ; a c onillittee of inquiry (which never received 
its passports) was appointed ; and the issue was deferred 
to the next conference . Hecognizing that the Second Inter-
national had become defunct, the final act of the :Serne 
Conference \:JO.S to form a Permanent Commission with the 
instructions to t ake t he necessary steps for the e arly re-
organization of the International . 
This Permanent CoJI.l.mission met immedi a tely following 
the Berne Conference and again at .tunsterdam in April and 
at Lucerne in Aucust. At _t\.msterdara it ·was decided t .ha t 
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the first general post -war Congress should be held on 
February 2, 1920, and a committee was appointed to drC:J.ft 
statutes for the revived International . The Lucerne 
gathering endorsed these plans , but the formation of the 
Third International caused the date to be postponed until 
July 31 . The organization of the Third International 
presented a rival to the Berne mo vement and split the 
in tern a tional proletariat . Alrao st every national movemen t 
found itself divided between the t wo groups, and for this 
reason the Geneva Congress was postponed . Ramsay La c 
Donald warned the Permanent Commission tha t such action 
would be an open admission t ha t the Second In. terna tional 
was dead, but the general will of the group prevailed .l 
Some Socialists could not align tLemse lves with 
either of these groups, so t.t.ey formed a ';;orkers' Inter -
national of Socialist Parties with Vienna as its center. 
It was more popular l y known as the Vienna Interna tional 
or as the TvJO and One-half International . In the shadow 
of the t hreat of Communism the differences between t he 
Berne and Vienna groups became less and less, and in 1923 
they united in an International Congress in Hamburg to 
re constitute the International with the exclusion of the 
Communists . A second Congress was held in 1925 . This 
united group c a lled itself t he "Labor and So cia li st In ter-
national . n There were probably some members who felt they 
libid., 11-21 . 
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were the inheritors of the Second International, but any 
real thread of con t inuity is diffi c ul t to disc ern . 
Russian involvement in these efforts to revive the 
.3econd International was minimal. s the Bolshevik move-
nent reaped success in ussia more Russian 3ocial .Uemo -
crats were drawn into its ranks . This was particularly 
true after the forr ation of the Third International . 
Those Russian So c ialists vho attempted to keep alive the 
international spirit in the Berne and Vienna Internation-
als were priruarily e igre s who a l ienated both tt ... e tsarist 
and 3ovie t re g i mes , and they steadily declined in nw..1bers 
and enthusiasm as the __;reat 1..enshevik and Jocialist J.tevo -
lutionary leaders passed away . 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study has been to trace the 
interrelationship between the international sociulist 
.movement of the Se cond International and the Russian 
Radicalism of the late nineteenth and early tvven tieth 
centuries. The study has been linlited by the shortage 
of available resource material, particularly by the 
loss of the records of the International Socialist 
Bureau, and by the confusing nature of the Russian so -
cialist movement . 
It is difficult to define what mi ght legitimately 
be called Russian participation in the Second International . 
This difficulty stems from the fact that the Russian Em-
pire was a multi - national state , and the leaders of the 
Se cond International did not know how to reco ,::;nize this 
fact in their organization . (The Austrian Empire pre -
sented the same problem . ) Generally speaking , the l'oles 
received separate representation in the Second Inter-
national and , therefore, have not been included in this 
study . The Lettish Social Democratic Party vias itself 
a multi- national party and \\as usually represented t.i.1rouc;h 
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the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The trade 
unionists were usually represented through the Russian 
Social Democratic Labor Party, too , althoush at some con-
eresses they received direct representation. The Bund 
(Russian Jewish So cialist labor Party) was in and out of 
the Lussian Social Democratic Labor Party durin c this 
per iod. It was affiliated with the R. S. D. L. P in 1898, 
bu t withdrew in 1903 after unsuccessfully demanding rep -
re sen t a tion for all Jewish workers . It reaffilia ted at 
the "Unity" Con gress of 1906, and after that usually 
supported the I,~ensheviks . ... t the Stuttgart Congress, 
Bund representatives v~ere admitted with an advisory 
vote, but they constantly c ame into confli ct with other 
Russian dele ga tes v;ho wan ted to put a stop to their 
separatist character . It was therefore stipulated that 
the Bund be admi tted to the Congress as a member party , 
but not to the l~ternational and that so cialist po licies 
be desi gned in the interest of the Jevvs only in so far 
as they ·w ere members of the pro letariat •1 The Social 
Democratic Labor Party and t he Socialist Revolutionary 
Party were the principal Russian par ticipants in the 
Second International. I,.lost of the other Russian parties 
were indirectly represented through them and have been 
mentioned only when their individual members v ere in-
volved. 
1van der Esch, 62 . 
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An at tempt has been made to present sow.e biographi -
cal data on the individual Russians mentioned in this 
study . This data is admittedl y sketchy, and all parti -
cipants have not been covered . In some cases no bio -
graphi cal information is available . The Bolshaya dovet -
skaya Entsiklopedya1 and Gankin and Fisher are the prin-
cipal sour ce s of this data . Some participants are un-
identifiable be cause of the pseudonyms they used or be -
cause of faulty transliteration of their names . 
Despite these limitations, it has been possible to 
present a fairly clear and complete survey of Russian 
participation in the Second International . It is obvious 
to the student of this period that at best the Second 
International was a loosely connected organization of 
several national and nnilti"':'na t ional socialist groups . The 
basic unifying factor in the Second International during 
its early years was the unquestionable opposition of 
European socialism to the existing govel'n.mental and 
economic order . This common opposition to the existing 
capitalistic governments , more than anythinG else, gave 
unity to the most diverse socialist groups . But this 
unity was deceptive , because t here was no real a greement 
of sentiment within the socialist move.men t at this time . 
Rather , there was wide disagreement over the interpretation 
of the teachings of hiarx . This disagreeraen t stemmed 
from the fact that the theories of Iv.i:arx and the prac-
tices of m.ost of his disciples we re no longe r in har-
mony , although his followers continued to insist that 
they were . 
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The stated purpose of t he Second International was 
like that of the First , i . e . , to organize the proletariat 
in preparation for the socialis t revolution which vJould 
come in the fullness of time . Yihen Ivl:arx first outlined 
his revolutionary theories , Europe had not become . 
democratic. \"hen he. died, changes in t his direction 
were just beginning . Engels observed these c hanges and 
noted that bourgeois democracy was more beneficial to 
the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie , but he was too 
devoted to Larxism to revise its doctrines a ccordine;ly . 
It took harx a lon g time to define his theories , and it 
took his disciples an equally long time to embrace them 
fully . No European socialist party became truly l,ar:x:ist 
until the Germans met at Erfurt in 1891. Therefore , at 
the time European c onditions be gan to belie Larx ' s 
teachings , European Socialists had just become fully 
dedicated to the basic doctrines of bar:x:ism . The rar1k 
and file and most of the leaders of the European social-
ist movement were pra ctical men , not theorists , and, for 
this reason , they we re reluctant to abandon the theory 
whi ch had taken them so long to rua ster . Recognition of 
the realities of their society would have forced them to 
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do t his . Among them , Bernstein did recognize that 
chances had taken pla ce, and his revisionisr:l was really 
an abandonment of Larxi sm . 
The European Socialists vJho founded the Jecond 
International viere fully dedicated to l .... arx ' s revolution -
ary theories , but inas.r.mch as they did not feel the 
revolution to be iLrntinent, they becan to stren~then the 
position of the vJOrker ·with the ne\; deh!.ocra tic means 
available to them. In doing so , t hey followed the course 
of reformiso. while preaching revolution. These efforts 
succeeded in strengthening the labor movement but under -
mined the c ause of revolution, because revolution ~ould 
novi destroy the system \lhi ch had bi ven the \·,orkers 
strength . L:uch had been gained without revolution, and 
they stood to gain rwre . For these reasons, the main 
stream of European socia li sm in the 0e cond Internationa l 
abandoned the .arxian do c trine of revolution . 
These European do c ialis t s betrayed Larx in their 
refornism, but they did not betray socialism until later 
when they were confronted v;i th the outbreak of the ·\:Jar . 
~-hether lu.arxian or not , so cia l isn in this age \1Jas inter-
nationalist . One basi c tenet was that the proletariat 
of different nations have more in CO.D..liilon than the vari-
ous classes of the s&,le nation . Therefore , the ultiraat e 
loyalty of a socialist should be devotion to international 
so cia l ism , not patriot ism. ~bove all , they vvere v.arned 
not to allov, themselves to becone involved in capitalist 
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warfare , in which they \ ould be bu t cannon fodder i n the 
n8111e of bourgeo i s imperialism . Resolution af ter resolu-
tion \'las passed by the Second International endorsing 
the an ti -war po lic y , but when they were faced with t h e 
t ask of app l y i ng this principle in 1914, mos t of its 
le a der s cho se pa trioti sm . 
Thus , on t wo occasions , t he major it y of t he Larxian 
members of t he Se cond International strayed from the p8th 
of r evo lutionary so ciali sm : in their reformism. 811d in 
t heir re sponse to t he wa r . On bo t h occasions , they re-
fused to admit t ha t they had violated their principles 
and sought to justify their a ctions i n Earxian ter.r.1s . 
The result was wide disagree.r.1ent over the interpr e t a tion 
of the t eachings of lv.ia rx , which jeopardi ze d the unity of 
t he Internat iona l and, on the second occasion, destroyed 
it . This p rob lem o f d isunity was c omplicated by the fact 
that t here were several significant socia list parties 
and tr ade unions which v; ere not ka rxi an in their origins . 
As these tendencies toward diversity increased, t he 
appearance of unity bec ame all-important in the position s 
t aken by t he Second Inter national . hS several socialist 
parties gai ned s i gnificance in t heir national legislatures, 
t hei r opposition to the ttbourgeoisn governmen ts in which 
t hey participated weakened . The thing whi ch had p revi-
ously united a ll So cia lists in t he Se co nd International 
was their c ommon opposition to such governments . \:hen 
t h is opposit ion weakened , the basic unity of the 
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International viaS threatened . 1Jo t Vvanting to re c ocnize 
t l1is fact, the leaders o f the uecond International 
strained even harder to maintain an out\vard seablance 
of agr eement . 'rhis effort c aused most of t he re solutions 
passed by t he International to be meaningl ess cor.rpro -
mises . 
··.here did the Russians stand in relation to the 
failure of the rhain stream. of the Se cond International 
to live up to the princip les and hopes o f i ts founders? 
Generally speakins , t he .1: u ssian members of the Se cond 
International a cc epted the princi ple of mai ntainine an 
out\,ard semb l ance of unity and \1ere willinz to sa crifice 
sor.1e of their basic ideologic a l doctrines i n the nar.1e of 
unity . This was the case at least until Lenin beean t o 
l ose faith in t he International and to a c t independently 
of it . If there was any one issue on whi ch the Russians 
\vere unv;illinc to raake a sacrifice , it \,as in their c on -
tinued and stahJart op_posi tion to "revisionism . " It 
should be noted , however, t hat t h e Russi an posi tion on 
t h e q_ues tion of revisionism v1as conditioned by histori -
cal circumstances . In Russia , nei t he r did t he existing 
conditions belie l,B. rx nor were t he democrat ic mean s for 
reform available . Revolution continued to be the socia l-
ist way . The Erfurt program left the door open to re-
formism b y recogniz ing parliamen t ary action as a legiti-
ma te so cialist i nstrument , but this concep t had no mean-
i ng i n ... tussia until 1905, if even then . The autocrati c 
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tsarist government prohibited the developBent of lega l 
socialist parties and frustrated any hope of le ~islative 
representation prior to the October Lanifesto . because 
the Larxist doctrine of revolution iias relevant to the 
Russian situation, the Russians rer~aine d its staWlchest 
defenders . Likewise, dussia was far behind western 
Europe in the processes of industrialization, and the 
economic theories of Larx , based on data collected in 
Encland durinG the first half of the nineteenth century, 
still appeared quite valid to the Russians . This point 
should be qualified , hovever , by pointing out that the 
::.tussian :i •• arxists eventually developed their own variety 
of revisionists in t he "Legal I • ..arxists . " 
dussian Jocialists had little, if any , opportunity 
to prac tice refor.r.lism, but they ·were in npproxir.,ately 
the same position as other European clocialists when they 
were confronted ~ith the outbreak of the wa r . Plekhanov 
led many exiles in supporting the defense of t l e f a ther-
land, but his leadership amonc Russian Jocialists was 
wanin~ , and his stand •uas not ne cessarily representative. 
The Dwna was the stage upon V· hich Russian socialism. re-
vealed its true attitudes tov;ard the ivar . 'rhe IB.bor 
(Trudoviki) Group was joined by both factions of the 
Russian Jocial Democratic labor Party in abstaininc; fron 
votin g war credits . The Bolsheviks and Lensheviks pro -
posed a resolution condemninG war and the political and 
social order which they accused of brincing it about . 
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However , despite their abstention from voting vvar credits , 
t he labor Group and the L:ensheviks a e;reed to cooperate 
with the tsarist government in waging a defensive war . 
Only t he Bolshevik deputies rema i ned unconditionally op -
posed to t he wa r . The So ciali s t Revolutionaries boy-
cotted both the 'rhird and Fourth Dumas , so there was n o 
opportunity for them to reg ister t heir official position 
on th i s matter . The individual members of the So c ialist 
Revolutionary Party responded in much the same ~ay as 
t h e members of t he western European parties . The in-
tellectual leaders corap ror.1i sed t he ir i n t ernationalist 
principles and supported wha t they deemed to be a defen-
sive war . The Soci a list Hevo l utionaries of p easan t origin 
moved closer to t he Bolsheviks and opposed t h e war . 
In li c;h t of the a c tion taken on these t wo issues , re-
formism and the v1a r , a certain degree of Russian i ndep end-
ence from the ma in stream of European socialiSlll can be 
seen . The Russians stood in opposition to reformi sm both 
in t heory and in p ractice . 'rhis opposition was t he re -
sult , in part , of the existing state of Russian political 
and economi c c;row th . As time passed , t he Russ ians b ecame 
increasin gly aware of the reformist nature of t he actions 
of their inte rn a tional comrades . This awareness was ex-
perienced partic ularly by the Soci a l Democrats, who , in-
volved i n t he ir own in traparty dispute s , gr adual ly v'Ji th-
drevv from t he activities of t he Second Interna tiona l. In 
t heir response to t h e outbreak of the wa r , the Hussians 
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did not differ too greatly from other So cialists . There -
fore , t he independence of the Russ i ans on this issue is 
less obvious . As t he Ru ssian so ci alist novement became 
increasing ly dominated by the Bo l sheviks , who stood 
clearly apart fron the main stream of interna tional so -
ci alism on the issue o f the war , the independence of the 
Russians becrune more apparen t. These observations sug-
ges t tha t whenever the main stream of thought and a ction 
i n t he Se cond International r an counter to the basi c in-
terests and a ttit udes of Russian socia li sm , t he Russians 
assumed a posit ion i ndependen t of t hat ma in stream . This 
independen ce explains , in part , the r e lative unir.1portance 
of the Russ i ans as a group in t he Se cond International. 
It a l so suggests vvhat the nature of t he relationship of 
Russian sociali sm to the international so cialist movemen t 
would be in the years following t he Second International . 
1io st Russian Socialists divorced themselves from any 
effort to revive the Se cond International and suppor t ed 
the Bo l shevik- domina ted Third International, wh ich was 
not a rep resentative of international socialism but an 
instrument and protector of Russian communism . 
The final question c once rning Russian participa tion 
in the Second Internationa l c enters around a qualitative 
analysis of the .dussian role in the International. This 
quest ion has several parts . In what way did the J.~uss iru1 
revolutionary movement affe c t the developments of the 
Second In t ern a tional? In ·what •aay did the a c ti vi ties 
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of the Se cond In t ernational affe ct the Russ i an revolu-
tionary movement? Vilt..at v·ias the a c tual significanc e of 
the Russian se ction in the meeting s and a ct ivities of 
the Second International? There have been on l y tvw 
attempts i n studies of t he Jecond International to 
answer t hese Questions . The most r e cent vvas made by 
Stanley W. Page : 
In t he p rewar conference s of the .Je cond Inter-
national the Bo l sheviks had been a mere fringe 
group , content to remain on the side lines , some-
times g iving voice to a resolution and [;rateful 
for occasional crumbs of a cknow ledTement that fell 
to the Russian r evo l ution of 1905 . 
The other a tt empt was made by the late G. D. E . Cole and 
is more comprehensive , temperat e , and judicious: 
Next in importance to the Germans and the 
French stood the rtussians , though t hey had no mass 
organization compa r ab le V•ith that of the c ountries 
in whi ch t he work of organization could be openly 
and l avvf ull;>r ca rried on . Indeed , until 1905 t he 
Russ i ans p l ayed no l arge par t in the Interna tional ' s 
affairs ; and even t her eaf ter they continued to be 
shar p l y divided , not only between Socia l Democrats 
and Soci a l Revolutionaries but also wi t hin the Social 
Demo cratic f a c tion between Bo lsheviks and Menshevik s . 
The Russians, ho-wever , had this in c ommon : t h e y 
were all revolutionaries , b ec a u se t here was no other 
course open to t hem in face of the autocra tic Cza rist 
r e gi me . After the defeat of the Revo l ution of 1905 
t h e re was i ndeed a s ort of Pa rliament - the nwna ; bu t 
t he condit i ons of its election denied the Socialists 
all chances of wi nning any substantial representa-
tion i n it, and in any case it s powers were very 
narrow . There was in Czarist Russia no possibi lity 
of buildin g up a pr i mar ily Parli amen t a r y So ci a li s t 
Party on the German , or on any Hes t ern , model; and 
though the ussian So cial Democratic dele gates at 
D1ternational Con gresses continued to re gard the 
German Jo cial Demo crati c Party as the leading ex-
ponent of the Larxi st creed , their ovm situa tion \Nas 
1Pa ge 22. 
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so different from that of the vies tern countries 
which dominated the Interna tional ' s proceedings 
as to make it difficult for them to t ake much par t 
in many of t he discussions . Their mos t i mpor t an t 
i n t e rvention was at Stutte;art in 1907, when I€nin 
and dosa Luxembur g managed to amend t he resolution 
defining the a ttitude to be t aken by So cia lists in 
the event of interna tional war . l 
Professor Cole amplifies this staterilent by pointing out 
t ha t the p reoccupa tion of western European Soci a lists 
was the building up of parties for par ticipat ion in the 
pa rliarnen t a ry struge;le for political povJ er . 
In .l.=tuss i a ... t here was no Parliam.ent for t h e 
Socialists to set out to con q_uer • • • The Russian 
Socialist was a revolutionary perforce • • . 
Because of this, it vvas i mpossible for t he 
:rtussians to become assimilated to the clima te of t h e 
Second Interna tional or to play more than a p eripheral 
part in its doings and debates . The y were outsiders, 
facing p roblems of t heir own which were i mmensely 
different from t hose of t he \: e s tern Soci alists even 
when t hey ma de use of the sarile wo:cd s an d philo sophi-
c a l concep ts . 2 
Disallowing the extremity of Page 's statement, bo th 
of t h ese scholars have struck upon the essence of the 
nature of Hussian participa tion in the Se cond Internat iona l. 
·ihe Russi ans were in a different stage of socialist devel-
opmen t t han mos t of the members of t he Se con d International . 
Hestern European .So ci a lists we re mar shalli ng their forces 
for legi s l a tive struggle, while the Russians we re prepari ng 
for r evo lution. The Russian participants in t he Se cond 
Internationa l, therefore, asswned an active role in t he 
op en discussions only vJhen issues directly affect e d them 
1 Cole, III , 1, xii . 2Ibid ., 392- 93 . 
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or when Russian conditions were not adequately considered, 
e . g., the issue of party and trade Wlion w1ity and the 
question of the admission of the Zionist 3ocialist Labor 
Party . There is no v;ay of telling ·what influence the 
Russians had in informal discussions short of direct 
testimony on their behalf by other members of the Inter-
national, and this is practically non - existent . r.rhe al-
most complete absence of any corrJL::ent about the Russians 
in the memoirs of the other leaders of the International 
indicates that they were considered relatively unimportant 
colleagues . Yet, the allocation of the LlBximum voting 
allotment to the Russian section at the Stuttgart Con-
gress and thereafter reveals that the Russian section was 
considered equal in importance to Gerlliany, Austria -
Hungary, France , and Great Britain. 
Professor Cole asserts that the l~ussians v;ere next 
in importance to the Germans and the French in the affairs 
of the International, althouGh he does not substantiate 
this categorical statement . The Jermans were unquestion-
ably the primary national section in the Second Inter-
national because of their inner unity and discipline. 
The French ranked second because of their nw-·1bers and 
historic role in the socialist movement . It is iopo ssi ble 
to coraplete this l'ankint:,; by national '3:roups, because after 
the Germans and the French, the important roles in the 
Second International were played by individuals . None of 
the other sections played a siGnificant part as a national 
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group . In the minds of the western European 0ocialists 
the Russian se c tion was important only as a symbol of 
the Revolution of 1905 , re ca l ling the all but foreotten 
revolutionary spirit of the Comnunis t Lanifes to . This 
reminder had little impa c t on the course follmJed by 
the International. The inf l uence of individual Russian 
par ti c ipants was also insignificant . In the early years 
of the Second International , Plekhanov vvas one of the 
principal interpreters of Lrarxism . he was ah·Jays re -
spected for his c ontributions to the early development 
of the l.J.arxist movement , but he gave little leadership 
to the International . In later years , Lenin ' s voice was 
heard but not heeded . He frequently opposed the policies 
of the International , and his stubborn refusal to accept 
the will of the majority was a source of concern and 
embarrassment to international socialism . He insisted 
that his opponents , not he , were the deviationists from 
true socialist doctrine . Lenin's most important contri -
bution was his co - authorship of the am.enduent to the 
Stuttgart resolution . Eo~ever , this contribution proved 
to be of little consequence with the failure of the 
International to apply the resolution at the outbreak of 
t h e \Nar . 
Russian participation in the 3econd International 
was not s i zni f i cant • The ri us sian s we re too preoc c upied 
with the struggles in their own national socialist move -
ment to exercise any important leadership in the 
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International . They refused to accept mediation from 
the International Socialist ~ureau in the solution of 
their problems . The result of this attitude was perrua-
nent estranger.1ent between themselves and most of the 
socialist ·world . This estrangement continued between 
the Russians and those Socialists who refused to follow 
Russian leadership . It was a characteristic which 
marked the development of Russian socialism through 
the revolutions of 1917 and the foundinc of the Third 
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ABSTR.\CT 
RUSSI.Al-q PAHTICIPATION TI~ TEE ;3ECOND TIJTERNA':CIOlJAL , 1889- 1914 
George Douglas Ni coll, Ph .D. 
Boston University Graduate School, 1961 
h:ajor Professor : Frank Nowak , Professor of History 
The modern international socialist movement experi -
enced its infancy and childhood in the form of the Inter-
national \'forking ken's Asso c iation , or First International 
(1864- 1876) . Its maturity seems to have been reached in 
the wake of the successful Bolshevik Hevolution of 1917 
with the foWlding of the 'l1hird International , or Comintern, 
and the expansion of J,:arxism- Leninism througho ut the world 
under Soviet leadership . The period between these t wo 
phases , the adolescence of international socialism, was 
the period of the Second International (1889- 1914) . Dur -
ing this period the social ist movement rose upon its ear-
lier foWlda tions and be carne a significant so cial and poli -
ti cal force in almost every European nation . At the same 
time t he Russian revolutionary socialist movemen t was 
growing wi thin t he tsarist empire and among its exiles . 
Hhile Russian So cialists vvere developing tl1e strength 
necessary to overthrow t h e tsarist re gi me , they also 
participated in the Second International . Since no sys-
temat ic study has been ma de of the interrelationship be -
tween the Second International and the riussian Radicalism 
of the late nineteenth and early t"ventieth centuries, this 
dissertation seeks to demonstrate the extent and nature of 
Russian partie ipa tion in t he Second International. 
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This study reveals a certain degree of Russian in-
dependence from the main stream of European socialis~ . 
The Russians stood in opposition to reformiffi1 both in 
theory and in prac ti ce . This opposition was due, in 
part , to the particular state of Russian political and 
econo~ic growth . As the Russians became av;are of the 
reformist nature of the actions of their international 
comrades, they became critical of the activities of the 
Second International . D1 their response to the outbreak 
of \lorld War I the Russians did not differ too greatly 
fro1 other 3ocialists , but as the Russian socialist move -
ment became increasin gly douinated by the Bolsheviks, 
who stood clearly apart from the leaders of the Inter-
national on the issue of the war , the independence of 
the Russians became apparent . r.rhese observations sug-
gest that whenever the main stream of thought and action 
in the Second International ran counter to the basic in-
terests and attitudes of Russian socialism, the Russians 
assumed a position independent of that raain stream . This 
independence explains, in part , the relative w1.importance 
of the Russians as a Group in the Second International . 
It also suggests what the nature of the relationship of 
:-?.ussian socialism to the international socialist movement 
would be in the years followin g the Second International . 
lv ...ost Russian Socialists divorced themselves from any 
effort to revive the 3econd L~ternational and supported 
the Bolshevik- domina ted Third International which \Vas 
not a represen t e ti ve of int,_rnatiorwl soc ia.l isn but e:.n 
instrument ond r)ro t e;ctor of :::luss ie_n comrnunism. 
241 
In the Second International the :-:.us s ian perticipc:J". ts 
s.ssruned t heir 111ost ective roJe in the o·oer discussions of 
the congresses and m.eetincs only Hhen the issures Jirectly 
n.ffec ted them or vere irreJ evm't to conditions in ~ .ussia . 
It is impossible to rank the contribution of the Hussie:.ns 
c.s & nc.;.tionsl group , because c..side from the Ger:.ncms and 
tte Frerch , the i~Jortrnt roles in the 0econd Intbrnhtional 
were played by individuals . 
'l1he primc:,ry aources used in this study ir_cl ude the 
bVailable docu:Jercts c:nd records of the ;:.,e c ond InternE..tional. 
This means primc.rily the records of the con~rLsses of the 
I nternbtionel , direc t reports of the sctivitie s of the ~econd 
Interne.tion£.1 u.nd its pe:r ticipan ts , and the pertinent rL.emoirs 
o-" its le<:<ding fisures . The rE-Jcords o:f the Internationc:..l 
Socialist Bureau have been lost . Valuable second~ry 0ources 
\Jere the si~ni~icrnt studies of international socic.;.lism , the 
uec ond Ir_ ter:r.H tionE<l, c..nd the l~ussic.1.n revol utione:.ry l!LOVeL:ten t . 
Virtuully c...ll relevant mater ial is e..va.ilB_ble in the libr(_ries 
of the United Gtates . 
